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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
There is ongoing debate both within Australia and internationally 
about the ways in which patents impact on the medical biotechnology 
industry. The underlying purpose of the patent system is to encourage 
innovation by granting the patent holder a temporary monopoly over 
the patented invention. However, patents can also have a detrimental 
effect on innovation, for example, by stifling the free flow of 
information or increasing transaction costs. Gene patents and broadly 
applicable research tool patents are of particular concern for two 
main reasons. First, if individual patents are licensed on a restrictive 
basis, access to broadly applicable foundational technology could be 
blocked, impeding downstream research and development. Secondly, 
if it is necessary to enter into licence negotiations over multiple 
patents, the pace of innovation could be delayed, creating what has 
become known as an anticommons.  
 
Although there is a large body of theoretical literature on this topic, 
the empirical literature is only small (but growing). To date, this 
empirical literature suggests that practical means are being found to 
work around the negative aspects of patenting in the medical 
biotechnology industry. In particular, broadly applicable research 
tools tend to be widely licensed. However, there is some evidence 
that gene patents are having a negative impact in the diagnostics 
sector of the industry in the United States.  
 
This study was conducted in order to assess the impact of patents on 
innovation in the Australian medical biotechnology industry. Surveys 
were mailed to three industry sectors: research institutions, public 
and private biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, and 
diagnostic facilities. Forty semi-structured interviews were 
undertaken with participants in all of these sectors. 
 
A summary of the key findings that emerge from the study is 
presented below. 
 
• Research base 
Australian research institutions provide a sound research base 
for the medical biotechnology industry in Australia. 
• Patent system 
Although the Australian patent system is operating 
satisfactorily and is consistent with other jurisdictions, there is 
 xi 
little doubt that better funding of the Australian Patent Office 
would assist in improving examination standards. It may also 
be desirable to explore avenues for encouraging challenges to 
questionable patents. 
• Patent enforcement 
To date, it appears that the Australian industry has not been 
exposed to the same level of aggressive enforcement of key 
research tool patents as in the United States. However, there is 
no guarantee that this situation will continue. 
• Technology transfer  
In general, the outward transfer of technology is difficult for 
all industry sectors. However, industry participants are putting 
in place arrangements to better manage and exploit their 
technology. In particular, research institutions are improving 
their intellectual property management strategies. 
• Research institutions 
Australian research institutions are facing a number of 
challenges in the evolving commercial environment in which 
they have to operate. One of the key issues is the extent to 
which research conducted in these institutions is immune from 
patent infringement. The desirability of an express research 
exemption in Australian patent law is an important issue 
canvassed in this Report, although uncertainty about the 
breadth of protection may persist. 
• Restrictions on access 
There is evidence of exclusionary practices within the 
Australian industry. Some degree of exclusion is to be 
expected, particularly when this relates to patents over 
competing technology, given that this is the nature of a patent 
grant. However, these practices may be of more concern when 
they relate to patents over technology that is useful for a range 
of research uses that may be competing or non-competing. 
Our findings suggest that instances of such practices are more 
isolated. The question, then, is whether law reform is 
necessary. We endorse the findings of other studies, that open 
science should be vigilantly protected although not at the 
expense of failing to adequately reward innovation. 
• Anticommons  
In general the Australian industry seems to be avoiding an 
anticommons situation, but the potential still exists for its 
emergence. Ongoing increases in the number of patents, more 
vigilant enforcement and the increasing complexity of 
 xii 
research paths may result in the development of an 
anticommons. 
• Diagnostic testing  
Although the diagnostic testing sector of the Australian 
industry has not been exposed to patent enforcement to the 
same extent as the United States industry, the possibility of 
more rigorous enforcement practices is ever present.  
 
One of the main conclusions of this Report is that at present the 
medical biotechnology industry is enjoying the advantages that the 
patent system offers in encouraging innovation. This does not 
necessarily mean that the patent system is working perfectly, and 
consideration of changes to further increase its benefits is warranted. 
It must be emphasised that a delicate balance exists between the 
multiple stakeholder interests within the industry, and any 
consideration of law reform should be investigated thoroughly. 
Whilst it is recognised that the Australian Patent Office should only 
grant good quality patents with clear industrial applicability, it is 
concluded that major reforms to the criteria for patent grant are not 
warranted. This does not preclude consideration of some 
modifications to existing patent law in order to fine-tune the 
processes for assessing patent validity, defences and infringement. 
Further, options to better regulate the use of patents could also be 
examined. These options include modification to existing compulsory 
licensing and government use provisions, the creation of a statutory 
licensing regime and use of clearing house mechanisms, and further 
consideration of the role of competition law. 
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PART 1: CONTEXTUALISING THE 
ISSUES 
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CONTEXT CHAPTER 1: AIMS OF 
THIS STUDY 
 
To date, there has been little or no analysis of the impact of patents 
and technology transfer on the commercial success of the Australian 
biotechnology industry, on the capacity of Australian research 
institutions to continue with their world-class research and on 
consumer access to the products of biotechnology research, 
particularly health care products. The challenge is whether the 
current legal and administrative arrangements are satisfactory, and if 
not, the extent to which they will need to be reformed. 
  
A number of government-sponsored reports have provided overviews 
of the state of the biotechnology industry in Australia. For example, 
Ernst & Young have published a series of reports, in which they 
undertook an overview of the biotechnology industry in Australia and 
other jurisdictions primarily on the basis of survey evidence.1 
However, to date no study has attempted to comprehensively map the 
framework of the industry in Australia focusing on patents and 
technology transfer and how this affects the performance of the 
industry. The aim of this study is to fill this gap for the Australian 
industry. Three industry sectors are considered: 
 
• the research sector, including universities, government 
research laboratories, public and private research institutes 
and hospitals, which we refer to collectively as research 
institutions hereafter; 
• biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies across the full 
spectrum, from upstream spin offs from research institutions 
through to downstream subsidiaries of multinational 
pharmaceutical companies. We use the terms “upstream” and 
“downstream” throughout this Report to describe the two 
ends of the continuum from basic research findings (gene 
sequences and the like) through to marketable products 
(drugs, therapies, diagnostics and so on); and  
                                                 
1 See for example, Ernst and Young, Beyond Borders: the Global Biotechnology 
Report 2003, (Cleveland: Ernst & Young LLP 2003) (hereafter Ernst & Young 
2003); Ernst & Young, Australian Biotechnology Report (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2001) (hereafter Ernst & Young 2001); Ernst & Young, Australian 
Biotechnology Report (Canberra: AGPS, 1999) (hereafter Ernst & Young 1999). 
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• diagnostic facilities offering clinical genetic testing and, in 
some instances, undertaking diagnostic research. 
 
The complex relationship between patenting, commercialisation of 
biomedical research and access to new healthcare products is 
increasingly being debated both nationally and internationally. In 
addition, the expertise of members of the Centre for Law and 
Genetics lies primarily in the area of medical law and ethics and to 
date the research work conducted within the Centre has been focused 
primarily in these areas. For these reasons, the study reported herein 
focuses primarily on the Australian medical biotechnology industry, 
although some data are included from other sectors of the industry 
for comparative purposes. 
 
Some key areas of inquiry in this study are as follows: 
 
• the nature of the research that is being undertaken by the 
Australian medical biotechnology industry and the patent 
activity associated with it; 
• whether the Australian industry has the capacity to 
commercialise its own technology, or has to transfer this 
technology for others to commercialise; 
• the extent of collaborations, assignments and licensing-out of 
patents held by the Australian industry and the nature of the 
arrangements;  
• the general terms and conditions contained in licences entered 
into by the Australian industry for the purposes of 
commercialising research (licensing-out); 
• the extent to which the Australian industry needs to obtain 
authorisation from other patent holders in order to carry out 
its research and commercialisation, specifically focusing on 
the types of patents that are being enforced in Australia and 
the quantum of in-licensing; 
• the general terms and conditions contained in licences entered 
into by the Australian industry for the purposes of obtaining 
access to patents held by others;  
• the particular issues faced by the research institution, 
diagnostics and private industry sectors. 
 
This study aims to provide data from which an assessment can be 
made as to whether the Australian industry (both through patents 
themselves and through technology transfer arrangements) is 
operating as a branch office of the major overseas companies or is 
Aims 
________________________________________________________ 
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establishing itself as a specialised niche market. Three broad 
questions form the backdrop to this study: 
 
1.  is the development of the biotechnology industry in Australia 
assisted or impeded by biotechnology patents and patent 
licensing practices?  
2. does the social advantage of commercialisation of public sector 
research, particularly the increased availability of private sector 
funding, outweigh the social cost, particularly the impact on the 
traditional norms of science?  
3. does the social advantage of biotechnology patents, namely 
encouraging innovation and product development, outweigh the 
social cost of the patent monopoly, including the effect on 
product availability, pricing, diversity and quality. 
 
This foundational information will allow examination of fundamental 
regulatory questions about how Australian government policy on 
commercialisation of biotechnology can be implemented and how it 
can be balanced against other important social values. The results of 
this study are likely to provide assistance in examining the following 
regulatory issues:  
 
• the current interpretation of patent law requirements in the 
context of biotechnology and the extent to which 
biotechnology patents impact on research and development; 
• the current system of contractual assignment and licensing in 
Australia and the extent to which collaborations, assignments 
and licensing agreements create rights and obligations that 
extend beyond the strict confines of the statutory rights 
granted by patent law; 
• the relationship between intellectual property law and 
government regulation of the biotechnology industry; 
• the extent to which patent law shields research institutions 
and diagnostic facilities from the enforcement of patent 
rights; and 
• the balance between patent rights and access to health care. 
 6 
 
CONTEXT CHAPTER 2: 
BACKGROUND 
 
 
THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN THE 
AUSTRALIAN MEDICAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY 
 
Federal and state governments in Australia have expressed a strong 
commitment to the development of an indigenous biotechnology 
industry. For example, during the last few years the Federal 
Government has instructed a number of committees to examine the 
biotechnology industry in Australia with a view to formulating 
proposals to provide the necessary impetus to expand the industry. 
The reports raise a number of relevant considerations that the 
Government needs to take into account in determining its policy for 
development of the industry. These include such important factors as: 
 
• creating a seamless flow of knowledge and skills from the 
public sector to the private sector2 through the process of 
technology transfer and through university-industry research 
schemes; 
• ensuring appropriate management of Australian-owned 
intellectual property; 
• developing appropriate regulatory regimes to adequately 
safeguard human health and protect the environment but not 
to unnecessary impede the development of the industry; 
• ensuring that appropriate international instruments are in 
place to protect and support the Australian industry. 
 
The Federal Government’s vision for biotechnology has been stated 
as follows: 
 
Consistent with safeguarding human health and 
ensuring environment protection, that Australia 
                                                 
2  See, for example, Prime Minister’s Science, Engineering and Innovation Council, 
University-Industry Linked Research in Australia (1998), available at: 
 http://www.dest.gov.au/science/pmseic/documents/unind.pdf (accessed 18 
November 2003). 
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capture the benefits of biotechnology for the 
Australian community, industry and the environment.3 
 
One vital issue that the Government has not addressed in any great 
detail is that of barriers to entry. The biotechnology industry is an 
archetypal global industry with a global marketplace. If there are 
significant barriers to entry into the global marketplace for the 
Australian biotechnology industry then it will be difficult for it to 
achieve the goals set by government. One of the most significant 
barriers to entry for Australian companies is likely to be intellectual 
property. There are two perspectives to this issue: 
 
• if the Australian industry is unable to get access to essential 
research tools and products as a result of the exercise of 
intellectual property rights by other participants in the global 
industry, this will be a significant impediment to its entry into 
the market; and 
• if, at the same time, the Australian industry is unable to 
adequately protect and exploit its own intellectual property, 
then this too will be a significant impediment to its entry into 
the market.  
 
There is a further crucial consideration that needs to be taken into 
account, as intimated in the Federal Government’s vision for 
biotechnology: that the work conducted by this industry has the 
potential to affect human health and the environment. This potential 
can be viewed from both a positive and a negative perspective. Laws 
relating to intellectual property are not the most appropriate avenues 
for dealing with the negative impact of biotechnology on human 
health and the environment. This should largely be left to legislation 
and administrative procedures specifically set up for the task of 
assessing safety, efficacy and ethics. However, the availability of 
intellectual property rights does have an important bearing on the 
positive effects of biotechnology in relation to human health and the 
environment. Patent grants are generally justified on the utilitarian 
ground that they provide the necessary incentive to innovate and that 
innovation is good for society. The line of argument is that, if 
                                                 
3 Biotechnology Australia, Australian Biotechnology: A National Strategy, 
(Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2000) at p.7, available at:  
http://www.biotechnology.gov.au/library/content_library/BA_Biotech_strategy.pdf 
(accessed 18 November 2003). See also, Biotechnology Australia, Developing 
Australia’s Biotechnology Future, Discussion Paper, (Canberra: Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1999). 
Context Chapter 2 
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inventors can recover the costs put into research and development 
and earn rewards through product pricing and licence fees, they will 
be encouraged to take their inventions through to commercial 
production and to create further inventions.  
 
On this basis, the availability of patents for biotechnology inventions 
will encourage industry participants to make their inventions 
commercially available, and the availability of these new health care, 
agricultural and other products derived from biotechnology research 
is likely have a positive impact on human health and the 
environment. However, one of the difficulties in this area is that it is 
not clear how patents and technology transfer arrangements are 
actually operating in the biotechnology industry as a whole; whether 
they do indeed encourage innovation and the extent to which they 
have an effect on other socially desirable goals. Patents grant patent 
holders and their licensees a period of market exclusivity, which 
enables them to charge monopoly prices on the sale of their products 
for the life of the patent and prevent others from using the patented 
technology for the life of the patent. Although the justification for 
patents is that they enable innovations in biotechnology to be 
commercialised, they could, at the same time, be used to block others 
from innovating.4 Thus, it is necessary to consider whether patenting 
of genes and other biotechnology inventions does indeed achieve the 
goal of encouraging innovation. It is also necessary to consider 
whether, in achieving this goal, other public interests might be 
compromised, particularly the public interest in the process of 
scientific discovery and the public interest in access to new products 
developed using biotechnology.  
 
There is a growing recognition that the way in which patents are used 
could have a significant impact on the progress of biotechnology 
research and development and the availability of the products of this 
work. Perhaps these issues are best exemplified in the well known 
scenario surrounding the use of United States patent 5,753,441 which 
was filed on 5 January 1996, granted on 19 May 1998 and assigned 
to Myriad Genetics Inc. The patent is entitled “170-linked breast and 
ovarian cancer susceptibility gene”.  
 
                                                 
4 For further discussion on this issue see D. Nicol and J. Nielsen, ‘The Australian 
Medical Biotechnology Industry and Access to Intellectual Property: Issues for 
Patent Law Development’ (2001) 23 Sydney Law Review 347 (hereafter Nicol and 
Nielsen). 
Background 
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Similar patents have been granted to Myriad in Australia, for 
example patent AU691958, which is entitled “17q-linked breast and 
ovarian cancer susceptibility gene”. What Myriad has obtained, 
through these and other patents, is broad claims over mutant BRCA 1 
gene sequences and their use in diagnosis and prognosis of breast, 
ovarian and other cancers, therapies and drugs. The patents include 
claims to a whole range of methods for identifying, screening and 
detecting mutant sequences, nucleic acid probes hybridizable to the 
gene sequences, cloning vectors, expression systems, recombinant 
host cells, and so on. Myriad has been actively enforcing its patent 
rights against public and private sector researchers and against 
laboratories offering BRCA tests in a number of countries. For 
example, in 2001 it sent enforcement notices (often referred to as 
“cease and desist” letters) to provincial health service providers in 
Canada, requiring that all samples were sent to Myriad’s own 
laboratories in Utah for testing.5 It has also been reported that Myriad 
has licensed its BRCA patents to academic institutions. The reported 
terms of the licences allowed academic researchers to conduct tests 
provided no fee was charged and no direct clinical use was made of 
the tests.6 This meant that participants could not be informed of their 
test results. There is a large body of academic and media commentary 
that is critical of these actions by Myriad. The general line of 
argument is that this type of action is taking the patent monopoly too 
far, to the detriment of other socially important values. If this is 
indeed the case, it is important to know the extent to which other 
patent holders are engaging in similar behaviour.  
 
Actions by Myriad in relation to the BRCA patents have recently 
been the subject of some commentary, both academically and in the 
media, in Australia.7 One of the reasons for this was the 
                                                 
5 See, for example, L. Macdonald, Gene Patenting: Is It Too Late To Stop It? 
Canadian Breast Cancer Network, 24 April 2002, available at: 
http://www.cbcn.ca/english/adv_db.php?show&43 (accessed 12 January 2003) 
(hereafter Macdonald). 
6 ‘Corporate Takeover’ The Boston Globe Magazine, 30 June 2002, available at: 
http://www.boston.com/globe/magazine/2002/0224_patent_part2 (accessed 1 July 
2002). 
7 For example, I.R. Walpole, H.J.S. Dawkins, P.D. Sinden and P.C. O’Leary, 
‘Human Gene Patents: The Possible Impacts on Genetic Service Providers’ (2003) 
179 Medical Journal of Australia 203-205; D. Nicol, ‘Human Gene Patents: Under 
Whose Control?’ (2003) 179 Medical Journal of Australia 181-182; see also 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) Four Corners, ‘Patently a Problem’ 
broadcast on 11 August 2003, transcript available at  
http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/transcripts/3922059.htm (accessed 12 
August 2003) (hereafter ABC Four Corners). 
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announcement on 28 October 2002 of a strategic alliance between 
Myriad and Genetic Technologies, Ltd (GTG), a Melbourne based 
company, involving the BRCA tests.8 This announcement has 
heightened concerns about the potential impact of enforcement of 
broad gene patents and other related types of patents by foreign 
companies like Myriad on the Australian biotechnology industry.  
 
Interestingly, GTG has also been actively enforcing its own patents 
over the last year or so both within Australia and in other countries. 
GTG owns a number of patents relating to intron sequence analysis 
(the so-called junk DNA patents) and others relating to fetal cell 
recovery, details of which are presented below: 
 
 
 Junk DNA patents  
 
1. Intron sequence analysis method for detection of 
adjacent and remote locus alleles as haplotypes. 
Patent granted by USPTO in 1998 US5,612,179. 
Granted in Australia AU67519; 
2. Genomic mapping by direct haplotyping using 
intron sequence analysis. Patent granted by 
USPTO in 1998 US5,851,762. Granted in 
Australia AU647806; 
3. Intron sequence analysis method for detection of 
adjacent and remote locus alleles as haplotypes. 
Patent granted by USPTO in 1993 US5,192,659. 
Granted in Australia AU654111 
 
Patent holder: Genetype AG (Genetic Technologies 
Ltd) 
 
 
 Fetal cell recovery patents  
 
1. Fetal cell recovery method. Patent granted by 
USPTO in 1995 US5,447,842. Granted in 
Australia AU649027 
                                                 
8 ‘Genetic Technologies and Myriad Genetics Announce Strategic Licensing 
Agreement’, Press Release, 28 October 2002, available at: 
http://www.gtg.com.au/Media.Coverage.html (accessed 8 December 2003). 
Background 
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2. Fetal cell recovery method. Patent application in 
Australia 200177352. 
 
 
The junk DNA patents are most relevant to current discussions. The 
two intron sequence analysis patents have the following abstract: 
 
The present invention provides a method for detection 
of at least one allele of a genetic locus and can be used 
to provide direct determination of the haplotype. The 
method comprises amplifying genomic DNA with a 
primer pair that spans an intron sequence and defines a 
DNA sequence in genetic linkage with an allele to be 
detected. The primer-defined DNA sequence contains 
a sufficient number of intron sequence nucleotides to 
characterize the allele. Genomic DNA is amplified to 
produce an amplified DNA sequence characteristic of 
the allele. The amplified DNA sequence is analyzed to 
detect the presence of a genetic variation in the 
amplified DNA sequence such as a change in the 
length of the sequence, gain or loss of a restriction site 
or substitution of a nucleotide. The variation is 
characteristic of the allele to be detected and can be 
used to detect remote alleles. Kits comprising one or 
more of the reagents used in the method are also 
described. 
 
Simplistically, what these junk DNA patents claim is a method of 
using non-coding regions of DNA to predict mutations in active 
coding regions.9 GTG has entered into a number of lucrative licensing 
arrangements relating to the use of these patents, mainly with United 
States based companies, but also in Australia, New Zealand and 
Europe.10 Perhaps more controversially, GTG has also announced a 
research licence with the University of Sydney,11 and Dr. Mervyn 
                                                 
9 For a good lay discussion of the issues associated with GTG’s patents, see ABC 
Four Corners, above n7. 
10 See generally announcements on the Genetic Technologies website at: 
http://www.gtg.com.au/Media.Coverage.html (accessed 8 December 2003). See 
particularly: ‘Presentation by Dr. Mervyn Jacobson, Executive Chairman, to the 
Annual General Meeting of Genetic Technologies Limited (“GTG”), Melbourne, 
November 28th, 2003’. 
11 ‘GTG Grants Research License to University of Sydney’, 25 July 2003, available 
at:  
http://www.gtg.com.au/Announcements.html#25jul (accessed 8 December 2003). 
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Jacobson, the chief executive officer, has intimated that the junk 
DNA patents are also being enforced against public diagnostic 
facilities.12 By enforcing its patent rights in this way, GTG will be 
able to grow and undertake further biotechnology research and 
development. To a certain extent, these are precisely the types of 
actions that the Federal Government is promoting. But at the same 
time the impact on other sectors of the Australian biotechnology 
industry also needs to be considered, particularly the research and 
diagnostics sectors. If licence fees are too high or if licence terms are 
too restrictive this may have a detrimental effect on the capacity of 
Australian research institutions to carry out their research programs 
and on the capacity of diagnostic facilities to continue to offer 
diagnostic tests.  
 
The GTG example provides a snapshot of the complex issues 
involved in finding the right balance in protecting the rights of both 
the holders and the users of patented technology. It is only when we 
have an understanding of how the industry is operating and the true 
extent of the social benefits and costs associated with patent system as 
it currently exists that we can assess whether the existing balance is 
appropriate. It is only then that we can fully evaluate the need for law 
reform and the most appropriate ways for reforming the law.   
 
 
MEDICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH 
IN AUSTRALIA 
 
In 1999 a major review of health and medical research in Australia 
was completed and published as The Virtuous Cycle - Working 
Together for Health and Medical Research (hereafter referred to as 
the Wills Review, after the Chair of the review committee, Mr Peter 
Wills).13 The Wills Review recognised Australia’s proud tradition in 
health and medical research, citing figures that indicate that our 
research output is far in excess of what would be expected for the size 
of the Australian population. The Review pointed to the fact that 
increasing costs of health care will put extreme pressures on the 
economy in future and the important role of research in “determining 
the most cost effective and equitable approaches to both prevention 
                                                 
12 See ABC Four Corners, above n7. 
13 Commonwealth of Australia, The Virtuous Cycle-Working Together for Health 
and Medical Research, Health and Medical Strategic Review, (Canberra: Australian 
Government Printing Service, 1999) (hereafter the Wills Review). 
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and treatment”.14  Particular emphasis was given to the need to take 
advantage of advances in biotechnology (“the industry of the 21st 
century”) to improve the health of the Australian population, to build 
the economy and to create valuable jobs.15 The review recognised that 
this window of opportunity would close given the pace of change 
unless Australia acts now.  
 
A mutually reinforcing set of actions by the research sector, industry 
and government, a Virtuous Cycle, was described in the Wills Review 
as forming the framework for the development of biotechnology in 
Australia, with the research sector being the driving force. The 
Review recognised that there is a need for reform in the research 
sector, particularly in relation to: 
 
• the scope, size and duration of research grants; 
• the management of research enterprises and of research itself;  
• the need for creation of better career opportunities in the 
research sector; and  
• the need for priority driven research.  
 
With regard to the company sector, the Review referred to the need to 
enhance technology transfer between research and industry and the 
need to stimulate flow of medium to long term venture capital. The 
Review also recognised the need for the government sector to 
increase and better manage its investment in health and medical 
research.  
 
One of the outcomes of the Wills Review has been an increase in 
funding by the Federal Government to the National Health and 
Medical Research Council (the NHMRC). In its May 1999 budget the 
Government announced additional funding to the NHMRC of 
AU$614 million over six years, together with other specific grants.16 
Since then, other substantial public funding commitments have been 
made in this area of research. For example, Australian stem cell 
research efforts were boosted by the establishment of a National Stem 
Cell Centre in May 2003, and the award of AU$46.5 million over five 
                                                 
14 Ibid at 1. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Listed in Prime Minister’s Science, Engineering and Innovation Council Third 
Meeting Background Paper, Innovation in Medical Biotechnology (1999) at 3, 
available at: 
http://www.dest.gov.au/science/pmseic/meetings/3rdmeeting.htm (accessed 3 June 
2003). 
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years through a joint funding arrangement between Biotechnology 
Australia and the Australian Research Council.17 The Centre is a 
collaborative arrangement between research institutions in Victoria, 
Queensland, New South Wales, South Australia and the Australian 
Capital Territory. 
 
At the same time there is deliberate government policy in Australia, 
as in many countries with active biotechnology research programs, to 
encourage collaborations between the public and private sectors. 
Examples of relevant incentives in Australia include the 
Biotechnology Innovation Fund, the Innovation Investment Fund, 
Research and Development start up programs and Research and 
Development tax concessions.18 These incentives are part of a more 
general plan by the Federal Government to encourage greater levels 
of collaboration between the public and private sectors. One of the 
ways that it is doing this is by funding Cooperative Research Centres 
(CRCs) in innovative areas of technology. There are a number of 
CRCs in the area of medical biotechnology research. 
 
These incentives serve the dual goals of providing further financial 
assistance to the upstream research effort and also providing a useful 
avenue for downstream transfer of technology. Traditionally, 
upstream research has been the province of the public sector and the 
private sector has focused more on the downstream application of that 
research. However, the merging of basic science and applied 
technology has been well documented, particularly in the area of 
biotechnology.19 The result, according to Rebecca Eisenberg and 
Richard Nelson, has been the formation of a significant private 
industry around pre-product development research.20 One of the key 
features of the research drive in the biomedical area is the 
                                                 
17 Details are available on the Australian Research Council’s website at  
http://www.arc.gov.au/grant_programs/centre_stem.htm (accessed 3 June 2003); 
also see 
http://backingaus.innovation.gov.au/research/bio_ce.htm (accessed 3 June 2003). 
18 For details of these incentives, see the Australian Law Reform Commission, 
Issues Paper 27 Gene Patenting and Human Health (2003) at 73-75, available at: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/issues/27/ (accessed 19 
November 2003) (hereafter ALRC). 
19 See particularly R. Eisenberg and R. Nelson, ‘Public vs. Proprietary Science: a 
Fruitful Tension?’ (2002) 77 Academic Medicine 1392; see also D. Chalmers and 
D. Nicol, ‘Commercialisation of Biotechnology: Public Trust and Research’ 
International Journal of Biotechnology, forthcoming. 
20 Eisenberg and Nelson, ibid. 
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development of partnerships and collaborations between the public 
and private sectors. 
 
The nature of biomedical research is that it is conducted on a 
cumulative basis: much basic research forms the foundation for later 
research and there are many steps between initial pioneering research 
and what consumers would consider to be end products. Different 
stakeholders conduct research at each stage of the research spectrum, 
developing products, methods or technologies that can be 
characterised as inputs into subsequent steps in the development of 
drugs, therapies, and diagnostic methods. The situation is complicated 
by the fact that patents are being granted on inventions at each stage 
of the development pipeline. Researchers developing more 
downstream products will require access to patents at the upstream 
end of the drug development continuum in order to conduct research 
and commercialise products. Access to many patents may be required 
in order to enable development of one product. Companies and 
researchers using these patents see them as being useful inputs into 
further research. However companies and researchers operating 
primarily upstream no doubt view the products they develop as 
valuable end products rather than research tools.21  
 
After conducting a study of the industry in Australia in 2002, Hopper 
and Thorburn noted that the growth of the industry in Australia has 
slowed somewhat.22 They did, however, report a marked increase in 
companies that could be categorized as upstream, and that engage in 
the business of supplying more downstream users with, for example, 
gene sequence data.23 This apparent shift in focus by the Australian 
industry may have the effect of bolstering the upstream segment of 
the industry, and this will necessarily entail an increasing reliance on 
patent protection in this industry sector. Participants in the Australian 
industry will need to ensure:  
 
                                                 
21 R.S. Eisenberg, ‘Bargaining Over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is 
This Market Failing or Emerging?’ in R.C. Dreyfuss, D.L. Zimmerman and H. First 
(eds.), Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the 
Knowledge Society, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), at 228-229 (hereafter 
Eisenberg 2001). 
22 K. Hopper and L. Thorburn, 2002 BioIndustry Review – Australia & New 
Zealand, (Canberra: Aoris Nova and Advance Consulting & Evaluation, 2002) 
(hereafter Hopper and Thorburn). 
23 Ibid at 11. 
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• that they obtain adequate intellectual property protection, 
particularly in the world’s major markets;24 and 
• that they make efforts to ensure that their intellectual property 
is marketable and adequately exploited.  
 
 
OTHER EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
 
This study was conducted in order to address a number of questions 
pertinent to the Australian medical biotechnology industry. A number 
of studies have been conducted in overseas jurisdictions in order to 
ascertain whether issues perceived to be a problem in the 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries are eventuating in 
practice. To date, no comprehensive study has been conducted in 
Australia examining these issues. Particular challenges facing the 
Australian industry make these issues relevant, and a number of other 
issues may confront the industry.25 We have identified these 
challenges as being: 
 
• the need for Australian companies to seek foreign investment 
and enter into alliance activity with international companies; 
and  
• the fact that most Australian patents falling into the 
biotechnology category are owned by foreign companies, 
necessitating the need for Australian companies to negotiate 
access deals with these companies.26  
 
The impact of gene patenting and licensing on the development of the 
Australian biotechnology industry has not yet been assessed, although 
there is now some recognition of the need for examination of these 
issues. During the course of conducting this study, the Australian Law 
Reform Commission announced that they had received a reference to 
inquire into Gene Patenting and Human Health in Australia.27 The 
inquiry is considering a range of important issues associated with 
patenting and licensing practices. 
 
Most recently, John Walsh, Ashish Arora and Wesley Cohen were 
commissioned by the United States National Academies of Sciences 
                                                 
24 Ibid at 30. 
25 See Nicol and Nielsen, above n4. 
26 Nicol and Nielsen, above n4 at 374. 
27 See generally, ALRC, above n18. 
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to research licensing breakdowns within the biomedical industry in 
the United States.28 Walsh, Arora and Cohen set out to investigate 
two related questions: first, whether there was any evidence of an 
anticommons effect within the industry and on academic research,29 
and secondly, whether there were any restrictions on access to patents 
over inventions or research tools that are foundational to future 
research.30 As Walsh, Arora and Cohen point out, these issues are real 
in a number of industries.31 
 
The methodology employed by Walsh, Arora and Cohen entailed 
interviewing respondents within various sectors of the industry. 
Seventy interviews were conducted with respondents from 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, universities, law firms, 
government and trade associations.32 Questions asked during 
interviews were aimed at exploring the issues outlined above.33 The 
questions also focused on how negotiations over intellectual property 
rights have changed over time, and strategies employed by 
researchers and companies to overcome any challenges brought about 
by intellectual property.34 
 
Some leading researchers on behalf of the Max Planck Institute for 
Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law, 
and the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research 
conducted a similar study.35 The authors conducted approximately 25 
interviews with a view to identifying trends and developments within 
the German biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries. A broad 
range of issues were canvassed, including the nature of collaborations 
                                                 
28 J. Walsh, A. Arora and W. Cohen ‘Effects of Research Tool Patenting and 
Licensing on Biomedical Innovation’ in W.M. Cohen and S.A. Merrill (eds.), 
Patents in the Knowledge-Based Economy (Washington: National Academies Press, 
2003) at 287, available at: 
http://books.nap.edu/books/0309086361/html/285.html#pagetop (accessed 3 
October 2003) (hereafter Walsh, Arora and Cohen); see also J.P. Walsh, A. Arora 
and W.M. Cohen, ‘Working Through the Patent Problem’, (2003) 299 Science 
1021. 
29 See Context Chapter 4 for an explanation of the anticommons doctrine. 
30 See Context Chapter 4. 
31 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28 at 7-8. 
32 Ibid at 8-9. See their Table 1 at 62 for a breakdown of the respondents by 
organisation and occupation. 
33 Ibid at 9. 
34 Ibid. 
35 J. Straus, H. Holzapfel and M. Lindenmeir, Empirical Survey on Genetic 
Invention and Patent Law, (Munich: 2002 ) copy on file with authors (hereafter 
Straus, Holzapfel and Lindenmeir). 
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within the industry, the availability of licensing, the effect of 
patenting on publication, infringement of genetic inventions, the 
quality of patent documents and the necessity for special protection 
for particular genetic inventions.36  
 
The United States National Institutes of Health also established a 
Working Group on Research Tools to investigate access issues 
encountered by NIH funded investigators, and to investigate possible 
responses to any issues that arose. Again, the inquiry was conducted 
through a series of interviews, and in 1998 the Working Group 
presented a Report detailing their findings and recommendations.37 At 
the same time they released a set of guidelines for the transfer of 
research tools within NIH funded research, acceptance of which has 
been somewhat guarded.38 The Working Group’s inquiry had limited 
scope in that it was restricted to issues associated with access to 
research tools in transactions involving NIH grantees. At the same 
time, they recognised the issues they canvassed had broader 
application which were beyond the charge of the Working Group. The 
Working Group interviewed bench scientists, university technology 
transfer professionals, and personnel from private companies.  
 
Concern over the patenting of gene sequences and other products of 
biological systems prompted the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) to hold a workshop investigating 
the impact of patenting and licensing practices on access to genetic 
technologies, with over 100 invited speakers and participants 
reviewing empirical evidence on these issues.39 The Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics also released a discussion paper on the ethics of 
patenting DNA after extensively consulting core stakeholders within 
the United Kingdom industry.40  
                                                 
36 A summary of the results is contained at I-II in Straus, Holzapfel and Lindenmeir, 
ibid. 
37 National Institutes of Health, Report of the National Institutes of Health Working 
Group on Research Tools (1998), available at:  
http://www.nih.gov./news/researchtools/index.htm  (accessed 3 October 2002) 
(hereafter NIH). 
38 National Institutes of Health (NIH), Basic Guidelines for the Transfer of 
Research Tools To and From Recipients of NIH Funds, Appendix A, NIH, ibid.  
39 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Genetic 
Inventions, Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing Practices: Evidence and 
Policies, (Berlin: OECD, 2002), available at:  
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/21/2491084.pdf (accessed 18 November 2003) 
(hereafter OECD). 
40 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Ethics of Patenting DNA: A Discussion 
Paper,  (London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics), available at:  
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Prior to that, the United States National Academies of Science held a 
workshop on intellectual property rights and the dissemination of 
research tools in molecular biology. The workshop heard from a 
variety of participants within the various sectors of the industry, and a 
summary of the workshop was subsequently collated and published.41 
Another study investigating the differences in levels of DNA 
patenting and licensing within the various industry sectors has also 
been conducted,42 while the effect of patents on the provision of 
clinical services was considered in a number of related studies.43 
 
This study was conducted with the particular challenges facing the 
Australian industry in mind. This Report will generally consider the 
issues raised in the studies outlined above. Our initial focus when 
commencing the study was an analysis of whether there is any 
evidence of restricted access to upstream patents having a consequent 
effect on downstream research in Australia, and whether there is any 
evidence of an “anticommons” within the Australian medical 
biotechnology industry. The focus of the study became broader as we 
became aware of specific issues facing the industry after collecting 
survey evidence. 
                                                                                                                  
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/patentingdna/index.asp (accessed 18 November 
2003) (hereafter Nuffield). 
41 National Research Council (NRC), Intellectual Property Rights and Research 
Tools in Molecular Biology (Washington DC: National Academy of Sciences, 
1997) (hereafter NRC). 
42 M.R. Henry, M.K. Cho, M.A. Weaver and J.F. Merz, ‘DNA Patenting and 
Licensing’ (2002) 297 Science 1279 (hereafter Henry and others). Some empirical 
evidence has also been collected in other studies. For example, the authors of a 
study considering the effect of Canadian agricultural biotechnology patent policy on 
the enhancement of social welfare, conducted a survey of research institutions in 
Canada, the US and Australia; see D. Dierker and P. Phillips, ‘The Search For the 
Holy Grail? Maximising Social Welfare Under Canadian Biotechnology Patent 
Policy’ (2003) 6 IP Strategy Today. 
43 J.F. Merz, D.G. Kriss, D.D.G. Leonard and M.K. Cho, ‘Diagnostic Testing Fails 
the Test’ (2002) 415 Nature 577 (hereafter Merz and others). See also M.K. Cho 
and J.F. Merz, ‘Letter to Nature’ (1997) 390 Nature 221; M. Cho, ‘Impact of 
Patents on Provision of Clinical Genetic Testing Services’ (2002) Paper Presented 
at OECD Workshop on Genetic Inventions, Intellectual Property Rights and 
Licensing Practices, January 24, 2002, Berlin. 
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CONTEXT CHAPTER 3: 
PATENTING OF 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INVENTIONS 
IN AUSTRALIA  
 
Australia, like any other member of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) is obliged to make patents available for all inventions in all 
fields of technology, provided that they fulfil the requirements of 
novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability (the invention 
requirements), as provided in Article 27 of the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS).44 Article 29 of 
TRIPS further states that members must require that the invention be 
fully described, including the best method of performing it (the 
disclosure requirements). Slight modifications were made to 
Australian patent law through the Patents (World Trade Organisation 
Amendments) Act 1994 (Cth) to achieve TRIPS compliance. Despite 
these prescriptions in TRIPS, there is considerable variability between 
countries both in the substantive law relating to the patentability of 
biotechnology inventions and in the procedural law prescribing the 
mechanisms for obtaining and maintaining patents. The key features 
of Australian patent law are discussed briefly below to assist those 
readers who are unfamiliar with these issues. 
 
 
PATENTABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
 
The requirements for obtaining Australian patent are provided for in 
section 18(1) (the invention requirements) and section 40 (the 
disclosure requirements) of the Australian Patents Act 1990 (Cth).  
 
  
                                                 
44 In full, the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Annex 1C in the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, (1994) 33 ILM 81.  
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 Section 18 Patentable inventions    
    
Patentable inventions for the purposes of a standard 
patent:45 
 
(1) Subject to subsection (2),46 an invention is a 
patentable invention for the purposes of a standard 
patent if the invention, so far as claimed in any claim: 
(a) is a manner of manufacture within the 
meaning of section 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies; and 
(b) when compared with the prior art base as it 
existed before the priority date of that claim: 
(i) is novel; and 
(ii) involves an inventive step; and 
(c) is useful; and 
(d) was not secretly used in the patent area 
before the priority date of that claim by, or on 
behalf of, or with the authority of, the patentee 
or nominated person or the patentee’s or 
nominated person’s predecessor in title to the 
invention. 
 
 
 Section 40 Specifications  
 
(1) A provisional specification must describe the 
invention. 
(2) A complete specification must: 
(a) describe the invention fully, including the 
best method known to the applicant of 
performing the invention; and 
(b) where it relates to an application for a 
standard patent—end with a claim or claims 
defining the invention; and 
(c) where it relates to an application for an 
innovation patent—end with at least one and no 
more than 5 claims. 
                                                 
45 The requirements for innovation patents, new type of patents which have a lower 
inventive threshold and shorter duration, are provided for in section 18(1A). 
46 Subsection (2) provides that human beings, and the biological processes for their 
generation, are not patentable inventions. 
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(3) The claim or claims must be clear and succinct and 
fairly based on the matter described in the 
specification. 
(4) The claim or claims must relate to one invention 
only. 
 
The key features of these requirements are summarised below. 
 
The invention requirement: manner of manufacture and 
exclusions from patenting 
 
Australian patent law still uses the same language of ‘manner of 
manufacture’ as used in early English patent legislation: section 6 of 
the Statute of Monopolies 1623. Despite its antiquity, recent reports 
considering reform of Australian patent law recognise that this 
requirement has served its purpose well and should remain as the 
touchstone of patentability.47 The seminal case in interpreting this 
requirement is National Research and Development Corporation v 
Commissioner for Patents (NRDC).48 In that case, the High Court set 
down the key considerations that were required to be satisfied: the 
claimed invention must belong to the useful rather than the fine arts; 
it must provide a material advantage; and its value to the country 
must be in the field of economic endeavour.49  
 
The case law interpreting the manner of manufacture test recognises 
a range of exceptions for material that is considered to be 
unpatentable because it fails to satisfy this test. The two most 
relevant exclusions are discussed below. 
 
Discoveries/ products of nature  
Traditionally, mere discoveries have not been patentable because of 
the requirement that knowledge and ingenuity are used to produce a 
new and useful thing.50 Discoveries are neither new nor useful, first, 
because they are already in existence, and secondly, because they do 
not have the requisite applicability. In the NRDC case, the High Court 
                                                 
47 Industrial Property Advisory Committee, Patents, Innovation and Competition in 
Australia (Canberra: AGPS, 1984). Intellectual Property and Competition Review 
Committee Review of Intellectual Property Legislation under the Competition 
Principles Agreement Final Report (Canberra: AGPS, 2000) (hereafter IPCRC). 
48 National Research and Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents 
(1959) 102 CLR 252 (hereafter NRDC). 
49 Ibid at 275. 
50 See, for example, Lane-Fox v Kensington & Knightsbridge Electric Lighting Co 
Ltd [1892] RPC 413. 
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explicitly recognised the difficulty in distinguishing between 
discoveries and inventions.51 Products of nature have been considered 
to be one of the traditional exclusions from patenting on the basis that 
products of nature are already in existence and generally do not have 
the requisite industrial applicability.  
 
The ground breaking United States case of Diamond v Chakrabarty,52 
allowing a patent for a modified bacterium, decided by the United 
States Supreme Court in 1980, laid the foundation for a growing body 
of case law and patent office decisions supporting the view that 
biological material is patentable.53 The list includes both whole 
organisms – bacteria and viruses and genetically modified higher 
organisms – and their components: genes, proteins, cell lines, and so 
on. Provided they are isolated and synthetically reproduced, they are 
classified as inventions, not discoveries. The European Biotechnology 
Directive confirms that this interpretation also applies in Europe. For 
example, Article 5.2 states that: 
 
An element isolated from the human body or otherwise 
produced by means of a technical process, including 
the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, may 
constitute a patentable invention, even if the structure 
of that element is identical to that of a natural element. 
 
On this basis, isolated and synthetically produced genes are 
patentable provided that they are novel, have an inventive step, and 
have some disclosed industrial applicability or utility. The Australian 
Patent Office similarly considers that patent protection is available 
for:  
 
The building blocks of living matter, such as DNA and 
genes (including human DNA and genes) which have 
for the first time been identified and copied from their 
                                                 
51 NRDC, above n48 at 264. 
52 206 USPQ 193 (1980). 
53 In Australia, Diamond v Chakrabarty was referred to with approval by the High 
Court in Grain Pool of Western Australia v The Commonwealth (2000) 46 IPR 515. 
See particularly paragraphs 46 and 47 of the majority judgment and paragraph 134 
of Justice Kirby’s judgment. Paragraphs 46 and 47 of the majority judgment could 
be read as referring only to the applicability of Chakrabarty in US law, or could be 
read more broadly, applying in Australian law as well. See M. Rimmer, ‘Franklin 
Barley: Patent Law and Plant Breeders’ Rights’ (2003) 10(4) Murdoch Electronic 
Law Journal available at: 
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw (forthcoming). 
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natural source and then manufactured synthetically as 
unique materials with a definite industrial use.54 
 
One of the interesting features of the situation in Australia is that 
despite a large body of case law interpreting patent legislation 
generally and despite a growing body of jurisprudence in other 
countries on the application of patent legislation specifically dealing 
with biotechnology inventions, there is a dearth of biotechnology-
related case law here. There has been one major Federal Court case, 
Genetics Institute v Kirin Amgen,55 the primary focus of which was 
on the interpretation of the description requirements in section 40. 
There have been a number of relevant decisions by the Commissioner 
of Patents,56 but the absence of judicial guidance in this area is 
problematic. 
 
Methods of treatment of humans and animals 
Article 27(3)(a) of the TRIPS Agreement expressly allows for the 
exclusion of diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods of treating 
humans and animals. Methods of human treatment have been 
described as unpatentable in a number of Australian cases, including 
NRDC.57 However, this exclusion was not expressly incorporated into 
the 1990 Patents Act and consequently its ongoing existence in 
modern Australian patent law has been subject to some debate. The 
matter was finally resolved in the case of Bristol Myers Squibb v FH 
Faulding & Co Ltd58 where the Full Court of the Federal Court 
unanimously decided that there is nothing inherently unpatentable 
about methods of treatment. Black CJ and Lehane J referred to two 
compelling considerations in support of this conclusion: 
 
                                                 
54 IP Australia, Australian Patents for: Microorganisms; Cell Lines; Hybridomas; 
Related Biological Materials and Their Use; and Genetically Manipulated 
Organisms (Canberra: AGPS, 1998), available at:  
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/patents/specific/biotech.pdf (accessed 20 
November 2003) (hereafter IP Australia) 
55 Genetics Institute Inc v Kirin Amgen Inc (No 3) (1998) 156 ALR 30. 
56 The Commissioner of Patents hears opposition proceedings, although the 
Commissioner’s decisions can be appealed to the Federal Court. See the helpful 
analysis of some of these decisions by C. Lawson and C. Pickering, ‘Patenting 
Genetic Materials – Failing to Reflect the Value of Variation in DNA, RNA and 
Amino Acids’ (2000) 11 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 69 (hereafter 
Lawson and Pickering). 
57 These cases are reviewed in D. Nicol, ‘Should Human Genes Be Patentable under 
Australian Law’ (1996) 3 Journal of Law and Medicine 231 at 239-241. 
58 Bristol Myers Squibb v FH Faulding & Co Ltd (2000) 46 IPR 553. 
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1. the ‘insurmountable problem, from a public policy viewpoint’ of 
distinguishing between methods and products involved in 
treatment of the human body; and 
2. the failure of Parliament to deal with this issue when it enacted 
the 1990 Act.59 
 
Statutory exclusions from patenting 
 
There are a very limited number of express exclusions from 
patenting in the Australian Patents Act. 
 
Human Beings and the Biological Processes for Their Generation  
Section 18(2) Patents Act 1990 states that human beings, and the 
biological processes for their generation, are not patentable 
inventions. This provision has some interesting history to it. In 1990 
during the parliamentary debate of the Patents Bill Senator Coulter 
sought to add an amendment to section 18 that would effectively 
have excluded gene patents, whether naturally produced or 
chemically synthesised, as well as genetically engineered organisms. 
The Coulter amendment was rejected by the Senate Standing 
Committee on Industry, Science and Technology and by the 
Opposition.60 In the second reading speech of the Patents Bill Mr. 
Prosser said that the amendment was too restrictive because it would 
prevent patenting of vaccines and antibiotics and would create a flow 
on effect of hindering research and development of new technology 
in the medical and pharmaceutical fields.61 
 
In the alternative, the present section 18(2) was introduced into the 
Patents Bill by Senator Harradine, and agreed to by both Houses. 
Senator Harradine stated his belief that the second half of this 
amendment would prevent patenting of techniques developed for 
cloning human embryos at the four cell stage, although Senator 
Coulter seemed to doubt that it would cover anything more than 
normal sexual reproduction. Reference to the possible patenting of 
humans in the first part of the amendment is generally considered to 
                                                 
59 Ibid at 558. 
60 Senate, Hansard Parliamentary Debates 20 September 1990, 2653; House of 
Representatives, Hansard Parliamentary Debates 16 October 1990, 2947. 
61 House of Representatives, Hansard Parliamentary Debates 16 October 1990, 
2947, at 2948. 
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be so contrary to fundamental norms that it goes without saying. This 
amendment therefore has limited effect.62 
 
Discretionary refusal to accept applications 
Section 51 of the Patents Act 1990 gives the Commissioner For 
Patents a number of discretionary grounds to refuse patents, 
including when the use of the invention would be contrary to law; for 
mere admixtures of known ingredients and where a claim includes 
the name of a person as the name, or part of the name, of the 
invention. 
 
Exclusion of plants and animals for the purposes of an innovation 
patent 
Section 18 (1A), (3) and (4) of the Patents Act 1990 excludes 
applications for innovation patents (but not for standard patents) for 
plants and animals and biological processes for the generation of 
plants and animals (but not microbiological processes). These 
exclusions are allowable under Article 27(3)(b) of TRIPS provided 
that there is plant protection under plant variety legislation, which is 
the case in Australia under the Plant Breeders Rights Act 1994 (Cth).  
 
Attempt to exclude genes and gene sequences 
Two attempts have been made to exclude gene sequences from 
patenting in Australia. The first was made by Senator Coulter 
discussed above. In June 1996 Senator Stott-Despoja of the 
Australian Democrats introduced an amendment to section 18 as a 
private member's bill. It would have added a new subsection to 
section 18 which would state that: 
 
The following are not to be regarded as possessing the 
quality of novelty or inventiveness for the purposes of 
this section: 
(a) naturally occurring genes; or 
(b) naturally occurring gene sequences; or 
                                                 
62 For a discussion of the applicability of this exclusion to stem cell technology see 
M. Rimmer, ‘The Attack of the Clones: Patent Law and Stem Cell Research’ (2003) 
10 Journal of Law and Medicine 488 (hereafter Rimmer, Clone paper). Note that, at 
the time of writing, a Bill that would similarly prohibit the issuance of patents on 
human organisms (providing for codification of existing United States Patent and 
Trademark Office practice) is being debated in the United States Senate. See J. 
Abrams ‘Lawmakers Weigh Human Organism Patent Ban’ Washington Post 26 
November 2003. Available at:  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A16205-2003Nov26 (accessed 8 
December 2003). 
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(c) descriptions of the base sequence of a naturally 
occurring gene or a naturally occurring gene sequence. 
 
In the second reading speech on 27th June 1996 Senator Stott-
Despoja commented on the need for urgent action, both in terms of 
public policy and also for fundamental philosophical and moral 
reasons.63 However, debate on the Bill was postponed and ultimately 
it lapsed. 
 
Statute of Monopolies exclusions 
Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies does not allow letters patents 
for manners of new manufacture that are: 
 
• contrary to law; or 
• mischievous to the state by raising prices or harming trade; or 
• generally inconvenient. 
 
The contrary to law exclusion is expressly incorporated as a 
discretionary consideration through section 51(1)(a). Furthermore, it 
would appear to be accepted by the judiciary that the 1990 Patents 
Act and its predecessor, the 1952 Act, import the whole of section 
6.64  
 
The general inconvenience exclusion has been used a number of 
times in Australia to deny patent claims for subject matter to which 
the public expect that they have free access.65 It could be argued that 
general inconvenience also allows for the introduction of ethical and 
public policy considerations into the patent process.66 However, to 
date the judiciary has been reluctant to employ this tool, preferring to 
leave controversial exclusions for Parliament to deal with. The 
question then is whether there are ever likely to be sufficiently clear 
                                                 
63 Senate, Hansard Parliamentary Debates 27 June 1996, 2332. 
64 See, for example, the first instance decision of Gummow J in Rescare Ltd v 
Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd  (1993) 25 IPR 119. 
65 Including purchased computers (Telefon A/B LM Ericssons Application [1975] 
FSR 49), lunch boxes (Clayton Furniture Ltd’s Application [1965] AOJP 2303) and 
picture frames (Boccari’s Application [1967] AOJP 1380). 
66 In Joos v Commissioner of Patents (1972) 126 CLR 611, for instance, Barwick 
CJ referred to the method of medical treatment exclusion being based on public 
policy using the Statute of Monopolies language of being generally inconvenient, 
and Gummow J confirmed that the question should be framed in this way in 
Rescare Ltd v Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd  (1993) 25 IPR 119. See also M. Forsyth 
‘Biotechnology, Patents and Public Policy: A Proposal for Reform in Australia’ 
(2000) 11 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 202. 
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social policy arguments for the courts to be willing to invoke the 
proviso. Perhaps the debate about gene sequence patents is the most 
obvious. 
 
The TRIPS agreement does allow for some consideration of social 
and moral issues. Article 27.2 provides that: 
 
Members may exclude from patentability inventions, 
the prevention within their territory of the commercial 
exploitation of which is necessary to protect 
ordre public or morality, including to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious 
prejudice to the environment, provided that such 
exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation 
is prohibited by their law.  
 
European case law and the European Biotechnology Directive gives 
some guidance as to how this provision might be interpreted. Article 
53(a) of the European Patent Convention and mirror State legislation 
provides for the “ordre public/morality” exclusion discussed above. 
The Relaxin67 case indicates that this exclusion will only be 
successfully invoked in rare and extreme cases. Relaxin involved a 
patent application by the Howard Florey Institute in Australia 
concerning molecular cloning and characterisation of a gene sequence 
coding for human relaxin. The Opposition Division pointed out that 
the function of this provision is to ensure that patents are not granted 
for inventions which would universally be regarded as outrageous. As 
such, the Article will only be invoked in rare and extreme cases. The 
Division referred to EPO Guidelines, which state: 
 
A fair test to apply is to consider whether it is probable 
that the public in general would regard the invention as 
so abhorrent that the grant of patent rights would be 
inconceivable. 
 
In this case it was held that a patent claiming a human gene sequence 
did not satisfy this requirement. 
 
The European Biotechnology Directive lists four types of 
technologies that this provision is intended to exclude: cloning of 
human beings, germline gene therapy and the like. Based on the 
                                                 
67 [1995] OJEPO 388. 
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Biotechnology Directive and the decided cases, the ordre 
public/morality provision in Europe is very limited in scope. 
Moreover, both the courts and patent offices have expressed 
reluctance to consider ethical or social policy issues on the basis that 
they have no particular expertise on these matters. 
 
The novelty and inventive step requirements  
 
Logically, patents are only available for new inventions. However, 
the mere fact that something was in existence prior to a patent being 
filed is not enough to destroy novelty. An enabling disclosure is 
required to destroy novelty. Australian patent law requires that 
challenges to novelty are made on the basis that prior art information 
disclosing all of the features of the invention has been made publicly 
available. Hence, the isolation and characterisation of a gene outside 
of its natural environment will make it novel because prior to this the 
gene sequence was not publicly available. 
 
Inventive step (or non-obviousness) requires an analysis of the prior 
art (what has gone on before in the field – including what is generally 
known and what is written). The question is whether the teachings 
from the prior art make the invention obvious to an ordinary person 
skilled in the field. Arguably, the techniques used to isolate and 
characterise genes are now so routine that very little inventive 
ingenuity is required to describe a new gene. In particular, the use of 
computer technology has dramatically improved the ease and speed of 
gene identification.  
 
In the United States, the inventive step requirement has been 
interpreted liberally. The focus is placed on the invention itself, not 
on the techniques for producing it. This means that the focus of 
inquiry for gene patents is whether the gene sequence is obvious, not 
whether the method used to obtain it was obvious to try. The United 
States courts have accepted that the redundancy of the genetic code 
means that until the claimed molecules are actually isolated and 
purified it would have been highly unlikely that a person skilled in the 
area could have contemplated what was obtained. In Europe, on the 
other hand, the focus is on whether the isolation of the gene was 
obvious. On this basis, in silico gene identification by computerised 
matching of unknown human gene sequences to homologous animal 
gene sequences would be obvious.68  
                                                 
68 See Nuffield, above n40 at 29-30.  
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Whilst the courts in Australia have not been given the opportunity to 
address this issue with respect to gene sequence patents, recent High 
Court authority suggests that the United States approach would be 
favoured in Australia. In the case of Aktiebolaget Hassel v 
Alphapharm the High Court rejected the notion that obviousness is 
determined by considering whether or not something is “obvious to 
try”, instead affirming that the relevant inquiry is whether the 
invention itself is obvious.69 
 
In 2001 a number of amendments to the Australian Patents Act 1990 
were passed by the Federal Parliament in the Patents Amendment Act 
2001 (Cth). These amendments affect both the novelty and inventive 
step requirements. It is now harder to establish novelty and inventive 
step because prior acts done anywhere in the world may be looked at, 
as well as documents published anywhere in the world (previous 
provisions required only that acts done in Australia were considered). 
Furthermore, in considering the inventive step requirement, it is 
possible to look at a combination of common general knowledge (the 
knowledge possessed by experts in the field) together with more than 
one piece of additional information (previous provisions restricted 
consideration to the common general knowledge and a single piece of 
information, with limited extensions for two or more related 
documents). However, in this regard, the novelty requirement remains 
the same as previously, that is, only single acts or documents can be 
looked at, with the same limited extensions as for inventive step. 
Finally, in examining a patent, the patent examiner must be satisfied 
on the balance of probabilities that the invention is novel and 
inventive (previously if the examiner was uncertain that these 
requirements were met he or she had to give the applicant the benefit 
of doubt). 
 
Subsequently, in 2002 an amendment was made to the Patent 
Regulations creating a grace period, allowing public disclosure of the 
invention by or with consent of the patent holder for a period of not 
more than 12 months before the filing date. A grace period also exists 
in the United States, which also allows publication by the patent 
holder up to 12 months prior to filing. However, not all countries 
have a grace period. Consequently IP Australia has cautioned against 
using the grace period as a general strategy, recommending that it 
should only be relied on where there is accidental disclosure. 
                                                 
69 Aktiebolaget Hassle v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2002-3) 56 IPR 129 para 41. 
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Whilst these amendments inevitably increase the hurdles in obtaining 
patents, they are unlikely to significantly impede the patenting of 
biotechnological inventions in any general way. 
 
The industrial applicability requirement 
 
Industrial applicability requires that the invention has some 
commercial value. In Australia, this requirement is in part dealt with 
through the manner of manufacture test in section 18(1)(a) of the 
Patents Act 1990.  
 
In the early 1990s, large number of patent applications were filed in 
the United States for fragments of gene sequences known as 
expressed sequence tags (ESTs).70 This led to a flurry of statements as 
to the patentability of partial sequences and sequences of unknown 
function. The common trend emerging around the world is that raw 
sequence data is not generally patentable because it fails to satisfy the 
industrial applicability requirement. In the United States, where 
industrial applicability is determined by the utility requirement, new 
utility guidelines require that patent applications demonstrate specific, 
substantial and credible utility of the claimed invention.71 This 
requirement will be met for gene sequence patents if the function of 
the sequence is disclosed. The European Biotechnology Directive72 
states that industrial applicability for gene patents requires the 
applicant to specify which protein or part of a protein is produced by 
the sequence or what function it performs. Similarly, as noted above, 
the Australian Patent Office considers that patentable subject matter 
includes DNA and genes “which have for the first time been 
identified and copied from their natural source and then manufactured 
synthetically as unique materials with a definite industrial use”.73 
However, there is no express requirement for specific, substantial and 
credible utility to be demonstrated by the applicant for a patent.  
 
                                                 
70 See, for example, R. Eisenberg, ‘Genes, Patents and Product Development’ 
(1992) 257 Science 903.  
71 See Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications (2001) 66 Federal 
Regulations (US) 1092; Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, 8th ed., Feb 2003 
revision (Washington, DC: United States Patent and Trademark Office, 2003); 
§2107, available at:  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.html (accessed 5 September 
2003) (hereafter US Examination Guidelines). 
72 Directive 98/44/EC On the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions. 
73 IP Australia, above n54. 
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In addition to the manner of manufacture requirement in Australia, 
there is a requirement that the invention is useful. However, this 
requirement is not assessed at examination. Usefulness in the sense 
used in the Australian legislation requires only that the invention does 
what it was intended to do, and the end in itself is useful. Commercial 
practicality or viability is not a necessary requirement, except that if a 
particular result is claimed, that result must be achievable.74 The 
issue, then, is not whether the invention is commercially viable, but 
whether the invention as claimed does or does not attain the result 
promised by the patent holder. 
 
In a recent review of Australian patent law it was recommended that 
the manner of manufacture test should be retained, but that the Patent 
Office should adopt the examination practice of requiring specific, 
substantial and credible utility.75 No action has been taken in response 
to this recommendation to date. 
 
The disclosure requirement 
 
When a patent has been claimed for a particular product or process, 
patent rights extend to cover any uses of the product, even when the 
new uses are themselves novel and inventive and are not disclosed in 
the patent. Such new uses may be the subject of new patent claims, 
but they are said to be dependent on the original patent, because they 
cannot be performed without using that patent. As such, where a 
patent is granted for a gene sequence, the patent holder gets broad 
rights to control all subsequent uses of that gene sequence. In addition 
to this, the claims made in a patent application often go beyond the 
actual invention. For example, patent claims may extend to a broad 
range of species and a broad range of products. We discuss the issues 
associated with broad claims over genes and other foundational 
patents in depth in this Report, particularly in Results Chapters 4 and 
5. 
 
In Australia, the breadth of patent claims for biotechnology 
inventions was considered in Genetics Institute v Kirin Amgen.76 The 
invention under consideration involved the use of recombinant DNA 
technology to produce commercial quantities of erythropoetin (EPO), 
an important and rare protein which plays a major role in regulating 
                                                 
74 Rehm v Websters Security Systems (1988) 11 IPR 289, at 305; Rescare Ltd v 
Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd (1993) 25 IPR 119, at 143. 
75 IPCRC above n47. 
76Above n55. 
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the rate of red blood cell formation. The main claim was for a purified 
and isolated polypeptide having the primary structural conformation 
and one or more of the biological properties of naturally occurring 
erythropoetin, unlimited by species or by specific structure. Heerey J 
held that the claim was permissibly wide because the gene sequence 
for EPO was a principle of general application and, therefore, it was 
acceptable for the claim to be made in correspondingly general terms. 
 
The Genetics Institute decision signals that as a general rule broad 
claims to gene sequences and their products may be accepted in 
Australia when the method of isolating the full gene sequence is 
disclosed. In the circumstances, the elucidation of the EPO sequence 
was a major breakthrough. However, because sequencing is now 
much more routine and requires very little in the way of inventive 
skill, granting broad patent rights may be too great a reward for such 
endeavours.  
 
In the United States, in contrast, there is much more reluctance by the 
judiciary to uphold broad patent claims.77 Furthermore, new written 
description and enablement guidelines impose similar restrictions on 
new claims.78 
 
Procedural matters 
 
There are two key procedural matters where Australian patent law 
coincides with European law but differs from United States law: 
 
The first to file rule 
In Australia and Europe the first person to file a patent for a particular 
invention has precedence, whereas in the United States the first to 
invent rule applies.  
 
Pre-grant opposition 
Section 59 of the Australian Patents Act 1990 enables a person to 
challenge the validity of a patent at any time during the three-month 
period after the patent has been accepted by the Patent Office. There 
is no provision for pre-grant opposition in United States patent law, 
although there is the option of bringing interference proceedings 
under section 135 of the United States patent legislation (35 U.S.C.). 
                                                 
77 See, for example, Regents of the University of California v Eli Lilly & Co (1997) 
119 F3d 1159. 
78 See US Examination Guidleines, above n71.  
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The function of interference proceedings is to determine priority 
based on the first to invent rule. 
 
Section 59 of the Australian Patents Act 1990 allows only limited 
grounds upon which a patent can be opposed. For example opposition 
based on the invention requirements in section 18(1) is limited to 
manner of manufacture, novelty and inventive step. There are broader 
grounds for post-grant challenges to patent validity (revocation) as 
provided in section 138. 
 
As noted in the ALRC Issues Paper, the pre-grant opposition 
procedure is seldom used (1.3 percent of accepted applications from 
1997 to 2002).79 Nevertheless, it has been made use of to challenge 
some important biotechnology patent applications.80 For example, the 
CSIRO has opposition proceedings on foot in relation to patent 
applications claiming rights over RNA interference technology (also 
known as gene silencing), including an application filed by the 
Queensland-based biotechnology company Benitec Australia Ltd 
(application 199929163).81 
 
 
USE OF PATENTS 
 
Patents, like any other forms of property, have intrinsic value in that 
they can be bought and sold. However, the real value of patents is that 
they give the patent holder a period (usually 20 years) during which 
time they have the exclusive right to make use of the invention that 
underlies the patent. In this regard, patents are often said to give the 
patent holder a temporary monopoly. 
  
The right of exploitation 
 
Patent legislation prescribes the rights of the patent holder. Section 13 
of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth), for example, provides that a patent 
gives the patent holder exclusive rights, during the term of the patent, 
to exploit the invention and to authorise another person to exploit the 
invention. The term “exploit” includes making, hiring, selling and 
                                                 
79 ALRC, above n18 at 114. 
80 See Lawson and Pickering, above n56. 
81 See ‘Benitec’s core patents’ available at:  
http://www.benitec.com.au/about/core_patents.htm (accessed 3 September 2003). 
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otherwise disposing of the invention.82 There are a few points that 
need to be made in relation to this definition. 
 
First, it is often said that a patent actually gives the patent holder a 
negative right: the right to prevent others from exploiting the 
invention. If another person makes use of the invention without the 
permission of the patent holder, the patent holder has the right to sue 
for infringement. In terms of liability, it is irrelevant whether or not 
the person alleged to be infringing knew about the patent, although 
lack of knowledge is relevant when the court determines whether or 
not damages should be awarded.83 As such, a patent does not give the 
patent holder the absolute positive right to exploit an invention. Other 
legal and regulatory requirements have to be complied with. For 
example, the exploitation of pharmaceutical patents requires 
compliance with all of the detailed safety and efficacy requirements 
of the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth). Hence, the right to exploit 
the invention is limited by other legal and regulatory requirements. 
 
Secondly, although s 13 states that the patent holder has the right to 
exploit the invention, in fact, the patent holder has the right to exploit 
what has been claimed in the patent. It is often the case that the claims 
made in the patent are much broader than the true scope of the 
invention. This is particularly the case for gene patents, where 
variants of the gene sequence, gene products, diagnostic tests, and 
therapies all might be claimed, when the true scope of the invention is 
merely the disclosure of the gene sequence. We will consider this 
issue again later. 
 
Thirdly, as previously mentioned, patent rights are like other property 
rights in that the patent holder is entitled to transfer ownership to any 
other person (assignment). They also enable the patent holder to give 
permission to another person to make use of those rights (licensing). 
There are various ways that patent rights can be licensed: 
 
• a sole licence means that the patent holder retains their right to 
exploit the invention and gives one other person equivalent 
rights; 
• an exclusive licence means that the patent holder hands over 
the right to exploit the invention to another person to the 
                                                 
82 The definition of ‘exploit’ is contained in Schedule 1 of the Patents Act 1990  
(Cth). 
83 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) section 123. 
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exclusion of all other people, including the patent holder. In 
this regard, the only differences from sale are that there is no 
formal transfer of registration and that the licence is generally 
for a fixed period; 
• a non-exclusive licence means that the patent holder gives to 
another person the right to exploit the invention, but this does 
not prevent the patent holder from exploiting the invention 
him or herself, or from licensing that right to others. 
 
Patent licences may be limited to certain aspects of the invention. 
They may also be limited in duration, geography, quantum, or in 
various other matters. Payment by the licensee may be in the form of 
a single lump sum, periodic payments, a series of milestone payments 
triggered by a particular event (for example, approval to market a 
product in a particular country) and/or a royalty fee per product sale 
or use. Licences are contractual arrangements and are regulated by 
common law contractual principles. The focus of contract law is on 
the rights and obligations of individuals. 
 
In analysing gene patents such as the BRCA patents, we have seen 
that claims are made to gene sequences, gene products, therapies, 
drugs and diagnostics. Patents that are cast in these terms effectively 
give the patent holder the exclusive right to control all downstream 
uses of the gene sequence, including commercial research and 
development of tests, therapies and drugs.  
 
Research exemption 
 
It is often said that the use of patented inventions in non-commercial 
research does not amount to infringement. However, the ambit of the 
so-called “research exemption” is far from clear.84 For example, there 
is no express provision for exemptions from infringement for acts 
done for non-commercial research purposes under existing Australian 
legislation or case law.  
 
In the United States, a case law defence of experimental exemption 
from liability is available against patent infringement. However, this 
exemption has been read very narrowly. For example, in Roche 
                                                 
84 For an excellent review of exemption from infringement for non-profit research 
see C. Nottenbaum, P.G. Pardey and B.D. Wright, ‘Accessing Other People’s 
Technology for Non-profit Research’ (2002) 43 Australian Journal of Agricultural 
and Resource Economics 3.  
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Products Inc v Bolar Pharmaceutical Co85 the court characterised the 
exemption as being “truly narrow”. Although there was some 
indication in subsequent cases of a willingness to extend its ambit,86 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently 
confirmed that the defence is very narrow and strictly limited.87 The 
Court followed a line of precedent limiting the defence to actions 
performed for “amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly 
philosophical inquiry.”88 This does not include use that is in any way 
commercial in nature or conduct that is “in keeping with the alleged 
infringer's legitimate business, regardless of commercial 
implications.”89 Consequently, a public research institution could not 
rely on the defence when a researcher uses a patented invention in a 
research project because it furthers that institution’s legitimate 
business objectives.90 
  
Exemption from infringement in Europe has a different basis. Patent 
legislation in a number of European countries provides express 
exemption from infringement for experimental purposes. In the 
United Kingdom, for example, section 60 of the Patents Act 1977 
provides in subsection 5 that: 
 
An act which, apart from this subsection, would 
constitute an infringement of a patent for an invention 
shall not do so if - 
 
(a) it is done privately and for purposes which are 
not commercial; 
(b) it is done for experimental purposes relating to 
the subject-matter of the invention; 
… 
 
The private use exemption has the same limitations as the United 
States case law exemption, being restricted to activities that have no 
possible commercial application. The experimental purpose 
exemption is, in one respect, potentially very broad in application, 
                                                 
85 733 F 2d 858 (1984). 
86 R. Eisenberg ‘Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use’ (1989) 56 University of Chicago Law Review 1017, 1018–19. 
87 Madey v Duke University, 307 F 3d 1351, 1360–1 (Fed Cir, 2002) (hereafter 
Madey). 
88 Ibid at 1362. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
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covering any experimentation on the invention (presumably including 
experimentation by commercial entities) as opposed to 
experimentation with the invention. In the other respect, however, it 
provides little comfort for non-commercial researchers who make use 
of the patented invention in their research. 91 
 
There is presently little indication that patent holders are generally 
enforcing their patent rights against academic researchers (the actions 
by Myriad and GTG discussed above in Context Chapter 2 being 
notable exceptions). If patent holders were to enforce their rights in 
any systematic way, much of the research conducted in the academic 
arena could at the very least become more expensive, through 
payment of licence fees, and more time consuming, because of the 
need for licence applications. At the worst, some research may 
actually be prevented if licensing were refused. For such reasons, 
there is some justification for an explicit research exemption in patent 
legislation to ensure that research having no commercial implications 
is not impeded.92 Difficulties will inevitably arise in setting the limits 
on the types of research that have no commercial implications. 
 
 
PATENT ACTIVITY IN AUSTRALIA 
 
There is little doubt that patent filing activity has increased 
dramatically in Australia, as it has in many other countries, over the 
last decade. We have previously reported on some key features of 
patent applications and grants in Australia from data supplied to us by 
IP Australia.93 The key data are extracted in the following summary. 
Up to 1998: 
 
• of the 5 000-11 000 patents granted each year in Australia, 
only around 10 percent originate in Australia. United States 
inventors dominate, holding over 45 percent of the patents 
granted in 1996; 
                                                 
91 For a useful summary of the case law interpreting these provisions see L. Bentley 
and B. Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 
2001) at 506-508. 
92 Following Madey, above n87, there has also been some support for the adoption 
of an express exclusion in United States patent law. See T. Saunders, ‘Renting 
Space on the Shoulders of Giants: Madey and the Future of the Experimental Use 
Doctrine’ (2003) 113 Yale Law Journal 261. 
93 Nicol and Nielsen, above n4 at 361-362. The authors thank Jodi Lawler and Rod 
Crawford from IP Australia for providing this data. 
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• of the 2 000 or so patent applications filed in the 
biotechnology category, only around two percent originate in 
Australia;94 
• in real terms the number of biotechnology patents filed by 
Australian residents increased from 26 in 1988 to 46 in 1998, 
showing that Australian biotechnology is in a growth phase.  
 
Further data provided in IP Australia’s annual reports indicates that 
the general rate of filing of patent applications continues to increase. 
Doubtless, the number of applications filed in the biotechnology 
category will have risen significantly over the last few years. 
However, it seems unlikely that the percentage originating in 
Australia will have changed dramatically. As such, it is probably fair 
to say that non-Australian companies and institutions hold most 
biotechnology patents granted in Australia.95 
 
A Report commissioned by the Australian Research Council (ARC) 
and the CSIRO indicates that the number of Australian invented 
patents filed in the United States closely matches the number of 
Australian invented patents filed in Australia.96 During the five-year 
period 1994-1998 there was a 249 percent increase in Australian 
invented biotechnology patents from the previous five-year period, 
further supporting the conclusion that Australian biotechnology is in a 
growth phase.97 However, the number of biotechnology patents 
originating in Australia pales into insignificance when compared with 
the number originating in the United States. In particular, a number of 
gene sequencing companies have flooded the USPTO with 
applications for gene patents. For example, Incyte reported that in 
2003 it has been granted 700 U.S. patents on gene transcripts and has 
pending patents on more than 27,000 other full-length human 
transcripts.98 
 
Aside from gene patents themselves, there has also been increasing 
patent activity in the area of research tool development. 
                                                 
94 Note that the biotechnology category includes both medical and agricultural 
biotechnology. It also includes gene patents. 
95 See Nicol and Nielsen above n4 at 361-362. 
96 CHI Research Inc, Inventing Our Future: The Link Between Australian Patenting 
and Basic Science (Canberra: AGPS, 2000), at 29. 
97 Ibid at 32. 
98 See Incyte, Intellectual Property, available at:  
http://www.incyte.com/control/researchproducts/licensing (accessed 5 September 
2003). 
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Biotechnology research tools are the technological developments that 
enable particular lines of biotechnology research to be pursued. The 
term “research tools” can be defined either narrowly or broadly. A 
narrow definition would limit research tools to those technologies that 
are traditionally understood to comprise methodologies employed in 
research laboratories for identifying potential drugs, such as receptors 
and drug targets.99 Notable examples are recombinant DNA 
technology, PCR taq polymerase, and genes and receptors. A broad 
definition would encompass virtually all upstream and intermediate 
technologies that primarily constitute inputs into further research and 
are not in themselves ‘end products’ in the sense of products that will 
be available to end consumers. As well as the ‘foundational’ tools that 
would be encompassed in a narrow definition, examples might 
include genomics databases, combinatorial libraries, clones and 
transgenic mice. 
 
Some of these research tools are more “foundational” than others. For 
example, taq polymerase is required for all DNA based research, and 
so limitations on the dissemination of this technology understandably 
attract considerable attention. Similarly, the technology claimed in the 
junk DNA patents mentioned in Context Chapter 2 is foundational to 
much modern genetics research, particularly research relating to the 
development of diagnostic tests. But agreeing upon commonalities in 
what constitutes a research tool is undoubtedly difficult.100 In writing 
this Report, we employed a fairly broad definition of research tools 
by classing any research input as a research tool. At the same time, 
we recognise that employing such a definition may be controversial in 
that virtually all of these research tools comprise important products 
of many research institutions and companies. It is not our intention to 
detract from this, but we are employing a definition that puts us in 
line with many of the other studies that have been conducted.101 
 
There is increasing debate in the United States about the 
consequences of granting patents that claim broad rights over 
foundational technological developments. The potential consequences 
are discussed in more detail below, and the question of their 
applicability within the Australian context is important to much of our 
further analysis. A number of key foundational patents have been 
identified as being particularly likely to impact on future 
                                                 
99 See OECD, above n39 at 50. 
100 See also NIH, above n37 at 4-5; Eisenberg (2001), above n21 at 229. 
101 See, for example, NIH, above n37 at 3-4; Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28; 
Cf Straus, Holzapfel and Lindenmeir, above n35 at I.   
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biotechnology research. We have already mentioned the junk DNA 
patents and the BRCA patents. As a first step in our analysis, we 
conducted searches for other foundational patents in the United States 
and Australia to determine their status in the Australian context. We 
selected these patents because they have been listed as being 
particularly problematic in a number of other reports.102 Surprisingly, 
we found that in most cases a patent had not been filed in Australia, 
or, where one had been filed it had not been granted. Notable 
exceptions include patents claiming taq polymerase and junk DNA, 
both of which have already been mentioned above. Details of the 
results of our searches are presented below.  
 
  
 Recombinant DNA technology  
 
Patent title: Biologically functional molecular chimeras 
Patents granted by United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) in 1980 US4,237,224 and in 1988 
US4,740,470 (now expired) 
Patent holder: Board of Trustees Stanford University 
 
Australian status: no record found 
 
Representing the most fundamental technology in 
molecular biology, recombinant DNA technology 
consists of one process patent for making molecular 
chimeras, and two product patents for proteins 
produced using recombinant DNA. This technology 
has no alternatives and is essential to all research in 
molecular biology.103 The patents were extremely 
broad but were widely licensed for low fees.  
 
 
 CCR5 receptor  
 
Patent title: Human G-Protein Chemokine Receptor 
HDGNR10  
Patent granted by USPTO in 2000 US6,025,154 
                                                 
102 See particularly Nuffield, above n40; Walsh, Arora and Cohen, ibid at 296-297 
and 305-314; OECD above n39 at 12-13. Further information was kindly provided 
by John Walsh, personal communication 2 September 2003. 
103 See further NRC, above n41 at 40-42. 
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Patent holder: Human Genome Sciences, Inc. 
 
Australian status: application number 199526632 
possibly lapsed. 
 
The CCR5 receptor is a chemokine receptor. Human 
Genome Sciences isolated the gene that codes for the 
receptor and filed a patent claiming rights over the 
gene and the CCR5 protein product. Although their 
claims over the protein product covered a viral 
receptor, they were unaware at the time the patent was 
filed that the HIV virus enters cells through the CCR5 
receptor. Subsequent research by the NIH revealed this 
to be the case.104 
 
 
 Human embryonic stem cell technology 
 
1. Patent title: Primate embryonic stem cells  
Patent granted by USPTO 2001 US6,200,806 
Includes in claim 9 a method for isolating pluripotent 
embryonic stem cells. 
2. Patent title: Hematopoietic differentiation of human 
pluripotent embryonic stem cells 
Patent granted by USPTO in 2001 US6,280,718 
Patent holder: Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation 
(WARF)  
 
Australian status: no record found in respect of these 
particular patents.  
 
Note some of the other patents owned by WARF: 
1. Title: Primate embryonic stem cells 
Patent granted by USPTO 1998 US5,843,780  
2. Title: Method of making embryoid bodies from 
primate embryonic stem cells 
Patent granted by USPTO in 2003US6,602,711 
 
Australian status of equivalent or related WARF 
applications:  
                                                 
104 See further Nuffield, above n40 at 41. 
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1. Primate embryonic stem cells: application number 
199647584;  
2. Primate embryonic stem cells with compatible 
histocompatibility genes: application number 
199938814; 
3. Method of making embryoid bodies from primate 
embryonic stem cells: application number 200138491. 
 
Human embryonic stem cells are an important tool in 
the development of therapeutics to treat disease. The 
cells can be developed into different tissue types. The 
central patent is for the isolation of human embryonic 
stem cells. Exclusive rights to develop the cells into a 
limited number of tissue types has been granted to 
Geron Corp, plus options for exclusive rights to 
develop the remaining tissue types. There has been a 
protracted licensing dispute between WARF and Geron 
Corp relating to this patent and other patents controlled 
by Geron Corp, particularly United States patent 
6,090,622 ‘Human pluripotent germ cells’.105 
 
Note that in Australia a number of patent applications 
have been filed by Geron Corp relating to pluripotent 
embryonic stem cells and one (AU751321) has been 
granted. 
 
 
 CD34 
 
Relevant patents: 
1. Title: Human stem cells  
Patent granted by USPTO 1987 US4,714,680 
2. Title: Human stem cells and monoclonal antibodies 
Patent granted by USPTO 1990 US4,965,204 
3. Title: Human stem cells and monoclonal antibodies 
Patent granted by USPTO 1991 US5,035,994  
4. Title: Human stem cells and monoclonal antibodies 
                                                 
105 The inventor was John Gearhart of Johns Hopkins University. See G. McGee 
and E. Banger ‘Ethical Issues in Patenting and Control of Stem Cell Research’ in 
Magnus, Caplan and McGee (eds), Who Owns Life? (New York: Prometheus, 2002) 
at 253; also discussed by Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28 at 308-309. See also 
Rimmer, Clone paper, above n62. 
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Patent granted by USPTO 1992 US5,130,144106 
Patent holder: Johns Hopkins University 
 
Australian status: no record found 
 
CD34 is an antigen found on stem cells, which are 
undifferentiated blood cells found in bone marrow. The 
United States patent was filed following the discovery 
of a particular antibody (My-10) that selectively binds 
to (and detects) CD34. All antibodies that bind to 
CD34 were claimed. The technology employing the 
binding of antibodies to CD34 was useful in the 
development of cancer therapies, specifically as an 
alternative to bone-marrow transplants. 
 
 
 Cox-2 
 
Patent title: Method of inhibiting prostaglandin 
synthesis in a human host 
Patent granted by USPTO in 2000 US6,048,850 
Patent holder: University of Rochester 
 
Australian status: no record found (note that other 
patents and patent applications relating to Cox-2 do 
exist). 
 
This patent claims broad rights over the Cox-2 enzyme, 
and any compounds developed to inhibit the enzyme. It 
now appears that compounds developed to inhibit the 
enzyme may have broad applicability – in addition to 
one of these compounds being useful as a pain 
medicine, it may also have some anti-cancer 
properties.107 
 
 
                                                 
106 P. Mikhail, ‘Hopkins v CellPro: An Illustration that Patenting and Exclusive 
Licensing of Fundamental Science is Not Always in the Public Interest’ (2000) 
Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 375 at 385. 
107 See Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28 at 297. See also their n16 outlining the 
results of unsuccessful infringement proceedings brought by the University of 
Rochester against Searle & Co Inc. 
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 NF-KB messenger protein 
 
Patent title: Nuclear factors associated with 
transcriptional regulation 
Patent granted by USPTO 2002 US6,410,516  
Patent holder: Harvard College, MIT, Whitehead 
Institute 
 
Australian status: no record found 
 
This is a broad patent covering methods for the 
treatment of diseases using the NF-KB messenger 
protein. NF-KB is widely known for its role in cell 
suicide. The patent has been exclusively licensed to 
Ariad Pharmaceuticals. 
 
 
 Method of screening 
 
Relevant patents 
1. Patent title: Method of screening for protein 
inhibitors and activators 
Patent granted by USPTO 1990 US4,980,281 
2. Patent title: Method of screening for protein 
inhibitors and activators 
Patent granted by USPTO 1993 US5,266,464  
3. Patent title: Method of screening for protein 
inhibitors and activators.  
Patent granted by USPTO 1999 US5,877,007 
Patent holder ICT Pharmaceuticals, Inc (now known as 
Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc) 
 
Australian status: application number 199064271 
possibly lapsed  
Note that there is a patent with the title: Method of 
screening for protein inhibitors and activators, granted 
in Australia AU612948 to Progenics Pharm, Inc. 
 
These patents are broadly applicable to methods used 
to screen substances for active compounds for potential 
use as pharmaceuticals. The patents have been the 
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subject of litigation in the United States.108 The 
implications of this litigation will be discussed in the 
Results Chapters. 
 
 
Cre-lox 
 
Patent title: Site specific recombination of DNA in 
eukaryotic cells. 
Patent granted by USPTO 1990 US4,959,317 
Patent holder: E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. 
 
Australian status: a related patent has been granted to 
DuPont. Title: Site specific recombination of DNA in 
plant cells, AU639059. 
 
This patent describes a method of using site specific 
recombination of DNA as a genetic engineering tool, 
particularly by inactivating known genes. After a 
number of years in which access to Cre-lox was 
restricted by DuPont, an agreement was signed 
between DuPont and the NIH in 1998 allowing non-
commercial research use without a licence. However, 
transfer of Cre-lox mice requires entry into a Material 
Transfer Agreement on terms that restrict use.109 
 
 
 PCR and Taq polymerase 
 
Patent title: purified thermostable enzyme 
Patent holder: Cetus Corp (assigned to F Hoffmann-La 
Roche AG) 
Patent accepted in Australia AU632857 in 1996 
                                                 
108 See Bayer AG v Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc 169 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Del. 
2001) and Bayer AG v Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc 228 F. Supp 2d 467 (D. Del 
2002) (hereafter Housey cases). 
109 See I. Abrams and M. Kaiser ‘Licensing Transgenic Mice: a Short Tutorial 
(2000) 12 Journal of Association of University Technology Managers, available at: 
http://www.autm.net/pubs/journal/00/transgenicmice.html  (accessed 22 October 
2003). 
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Opposition proceedings in 1997 by Bresagen Ltd and 
New England Biolabs: claims 1-7 invalid.110 The 
litigation relating to the opposition to this patent is still 
ongoing.111 
 
Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) enables specific and 
rapid amplification of existing DNA or RNA 
sequences in a test sample. Part of the process of PCR 
involves separating double stranded DNA using high 
temperatures. Taq polymerase is the enzyme used in 
the amplification, useful for its heat-resistant 
properties.112 Roche’s attempts to broadly enforce its 
patents are well known in Australia and were referred 
to by a large number of participants in our study, as 
discussed in Part 2 of this Report. 
 
 
 Oncomouse 
 
Patent title: transgenic non-human mammals 
Patent granted by USPTO 1988 US4,736,866 
Patent holder: President and Fellows of Harvard 
College 
 
Australian status: no record found, although an 
application by Harvard College exists for B cell 
deficient transgenic non-human animals (application 
number AU 199187358) 
Note also that Australian patents have been granted in 
respect of other transgenic non-human animals.  
 
This patent describes the methodology for producing a 
non-human mammal with an increased propensity for 
developing cancer. It serves as an important research 
tool in cancer research. Equivalent patents have been 
the subject of prolonged litigation in Europe and 
                                                 
110 F Hoffman-la Roche AG v Bresagen Ltd and New England Biolabs [1997] APO 
57 (12 November 1997). 
111 See, for example, New England Biolabs, Inc v F Hoffman-la Roche [2003] FCA 
1460 (4 November 2003). 
112 See further NRC, above n41 at 43-46. 
Context Chapter 3 
________________________________________________________ 
48  
Canada.113 In the United States, Harvard has an 
exclusive licensing arrangement with DuPont which 
has caused considerable access difficulties for others, 
particularly universities undertaking industry-
sponsored research.114 
 
 
 Hepatitis C virus (HCV) 
 
Chiron Corp has a suite of patents relating to HCV in a 
number of jurisdictions, including claims to the 
components of the virus itself and its use in diagnostic 
tests, vaccines and drug development. Chiron is widely 
known for aggressively enforcing its patents. Murex 
Ltd sought to have a Chiron patent revoked in 
Australia in the early 1990s.115 Although there were a 
number of interlocutory decisions in this matter116 and 
case went to hearing before Burchett J, it ultimately 
settled, with Chiron granting a licence to Murex.  
 
These broad method claims and aggressive enforcement practices 
have created controversy in the biotechnology industry, particularly in 
the United States. A notable exception is recombinant DNA 
technology. This technology constitutes the cornerstone of modern 
biotechnology, and the patent contained very broad claims. If access 
to it had been in any way restricted, the impact on all avenues of 
current biotechnology practice would have been profound.117 The 
patent has been extensively licensed, and affordable licensing fees 
meant that access to the technology was available to anyone who 
                                                 
113 See, for example, Oncomouse T19/90 [1990] Official Journal of the European 
Patent Office 476; Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents) (2002) 
SCC 76.  
114 Discussed by Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28 at 307-308. There is ongoing 
concern in the United States about the restrictions on access to oncomouse 
technology being imposed by DuPont. See, for example, ‘Cancer Scientists Contend 
DuPont Restricts Progress’ (3 November 2003) The Los Angeles Times. 
115 Docket No. NG106 of 1994. 
116 See, for example, Murex Diagnostics Australia Pty Ltd v Chiron Corporation 
[1995] FED No. 961/95; and Murex Diagnostics Australia Pty Ltd v Chiron 
Corporation (1995) 128 ALR 525. 
117 The patent is very broad, and if access had been restricted, its validity would no 
doubt have been challenged. 
Patenting in Australia 
________________________________________________________ 
49 
required it.118 Broad patent claims and restrictive technology transfer 
policies are likely to inhibit research if follow-on innovators doubt 
they will be able to gain access to those patents. For example, the 
breadth of the Cox-2 inhibitor combined with aggressive enforcement 
of the patent may discourage other researchers from investigating 
various compounds that act on the enzyme.  
 
We have established that a considerable number of these foundational 
research tool patents are not (or not yet) patented in Australia. This 
has implications for the Australian industry in that certain avenues of 
research may not be as restricted as they are in other jurisdictions. 
However, it should be noted that in a number of these cases other 
relevant patents do nevertheless exist, suggesting that these areas of 
research are not entirely free from encumbrances. Hence, we caution 
that it may not always be the case that the Australian industry is 
protected from the reach of broad, problematic research tool patents. 
In addition, it is clearly beyond the scope of this study to 
comprehensively analyse the existence in Australia of patents on all 
research inputs. Given the increase in patent filings in the 
biotechnology category by international participants, it is fair to 
assume that some of these patents will block research undertaken in 
Australia if access cannot be successfully negotiated. Therefore any 
conclusions we make about the existence of patents over foundational 
discoveries, or research tool patents in general, must be somewhat 
tentative. 
 
                                                 
118 The patenting of recombinant DNA technology closely followed the passage of 
the Bayh-Dole Act in the United States. This legislation aimed to promote the 
dissemination and exploitation of university inventions, by in effect mandating the 
patenting of university research, and encouraging exclusive licensing of those 
inventions. The basis of this was that exclusive licensing to small companies would 
best serve innovation. To this end, exploitation of the patent over recombinant DNA 
technology was wider than envisaged by the framers of Bayh-Dole; see NRC, above 
n41 at 41-42. 
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CONTEXT CHAPTER 4: IMPACT 
OF PATENTS ON MEDICAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
PATENTS AND PUBLIC SECTOR 
RESEARCH 
 
Commercialisation of biotechnology research is part of a wider trend 
favouring science that has commercial applicability in Australia. The 
interplay between public science and private commercialisation is a 
matter of ongoing debate in many areas of biological research and the 
influence of commercialisation on scientific research cannot be 
ignored. It would generally be accepted by most of the people 
involved in academic research, whether they are funders, policy-
makers or researchers, that the emphasis of that research has changed 
vastly over the last couple of decades. The ivory tower academy has 
had to learn the language of business economics. As part of this, 
research that has commercial implications will be favoured by 
funding agencies over pure science. Collaborative research ventures 
with industry will be highly regarded. This trend of encouraging 
commercialisation, particularly in the form of collaborations between 
the public and private sectors is also seen in other jurisdictions.119 
 
One of the consequences of introducing commercial considerations 
into the academic sphere is that many of the scientists who are 
involved in upstream research and for whom academic kudos has in 
the past been sufficient reward are now required to consider the best 
ways to protect their intellectual property rights and transfer their 
technology to industry. This introduces sharper focus on commercial 
considerations in the research environment.  
 
It is well recognised that there is a need to strengthen 
commercialisation of public sector research in Australia. For 
                                                 
119 For example, Tim Caulfield discusses these issues from the Canadian 
perspective in ‘A Colloquy on the Romanow Report. Sustainability of the Health 
Care and Innovation Agendas: the Commercialisation of Genetic Research’ (2003) 
66 Saskatchewan Law Review 629. 
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example, a Report of the Prime Minister’s Science, Engineering and 
Innovation Council stated that: 
 
To improve performance, we should ensure that 
research projects with commercial potential have every 
opportunity to move through the commercialisation 
process. This involves bringing together the exciting 
work already underway in our research laboratories, 
with what industry needs and what the market will 
embrace. 120 
 
In particular, the Report highlighted the need to increase the quantum 
of out-licensing and to create more spin off companies in order to 
improve the transfer of technology from the public to the private 
sector.121 
 
However, this elision between public and private research is not cost-
free. Arguably, it has accelerated challenges to traditional core 
science values summed up by Robert Merton as “universalism, 
collegiality, disinterestedness and organised scepticism”.122 One of 
the ways in which this new commercialised research culture could 
affect upstream research is in its impact on the dissemination of 
research results. The integrity of the individual researcher is promoted 
by the strong communal traditions of team-work and free exchange of 
ideas, results and research reagents. Integrity is further assured by 
subjecting research results to external testing and criticism through 
the peer review system and the publication of results in wide-
circulation refereed journals. This publication tradition has been the 
primary reward for academic scientists and the dominant measure of 
academic excellence. However, there may be valid commercial 
reasons, including the possibility of patenting, why the early 
disclosure of results is not always forthcoming. As Sherman has 
                                                 
120 See, for example, Prime Minister’s Science, Engineering and Innovation Council 
Commercialisation of Public Sector Research (2001) Report of Working Group 
presented at the Council’s Seventh Meeting 28 June 2001 at 3, available at:  
http://www.dest.gov.au/science/pmseic (accessed 11 November 2003) (hereafter 
PMSEIC). 
121 Ibid at 3-4. 
122 R. Merton, The Sociology of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1973). See also R. Eisenberg, ‘Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in 
Biotechnology Research’ (1987) 97 Yale Law Journal 177 at 182-184 (hereafter 
Eisenberg 1987); and A. Rai, ‘Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property 
Rights and the Norms of Science’ (1999) 94 Northwestern University Law Review 
77. 
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pointed out, patents change both the forum and form in which 
research results are first disclosed.123 At the same time, it must be 
acknowledged that commercialisation per se need not ultimately 
cause a decrease in publication rate. On the contrary, evidence shows 
that researchers from government institutes in the United States that 
have formal partnerships with industry tend to have higher 
publication rates than those from non-industry aligned institutes.124 
 
The novelty requirement is likely to have the most significant effect 
on the traditional norms of science because it requires that research 
data are kept secret until after the patent has been filed. However, 
once the patent has been filed, research results can be published 
provided that this does not compromise future intellectual property 
rights. In addition, the grace period which allows researchers to 
disclose their work before filing their patent applications without 
destroying the novelty of their inventions. Nevertheless, where 
patents are involved it is likely that there will be a longer time lag 
between research and publication than would otherwise be the case. 
The other option for protecting the economic value of research data is 
secrecy. Although the norms and rewards of science may have some 
congruency with the patent system, they would appear to have 
nothing in common with secrecy.125 One of the primary requirements 
of both publication and patenting is disclosure of information, 
allowing its subsequent use by others. The main difference is that use 
follows on immediately after publication, whereas for patenting, 
disclosure occurs at the start of the patenting period but use is not 
permitted until the end. Secrecy is premised on the fact that there is 
no disclosure requirement. Indeed, disclosure puts an end to the 
protection afforded by secrecy. For this reason the use of secrecy as a 
means of retaining control over information could create a 
“destructive, anti-intellectual climate”.126  
 
Attaching economic value to research results also may have other 
effects on scientific collegiality. Where, in the past, researchers often 
freely exchanged newly developed research reagents and other 
research tools, public sector institutes now often require recipients to 
                                                 
123 B. Sherman, ‘Governing Science: Patents and Public Sector Research’ (1994) 7 
Science in Context 515. 
124 United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Federal Technology 
Transfer and the Human Genome Project (Washington, DC: US Government 
Printing Office, 1995). 
125 Eisenberg (1987), above n120. 
126 G. Poste, ‘The Case for Genomic Patenting’ (1995) 378 Nature 534. 
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enter into contractual arrangements in the form of material transfer 
agreements.127 Even if no costs are involved, limitations are placed on 
the range of uses to which such materials can be put. This raises yet 
another concern about the so-called “post-academic” era of science: 
that objectivity could be lost as a result of commercial obligations.128 
Objectivity is an aspect of the norm of disinterestedness, which 
requires impartiality in the reporting of research results. Commercial 
sponsors may have contractual rights to decide both the time and 
content of publications which may have a serious impact on this norm 
of science. We report on the views of our respondents in relation to a 
number of these issues in Part 2 of this Report. 
 
 
RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO UPSTREAM 
PATENTS 
 
One of the two issues explored by Walsh, Arora and Cohen was 
whether the assertion of patent rights over foundational upstream 
discoveries is having the effect of undermining the advance of 
biomedical research.129 A notable feature of biomedical research is 
that complex research paths are required to fully exploit the potential 
of broad upstream inventions.130 A researcher or company may 
require access to a number of patents in order to commercialise an 
invention. Where access to one of those patents is restricted, there 
may be a detrimental effect on subsequent downstream research. 
Given that the essence of a patent right is the right to exclude others, 
there will invariably be some “routine under-use” in any well 
functioning patent system, and this may simply be a cost we pay for 
the operation of a patent system that otherwise benefits society.131  
 
But where inventions over which access is restricted comprise 
foundational discoveries which themselves require further 
                                                 
127 A. Rai and R. Eisenberg, ‘Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine’ 
(2003) 66 Law and Contemporary Problems 289. 
128 J. Ziman, ‘Is Science Losing Its Objectivity’ (1996) 382 Nature 751. 
129 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28 at 296-297. 
130 A. Rai, ‘Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: 
The Role of Patents and Antitrust’ (2001) 16 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 813 
at 831. See also E.W. Kitch, ‘The Nature and Function of the Patent System’ (1977) 
20 Journal of Law and Economics 265 (hereafter Kitch).  
131 M. Heller and R. Eisenberg, ‘Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons 
in Biomedical Research’ (1998) 280 Science 698 at 699 (hereafter Heller and 
Eisenberg); R Eisenberg in NRC, above n41 at 9-10. 
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development in order to produce consumer products, there is a real 
possibility that the patent system fails to fulfil its aim of promoting 
innovation. Patents are intended to promote innovation, and it may be 
questionable in some cases whether assertions of patent rights and 
exclusionary licensing practices achieve this aim. The move from 
public dissemination of research results, which in themselves 
constitute important research inputs, to more prolific patenting of 
research tools sets up the main precondition for the concern that 
research may be impeded.132  
 
Two further preconditions may exacerbate the problem. First, broad 
interpretation of claims on upstream foundational discoveries may 
extend the reach of upstream patents and deter downstream 
innovators from researching in what they perceive to be a broad area 
of research. Second, reach-through rights to future inventions (for 
example, a right to a compound that acts on a patented target even 
though the compound itself is not described in the patent claims) 
could deter subsequent innovation. This will of course depend on how 
broadly the original patent claim is interpreted, and even if patent 
offices continue to interpret claims narrowly, courts are not precluded 
from construing them more broadly.133 This uncertainty may act to 
inhibit research in an area where researchers are concerned about how 
a patent claim may be interpreted. 
 
When might an upstream invention be classified as “foundational” so 
that relatively uninhibited access is desirable? Of the many examples 
of patented inventions that are likely to constitute important 
foundational discoveries, many of the more prominent examples are 
those patented inventions discussed above, including recombinant 
DNA, PCR and Taq polymerase, embryonic stem cells, and genes and 
proteins that may potentially be important in terms of therapeutic 
applications.134 Walsh, Arora and Cohen suggest that there are two 
considerations when looking at this question:135 
 
                                                 
132 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28 at 296. The authors rely on their interview 
data to establish that there has been a surge in upstream patenting, and have no 
empirical data on whether there has been an increase in the proportion of upstream 
inventions patented. Anecdotal data from company and academic scientists 
suggested there has been a increase in defensive patenting and in university 
patenting. 
133 See Walsh, Arora and Cohen, ibid at 296-297. 
134 See the discussion above in Context Chapter 3. 
135 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28 at 332-334. 
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• how key is the invention or research tool to subsequent 
innovation and how broad a range of subsequent inventions 
might depend on the initial invention; and 
• can the invention or research tool be used as a tool in the 
development of a number of inventions that will eventually 
compete with one another.136 If one researcher uses such a 
tool, there will be less incentive for a competing researcher to 
use it because their profits will be eroded. On the other hand, 
some research tools can be used by a number of innovators 
with no erosion of their profits.137  
 
If an upstream invention is fundamental to competing downstream 
research applications, Walsh, Arora and Cohen contend that access to 
it is more likely to be restricted in some way, often through 
exclusivity in licensing. Exclusive exploitation of an invention will 
entail some social cost because the party exploiting the invention will 
not have the means to pursue every application.138 While this is 
certainly true, Walsh, Arora and Cohen point out that there may also 
be some social cost where patented technologies are widely licensed 
to many users. In this case, it may be less likely that access will be 
restricted completely, but arguably more likely that terms such as 
reach-through rights to future inventions will be imposed. It is 
nonetheless important in any case to consider the biological system 
being dealt with to determine whether there may be multiple ways of 
approaching a particular research issue. This will be one factor to 
consider in examining the impact of restricted access. In addition, 
how broadly patent rights are interpreted will determine the extent of 
research activities affected by those rights.139 
 
Promoting access to mitigate the social cost associated with restricted 
access to an invention must however be balanced against the risk that 
the incentive to develop the invention in the first place will be 
lessened.140 This balance needs to be borne in mind whenever a 
consideration of these issues is undertaken. 
                                                 
136 If so, the invention will be what is referred to as ‘rival-in-use’. The example 
given by Walsh, Arora and Cohen is that of two compounds that block a receptor 
that is specific to a therapeutic approach to a disease. The discovery of one would 
decrease the profit of the other from use of its compound; above n28 at 332.  
137 Examples include PCR, microarrays and combinatorial libraries; Walsh, Arora 
and Cohen above n28 at 332. 
138 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, ibid at 333-334. 
139 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, ibid at 334-335.  
140 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, ibid at 333-334. 
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THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS 
 
A complex patent landscape necessitates bargaining to allow the 
utilisation of patented products, methods and technologies at various 
stages of the research and development path.141 For some time, there 
has been concern that this proliferation of intellectual property rights 
over research inputs may present a daunting obstacle to successful 
bargaining in biomedical research.  
 
Where no party has an effective privilege of use over all the rights 
necessary to conduct research to develop a resource,142 parties must 
reach agreements with the various owners of the rights to enable them 
to aggregate the rights they require access to. They may, however, 
have difficulty reaching agreement.143 This is because high 
transaction costs may stand in the way of agreement.144 If there were 
no impediments to successful bargaining, rights would be traded and 
resources effectively utilised.145 But where agreement with a number 
of rights holders is required, prohibitive transaction costs may lead 
parties to decide that exchanging rights is not worthwhile.146 A 
socially optimal level of consumption of the resource may not be 
                                                 
141 The importance of bargaining for the transfer of rights is highlighted by much of 
the economic literature dealing with cumulative innovation and the optimal 
allocation of intellectual property rights, as recommendations on allocations are 
often predicated on the likelihood of successful bargaining taking place. See, for 
example, S. Scotchmer, ‘Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research 
and the Patent Law’ (1991) 5 Journal of Economic Perepectives 29 (1991) 
(hereafter Scotchmer); H. Chang, ‘Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative 
Innovation’ (1995) 26 Rand Journal of Economics 34; J.R. Green and S. 
Scotchmer, ‘On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation’ (1995) 26 Rand 
Journal of Economics 20; R. Merges and R. Nelson, ‘On the Complex Economics 
of Patent Scope’ (1995) 90 Columbia Law Review 839 (hereafter Merges and 
Nelson). 
142 M.A. Heller, ‘The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from 
Marx to Markets’ (1998) 111 Harvard Law Review 621 at 668-669 (hereafter 
Heller). 
143 Ibid at 676-677.  
144 See further below Results Chapter 4. 
145 R.H. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and 
Economics 1. 
146 See Heller and Eisenberg, above n131; Heller, above n142; Eisenberg (2001), 
above n21. The reasons for breakdown in negotiations within industries reliant on 
cumulative innovation will vary from industry to industry. For an empirical 
examination of this issue see Merges and Nelson, above n141 at 843-844. 
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achieved, resulting in a “tragedy of the anticommons” or under-use of 
the resource.147 
 
The idea of an anticommons in biomedical research was first 
advanced by Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg. They assert that 
there are two ways in which a government may inadvertently create 
an anticommons problem: through the creation of numerous 
overlapping property rights over potential products or resources, or 
through the use of reach–through licence agreements leading to 
licence stacking. In their view, the explosion of patent grants within 
the industry, and the increasing prevalence of restrictive licensing 
practices mean that an anticommons is inevitable.148 
 
Heller and Eisenberg consider it unlikely that the biomedical industry 
will overcome an anticommons without legal intervention. First, 
transaction costs of bargains within this industry are particularly high. 
Secondly, different sectors of the industry may find reaching 
agreement difficult. Finally, upstream researchers may overvalue their 
patented inventions making the development of downstream products 
less worthwhile. Thus, the preconditions for an anticommons in 
biomedicine exist, and it is unlikely that the market will right itself 
unassisted.149 Existing empirical evidence on the topic is divided. For 
example, Walsh, Arora and Cohen found little evidence of an 
anticommons in biomedical research, but the NIH Working Group’s 
Report suggests that increasing difficulties negotiating agreements 
over research tools is clear evidence that the conditions for an 
anticommons persist.  
 
 
THE CONSUMER PERSPECTIVE – 
RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO 
BIOTECHNOLOGY-RELATED PRODUCTS 
 
Where patents relate to new developments in health care, there may 
be countervailing public policy considerations that have to be 
                                                 
147 Heller, above n142 at 677. 
148 Heller and Eisenberg, above n131 at 699-700. 
149 Heller and Eisenberg, above n131 at 700-701; See also Eisenberg (2001) above 
n21 at 231-248. In addition, Eisenberg contends that different agents within 
organisations have different agendas, for example, scientists and technology 
transfer personnel within universities are generally at odds in what they are aiming 
to achieve; Eisenberg (2001), above n21 at 239-242. 
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weighed against the incentive to innovate, such as access, cost and 
quality issues.  
 
Pharmaceuticals 
 
Participants in the pharmaceutical industry argue that patents are 
essential because of the high costs of the research and the 
commercialisation phases and the time lag between invention and 
marketing that arises out of regulatory requirements for drug 
approval. This combination of factors makes patent protection more 
crucial for the pharmaceutical industry than for most other 
industries.150 It is often argued that without patent protection 
pharmaceutical research will simply not get done. Investment in the 
biotechnology industry carries even greater risks in terms of the cost 
of research, the failure of many products during commercialisation 
and the time lag between discovery and commercialisation. These 
costs are exacerbated by increased levels of upstream patenting of 
essential research tools, requiring payment of multiple licence fees, as 
discussed above. 
 
All these factors encourage holders of biotechnological and 
pharmaceutical patents to charge high prices, well above the actual 
cost of production. At the same time, from the health care perspective 
it is desirable for innovative treatments to be rapidly made available 
to a wide sector of the community. In 2000 a partnership of relevant 
stakeholders formulated Australia’s National Medicines Policy.151 
The Policy has four central objectives: 
 
• timely access to the medicines that Australians need, at a cost 
the community can afford; 
• medicines meeting appropriate standards of quality, safety and 
efficacy; 
• quality use of medicines; and 
• maintaining a responsible and viable medicines industry.152 
 
                                                 
150 See P. Loughlan, ‘Patents: Breaking the Loop’ (1998) 20 Sydney Law Review 
553 at 570. 
151 Available at: http://www.health.gov.au/pbs/natmedpol.htm (accessed 29 
November 2001). The partnership includes Commonwealth, State and Territory 
Governments, health educators, health practitioners, other healthcare providers and 
suppliers, the medicines industry, healthcare consumers and the media. 
152 Ibid. 
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The Policy states that cost should not constitute a substantial barrier 
to access to the medicines that people need, and that “normal market 
mechanisms may be tempered in access arrangements, to increase the 
affordability of important medicines.” There would seem to be some 
conflict between this policy and the Government’s patent policy. The 
fact that the Patents Act provides for possible extension of five years 
to the patent term for pharmaceutical patents is testimony to the high 
value placed on pharmaceutical research and development by the 
Federal Government.153 The trade off is that drug prices remain 
artificially high for a longer period than in other industries, which will 
clearly have a negative effect on consumer access. 
 
The conflict between access and cost recovery is resolved to a certain 
extent in Australia by the national Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme 
(PBS).154 Drugs are listed on the PBS by the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Advisory Committee (PBAC). Once listed, drugs are available 
through prescription. Although the PBS does provide access to many 
drugs at these reasonable costs, the gap between prescription charges 
and actual costs for PBS items still has to be borne by the Australian 
community. This cost is substantial: in the year to 30 June 2001 a 
total of around AU$4.9 billion was spent on PBS medicines, over 
AU$4.5 billion of which was supplied by the Federal Government, a 
19 percent increase from the previous year.155 Clearly, this rate of 
increase is not sustainable. 
 
There is a mechanism in place to ensure that prescribers and 
consumers do not overly favour brand label drugs. The Minimum 
Pricing Policy requires that consumers pay any additional cost if they 
buy a particular brand of prescribed drug that costs more than the 
listed basic price. This mechanism is important from the 
government’s perspective because it reduces the gap between the 
prescription charge and the actual cost of the drug. However, it only 
works when the drug is off patent and when cheaper generics are 
available. The gap between prescription charges and actual costs may 
be quite large when the drug is still on patent. In consequence, the 
                                                 
153 Sections 70-87 Patents Act 1990 (Cth). 
154 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Australia's Health 1996 (Canberra: 
AGPS, 1996) at 180. The history of Australia’s medicinal drug policy is described 
by K. Harvey and M. Murray, ‘Medicinal Drug Policy’ in H. Gardner (ed.), The 
Politics of Health 2nd ed., (Melbourne: Churchill Livingstone, 1995) chapter 9. 
155 Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, Consumer Information available at: 
http://www.health.gov.au/pbs/consumer.htm (accessed 29 November 2001). See 
also Australia's Health, above n154 at 181. 
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number of such drugs that can be included on the PBS is limited. 
Indeed, the National Medicines Policy cautions at page 2 that: 
 
In the context of the ongoing development and release of 
new medicines which are often relatively expensive, it 
can be difficult to meet the community’s expectations 
regarding subsidised access to all available treatments. 
 
The issue of which new drugs do or do not make it onto the PBS 
becomes very much a political decision.156 It is likely that many of the 
new products arising out of biotechnology research and development 
will be considered by the PBAC to be too expensive for inclusion on 
the PBS, in which case the cost must be borne by the individual 
consumer. The impending Free Trade Agreement between Australia 
and the US further threatens the ongoing viability of the PBS. 
Without PBS listing, it is only when patents expire and when 
competing generic products become available that the Australian 
community as a whole will get the full benefit of new pharmaceutical 
developments. Having said this, most Australians do, nevertheless, 
currently have access to a wide range of pharmaceutical products at 
reasonable cost.  
 
Thus, although the high cost of patented pharmaceuticals is a matter 
of ongoing concern, the balance between incentive to innovate and 
equitable access is not obviously out of kilter in Australia.157 
 
Devices and diagnostic tests 
 
Different considerations apply in relation to devices and diagnostic 
tests because the regulatory requirements are far less onerous than for 
drugs. Hence, the risks, time and expenses involved in the drug 
approvals process are not factors that need to be considered when 
considering the balance between device and diagnostic patent 
ownership and access rights. This is a particular issue for diagnostic 
                                                 
156 See A.H. Harris, ‘Economic Appraisal in the Regulation of Pharmaceuticals in 
Australia: Its Rationale and Potential Impact’ (1994) The Australian Economic 
Review 99 at 103. 
157 The same cannot be said in developing and least developed countries, where the 
cost of patented pharmaceuticals is prohibitive. However, there are ongoing 
international efforts that are attempting to alleviate some of these access issues. See 
J. Nielsen and D. Nicol, ‘Pharmaceuticals and Patents: the Conundrum of Access 
and Incentive’ (2002) 13 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 21; and D. Nicol, 
‘Balancing Access to Pharmaceuticals with Patent Rights’ (2003) 22 Monash 
Bioethics Review 50. 
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tests. Once the gene sequence for a particular disease related gene has 
been identified and isolated, the development of a diagnostic test is 
not particularly onerous. At present only a small number of diagnostic 
genetic tests are covered by the Federal Government through its 
Medicare Benefits Scheme (MBS). These are: haemochromatosis, 
factor V Leiden, protein C or S deficiencies, antithrombin 3 
deficiency and fragile X syndrome.158 
 
It would seem that in the past, patent holders claiming rights over 
diagnostic tests have not been aggressively enforcing their rights 
against providers of testing facilities. However, there is a growing 
body of evidence to suggest that this situation is changing, 
particularly in the United States. This change in strategy has the 
capacity to significantly affect the provision of diagnostic testing 
services. Detrimental effects are most likely to occur when the patent 
or licence holder either refuses to license or imposes onerous terms in 
the licence agreement. Such terms may relate to the price of tests, the 
quantity of tests that can be performed, which laboratories the tests 
can be performed in, whether further research is allowed to improve 
the quality and specificity of the tests, and so on. 
 
Recent research in the United States by Mildred Cho and her 
colleagues shows that a number of patent and licence holders are 
actively enforcing their patents against providers of genetic tests by 
requiring licences or refusing to license.159 This has reportedly led to 
a number of test providers ceasing to perform a genetic test they had 
previously offered and to a number of others deciding not to develop 
or perform a test because of the patent considerations. 
 
Searches of patent databases for equivalent Australian patents show 
that three of these United States patents have direct equivalents in 
Australia and four others are the subject of Australian patent 
applications (Table 1). Closely related Australian patents or patent 
applications (that is, having the same patent holder and subject 
matter) exist for most of the others. Only three have no direct or 
closely-related equivalents in Australia. 
 
                                                 
158 From the Medicare Benefits schedule, as reported in ALRC, above n18 at 93. 
159 M.K. Cho, S. Illangasekare M.A. Weaver D.G.B. Leonard and J.F. Merz, ‘Effect 
of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical Genetic Testing Services’ 
(2003) 5 Journal of Molecular Diagnostics 3 (hereafter Cho and others 2003); Merz 
and others, above n43. 
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Table 1: Patents linked to cessation of tests in the United States 
and equivalent Australian patents.  
 
Test160 US patent161  Patent holder Equivalent AU 
patent162 
Related AU 
patent 
Apolipo- 
protein E 
 
US5508167 
US6027896 
and 
US5716828 
Duke University 
 
 AU677614 and 
AU200173661 
US5753441 
(BRCA1) 
Myriad Genetics, 
Inc 
 
 
AU691958, 
AU686004 and 
AU691331 
Hereditary 
breast/ovarian 
cancer  
US6051379 
(BRCA 2) 
Oncormed, Inc163 AU199893216  
Duchenne/ 
Becker 
muscular 
dystrophy 
US5541074 The Children’s 
Medical Center 
Corp 
 AU633249 and 
AU200073786 
Hereditary 
hemo- 
chromatosis  
US5705343 
US5712098 
and 
US5753438 
Mercator 
Genetics, Inc 
 
AU733459  
Myotonic 
dystrophy 
US5955265 
and 
US5977333 
MIT and 
University of 
Wales College of 
Medicine 
 AU199335059 
Canavan 
disease 
 
US5679635 Maimi Children’s 
Hospital Research 
Institute 
AU199473207  
                                                 
160 The listed tests are those referred to as being stopped in some genetic testing 
laboratories in the United States study by Mildred Cho and her colleagues, ibid, 
Table 2. 
161 The United States patents that included claims covering the performance of those 
tests and holders of those patent were also reported in Cho and others 2003, ibid. 
162 Equivalent Australian patents were traced using the AU Published Patent 
Searching database at http://apa.hpa.com.au:8080/ipapa/qsearch and the European 
Commission’s esp@cenet database at http://ec.espacenet.com/espacenet/ between 
20 March and 9 April 2003. The six digit numbers signify granted patents, nine 
digit numbers are applications, the first four digits signifying the year of 
application. 
163 Note that the original British patent for BRCA2 was owned by a consortium of 
the Cancer Research Campaign Technology and Duke University, and was 
exclusively licensed to OncorMed, subject to certain stringent limitations relating to 
counselling and other matters. Myriad has an exclusive licence to OncorMed’s 
patents for the provision of genetic testing services. See M. Rimmer ‘Myriad 
Genetics: Patent Law and Genetic Testing’ (2003) 25 European Intellectual 
Property Review 20 at 22-23. 
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US5834183 
and 
US5741645 
(SCA1) 
Regents of 
University of 
Minnesota 
No equivalent  
US6251589 
(SCA2) 
SRL, Inc AU199664698  
US5840491 
(SCA3) 
Kakizuka, A No equivalent  
Spino- 
cerebellar 
ataxia (SCA1 
SCA2, SCA3, 
SCA6) 
US5853995 
(SCA6) 
Research 
Development 
Foundation 
AU735756  
Adenomatous 
polyposis of 
the colon 
US5352775 Johns Hopkins 
University 
 AU199213669 
US5780223 Baylor College of 
Medicine 
 AU199222265 Charcot-Marie 
Tooth type 1A 
US5691144 Athena 
Diagnostics, Inc 
No equivalent  
Fragile X 
syndrome 
US6107025 Baylor College of 
Medicine 
AU199221854  
Huntington’s 
disease 
US4666828 The General 
Hospital Corp 
 AU676001 and 
AU673575 
Factor V 
Leiden 
US5874256 Rijks Universiteit AU690644  
 
These results clearly indicate that the capacity exists for a number of 
gene patents to be enforced against providers of diagnostic services in 
Australia. The implication from these results is that people in the 
United States may well be denied access to new genetic tests because 
of enforcement actions by patent holders. Hence, in this situation the 
balance between innovation and access may be skewed too far in 
favour of innovation.164 We discuss our data on this issue in Results 
Chapter 6.  
                                                 
164 Assuming that patents covering genetic tests do indeed encourage innovation, 
which in itself is open to question. 
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CONTEXT CHAPTER 5: STUDY 
METHODS 
 
This study was conducted in two parts: 
 
• a quantitative component using survey data; and 
• a qualitative component using a semi-structured interview 
format. 
 
The aim of the study was to gather data through the surveys which 
would identify issues for further analysis within the interviews. We 
were aware when preparing the surveys that response rates to surveys 
in this industry are usually relatively low. For example, Hopper and 
Thorburn reported a 13 percent response rate to their 2002 survey, 
and attributed this to “survey fatigue”.165 Despite the likelihood that 
we too would have a modest response rate, we nevertheless felt that 
the surveys were an important component of the study and 
represented the most appropriate method of generating preliminary 
data for further investigation. 
 
 
SURVEYS 
 
The initial component of the study consisted of written surveys 
mailed to respondents falling within three sectors of the biomedical 
industry: private sector biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, 
research institutions and diagnostic testing facilities. The surveys 
were conducted with a view to addressing the issues raised in Part 1 
of this Report, and to identifying issues on which to focus in the 
interview portion of the study. 
 
Private and public companies 
 
A component of this study was to construct a database containing 
details of Australian biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, 
(including international companies with an Australian office) and to 
document, in particular, the patent portfolios and alliance activity of 
these companies. This database was completed using data obtained 
                                                 
165 Hopper and Thorburn, above n22. 
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from the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, and 
publicly available information including material from company 
websites and industry reports.166 Information from the database was 
used to identify respondents for survey mail-out. Companies were 
identified as being relevant to the survey if their activities comprised 
core biotechnology activities, or if their activities were in some way 
biotechnology related.167  
 
Although this research project was concerned with the biomedical 
biotechnology industry, this component of the project was not limited 
to the biomedical sector of the industry. Respondents were asked to 
describe their area of activity or research, and so we were able to 
identify companies involved in biomedical research and those 
involved in other activities. Our intention was to obtain some 
interesting comparative data. However, the overwhelming majority of 
responses were from the biomedical sector of the industry. Only four 
of the responses received were from companies that could not be 
classified as primarily biomedical. Of the four, three reported no 
patent activity and two of these reported no collaborative or licensing 
activity. Although data from all of these respondents is included in 
the overall results, we make specific reference to the two non-
biomedical companies that reported patent, licensing or collaborative 
activity in Results Chapters 2, 4 and 5.168 
 
Approximately 180 surveys were mailed to companies in June 
2002.169 The same survey was sent to both biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical companies. Follow-up letters were sent to respondents 
four weeks after the surveys were mailed out, and follow-up 
telephone calls were subsequently made. The survey asked 52 
questions about the structure and activities of the company, the 
company’s involvement in patenting, collaborations and licensing, 
and the views of the respondent on patenting within the industry. 
 
                                                 
166 We thank Rebecca Keep and Tim Graham for their assistance in compiling the 
database, and Brendan Gogarty for creating the database. 
167 Core biotechnology companies are companies whose business is entirely or 
substantially biotechnology related: See Ernst & Young 1999, above n1. 
168 One of these respondents appeared to be involved in biomedical applications to 
some degree. 
169 Ernst & Young listed the number of core biotechnology companies in Australia 
as 20 listed companies and 100 private unlisted companies in its 1999 Report, 
above n1. In a later survey, the number was estimated to have increased to 190; 
Ernst & Young 2001, above n1. A number of the companies targeted by our survey 
had only peripheral biotechnology-related activities.. 
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Of the surveys sent out, 49 completed surveys were returned, yielding 
a response rate of 27 percent. In addition, six respondents contacted 
us and informed us that they did not wish to participate in the survey 
either because they did not consider it to be relevant to their 
company’s activities, or they considered the information sought to be 
commercially sensitive. A number of respondents who subsequently 
participated in face-to-face interviews notified us that they had not 
completed the survey because they believed that they could 
participate more effectively in providing qualitative rather than 
quantitative data to us. Consequently, they were willing to take part in 
interviews. Although we concede that the response rate is low in 
relative terms, it  compares  favourably with other voluntary mailout 
surveys conducted within the industry.170 Further, if we had targeted 
specifically biomedical companies in distributing the company 
survey, we would expect our response rate to be more favourable than 
it was.171 It would be fair to assume that the 45 biomedical and 
pharmaceutical companies from which we received responses 
represents a significant proportion (perhaps in excess of 40 percent) 
of Australian companies engaged in biomedical and related 
applications. 
 
Research institutions 
 
Printed surveys were mailed out to 39 research institutions on 17 
March 2003 and reminder letters were sent in June 2003. As 
previously noted, we use the term ‘research institution’ to include 
universities, government institutions, publicly-funded independent 
research institutions and private research institutions. These 
institutions were identified by our prior knowledge of the research 
sector and using standard search engines.172 The survey asked 42 
questions about research activities, the institution’s involvement in 
patenting, collaborations and licensing, awareness of patents held by 
others and views on patenting. Twenty-three surveys were returned, 
yielding a response rate of 59 percent. 
 
                                                 
170 See, for example, Hopper and Thorburn, above n22. 
171 Ernst & Young estimated that approximately 47 percent of Australian 
biotechnology companies are operating in the area of human health, including 
diagnostics and therapeutics. They further estimated that approximately 13 percent 
of companies are operating in the areas of Genomics, Proteomics and Bio-
informatics; Ernst & Young 2001 above n1 at 13. 
172 We thank Tim Graham for research assistance in identifying relevant 
institutions. 
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Genetic testing laboratories 
 
Printed surveys were mailed out to the laboratories offering diagnosis 
of genetic disorders listed on the Human Genetic Society of 
Australia’s website in November 2002 and reminder letters were sent 
in December 2002. The surveys asked 61 questions about the 
laboratory, its clinical activity, research and patent activity and 
collaborations. A total of 52 surveys were dispatched. Eighteen were 
returned (35 percent response rate). These detailed surveys were 
supplemented by short telephone surveys conducted in March and 
April 2003 asking six questions about the laboratory, the tests it 
performs, payment of licence fees and/or royalties, receipt of 
notifications from patent or licence holders, responses to 
notifications, and views on patents. The six questions were only asked 
if respondents indicated that they had not returned the written survey. 
Hence we are reasonably confident that the telephone survey 
respondents did not overlap with the written survey respondents. 
There were thirteen responses to the telephone survey, yielding a total 
response rate of 60 percent.  
 
 
INTERVIEWS 
 
Forty interviews were conducted with various respondents falling 
within the categories of private companies, research institutions and 
diagnostic testing facilities between August 2002 and July 2003. 
Participants were selected based on prior contacts, media reports, 
internet based search engines and databases, and snowball sampling.  
 
Within the category of private sector companies, we interviewed chief 
operating executives, intellectual property personnel and bench 
scientists. Within the category of research institutions we interviewed 
directors of research groups, bench scientists and technology transfer 
personnel. Within the category of diagnostic testing facilities, we 
interviewed directors of research groups. We also interviewed a 
number of other respondents with expertise in the area, including 
patent attorneys, licensing consultants and government and trade 
representatives. Interviews were conducted on an anonymous basis. 
We proceeded on this basis because of the confidential nature of the 
data being gathered; anonymity in studies in the industry is standard 
practice. We also became aware from speaking with industry contacts 
prior to the commencement of the study that a majority of 
respondents were unlikely to respond to surveys or participate in 
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interviews unless anonymity could be guaranteed. During a 
considerable number of interviews, respondents sought assurances to 
this effect.  
 
Details of respondents by organisation type and occupation are 
contained in Table 2. Respondents were selected to provide a 
representative sample of various sectors within the biomedical 
industry, from research institutions and companies operating at the 
upstream end of the industry, through to companies involved in 
downstream drug development and therapeutic applications.  
 
Table 2: Interview respondents 
 
Respondent type Business/ 
IP/ legal 
manager 
Lab 
director/ 
scientist 
Managing 
director/ 
CEO 
Total 
interviews 
University Tech 
Transfer Office 
3   3 
Diagnostic 
Testing  Facilities   
 3  3 
Research 
Institutions 
1 4 3 8 
Tech Transfer 
Companies  
2  1 3 
Upstream 
Companies*  
4 1 1 4 
Intermediate 
Companies*  
3  1 4 
Downstream 
Companies*  
  3 3 
Pharmaceutical 
Companies 
4 1  4 
Device 
Companies   
2   2 
Licensing 
Consultants  
   2 
Patent Attorneys 
 
   2 
Trade Association 
Representatives  
   1 
Government 
representatives 
   1 
 
The categories marked with an * in Table 2 are fairly fluid in that 
some respondents conducted activities that could fit into more than 
one category. We have placed these respondents in the category that 
best fits their primary activities. It was also difficult to classify the 
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interviewees within respondent organisations, so we have described 
them as accurately as possible. In several cases, interviews were 
conducted with more than one person from within an organisation. 
Although we have included this as one interview within our tally of 
interviews, we have provided descriptions of all the personnel 
interviewed. 
 
Within respondent organisations, business, intellectual property and 
legal managers were the group most interviewed. We conducted 19 
interviews of personnel who fell into this category compared with 
nine laboratory directors and scientists and nine managing directors. 
We recognise that responses may vary depending on the particular 
person within an organisation who is interviewed. In some cases, 
where a business, intellectual property or legal manager was 
interviewed, we may have received a different response from, for 
example, a lab scientist. There are a number of reasons why we chose 
to interview managers rather than scientists. In particular, we selected 
business, intellectual property and legal managers because of their 
knowledge of the issues being investigated by us. In some cases 
another member of an organisation referred us on to them. Many 
institutions being considered were relatively small and there was 
evidence of close contact and discussion of relevant issues between 
managers and scientists within respondent organisations. In many 
cases, business, intellectual property and legal managers came from a 
science background, often from within the organisation itself. They 
therefore had a good understanding of the issues associated with the 
conduct of research and intellectual property in the relevant field, as 
well as complex technology transfer issues. Difficulty in persuading 
scientists to participate in interviews is also a common theme in some 
other studies.173 
 
Similarly, many managing directors and CEOs come from a science 
background and are well versed in the intellectual property activities 
of their respective companies. We do not therefore perceive the 
relatively low numbers of scientists interviewed as a significant 
omission, although we do concede that it may mean that responses 
differed to a degree. We do, however, hold the view that the level of 
knowledge of technology transfer issues of respondents falling into 
the categories of business, intellectual property and legal managers, 
and managing directors and CEOs, made them particularly valuable 
classes of interview respondents. 
                                                 
173 See, for example, NIH, above n37 at 6. 
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The resulting sample gave us some reliable insights into views and 
issues within the industry. We do not claim that this was a truly 
random sample. Respondents were selected to enable us broad 
coverage of a range of players within the industry, but at times were 
selected fairly opportunistically. However, given the number of 
respondents interviewed and the areas of the industry covered, the 
sample paints a broadly representative picture of issues facing the 
industry and trends within the industry. 
 
Most of the respondents interviewed were involved in human genetic 
or biomedical research and/or commercialisation. However, several 
respondents falling outside these categories, or falling into more 
general or peripheral categories were interviewed in order to obtain 
some comparative data. One respondent was involved in a 
biotechnology CRC unrelated to human health applications. Two 
company respondents were involved in medical device research and 
development, and one respondent from the bioinformatics sector took 
part in the study. One of the research institution respondents was 
involved in plant studies. Some respondents were involved in 
applications related to human health, in addition to other broader 
applications. We indicate throughout the course of this Report where 
data from interviews with these respondents is referred to.  
 
The respondents were asked a series of questions that conformed to a 
flexible format and were designed to elicit responses that gave some 
insight into the extent of the issues already raised in Part 1 of this 
report. Specifically, we were interested in finding out about how 
people exploited their own intellectual property and how they dealt 
with relevant intellectual property owned by others. From the self-
exploitation perspective, we wanted to know the extent to which 
Australian participants in the biotechnology industry are encountering 
significant barriers in transfer of technology. From the perspective of 
accessing intellectual property owned by others, we wanted to know 
the extent to which particular patents have a restrictive effect on 
downstream access, and whether an anticommons effect could be said 
to be occurring in the industry. Respondents were asked generally 
about the patent and licensing activity of their company or institution, 
and were then asked a series of questions designed to examine issues 
particularly relevant to them in more detail. The interviews were 
structured to allow us to consider whether patents and patent licensing 
are having an effect on research and/or the commercialisation of 
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patents, and ways in which respondents are overcoming any such 
effects.  
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RESULTS CHAPTER 1: RESEARCH 
AND PATENT ISSUES 
 
The strengths in the biomedical research in Australia were generally 
recognised by the respondents to our surveys and by interview 
respondents. As one respondent put it:  
 
Australia is food for the creative side of innovation, 
thinking outside the square. Because of our isolation 
we have the courage as well as intelligence.  
 
Research institution and company respondents alike confirmed that 
there are extensive research opportunities in Australia. Public sector 
researchers have access to funding for research projects from  public 
funders such as the NHMRC and the ARC and also from overseas 
sources, particularly the United States National Institutes of Health.  
 
They also have access to research funding from the private sector 
through collaborations with industry partners both within Australia 
and overseas. Our results show that one of the dominant features of 
the biotechnology industry in Australia is widespread alliance activity 
between the public and private sectors. Details of these arrangements 
are reported in Chapter 3 of our results.  
 
Finally, research organisations also have the capacity to feed back 
licence fees and royalties obtained through licensing out existing 
innovations into future research projects. However, one research 
institution respondent commented that it is now much harder to get 
money from industry for basic research than it was in the past. He 
stated that: 
 
In the past, industry may have funded public good 
work along the way. Now industry is much more 
focused and in order to secure funding it is necessary 
to go into an area that is valuable to industry. 
Consequently, for gene discovery work, the balance is 
shifting back to public funding because industry cannot 
readily make money out of it. So, we are much more 
likely to go to the NHMRC or the NIH than industry. If 
we find something along the way, we then seek a 
commercial partner. 
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This comment was certainly not isolated, and has implications for the 
patent system as an incentive for innovation; basic research is a 
crucial resource for the biotechnology industry and clearly the impact 
of a strong focus on patenting is being felt at a fundamental research 
level. 
 
In this chapter we report on survey and interview data relating to 
patent activity in Australia and on the views of our respondents about 
the value of patents and the impact of patents on research and 
development.  
 
 
PATENT ACTIVITY 
 
There is widespread ownership of patents in the biotechnology 
industry and in research institutions involved in this area of research. 
Thirty-seven of the 49 respondents to the company survey said that 
their company owned patents (76 percent). Similarly, 19 of the 23 
respondents to the research institutions survey said they owned 
patents (82 percent) and one of the others stated that their institution 
had an equity share in the company owing patents for inventions 
created in the institution.174  
 
Conversely, only two of the 18 respondents to the diagnostics survey 
indicated that they owned patents. However, it must be taken into 
account that of the 18 respondents, only 13 said that they were 
involved in research. On this basis, 15 percent of those diagnostics 
facilities with a research program had patents. These results probably 
reflect the nature of research being conducted in diagnostics facilities, 
but they are also likely to reflect different attitudes about patenting 
and commercialisation.   
 
One respondent involved in diagnostics research commented that 
although his laboratory had patentable technology it had not been 
patented because the patent process was simply too hard, in part 
because of lack of expertise but also in part because of intransigence 
on the part of some parties regarding ownership. He added that at the 
end of the day unless the patent process is made easy he would not 
                                                 
174 It is perhaps surprising that a higher percentage of research institutions than 
companies reported that they owned patent. Some of the possible reasons for this 
are explored later when we consider technology transfer. 
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bother. Another research institution respondent described the 
patenting process as boring and painful. 
 
Only a very small number of company respondents commented that 
patenting was not part of their commercial strategy. One respondent 
said that his company’s strategy was to rely on trade secrecy rather 
than patents. His justification was that patents are only as good as 
your defence of them. It will become apparent that defending patents 
is a major issue.  
 
Many patent holders, particularly those in the public sector, do not 
have adequate funding to contemplate instituting infringement 
proceedings or opposition proceedings to challenge the validity of 
competitors’ patents. Nevertheless, it is clear that in general patenting 
is seen as an essential part of the mainstream commercialisation 
process in Australia.  
 
Trade secrecy may well be a valid alternative strategy in some areas 
of research and development, particularly when it is difficult to 
reverse engineer. However, one respondent pointed out that in the 
area of genetic technology you don’t have to be too clever to reverse 
engineer and therefore patents are absolutely necessary. This was 
confirmed by another respondent who stated that: “often you put in a 
patent and a competitor will have theirs ready to go a week later. 
Trade secrecy doesn’t make a lot of difference at this stage, but may 
be useful at the lead compound stage.” 
 
Numbers of patents 
 
As previously discussed, there has been a huge escalation in the 
number of biotechnology patent applications filed in most countries, 
including Australia. Indeed, some gene sequencing companies have 
issued statements reporting that they have filed thousands of 
applications.175 We sought information about the quantum of 
patenting in each of the three sectors of the industry that we surveyed. 
Respondents were asked to specify the number of patents that they 
owned. The results are summarised in Table 3.  
 
                                                 
175 See Nicol and Nielsen, above n4 at 360. 
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Table 3: Numbers of patents held 
 
Number Research 
institutions (%) 
Companies (%) Diagnostic 
facilities with 
research base (%) 
0 3 (13) 12 (25) 11 (85) 
1 2 (9) 2 (5)  
2-4 4 (17) 7# (14) 1 (8) 
5-9 6# (26) 4 (8)  
10-19 2 (9) 7#** (14)  
20-50 5 (22) 4 (8)  
>50 0 (0) 9* (18)  
Not specified 1 (4) 3 (6) 1 (8) 
No answer 0 (0) 1 (2)  
 
Three of the company respondents referred to in Table 3 
distinguished between granted patents and applications (marked as * - 
numbers represent granted patents only). Given the time lag between 
application and grant, it is likely that a number of the patents referred 
to by respondents in Table 3 have not yet been granted. Ultimately, 
some of these may fail to satisfy the patent requirements, and hence 
the number of granted patents may actually be lower than reported 
herein. Nevertheless, the results give broad guidance as to the 
quantum of patenting by Australian organisations surveyed by us. 
One respondent in the research institutions survey and two 
respondents in the company survey referred to the numbers of 
families of patents rather than the number of patents per se (marked 
as #). As such, it is possible that a number of respondents may have 
been referring to patent families rather than individual patents. 
 
These results show that large scale patenting is not the norm in the 
Australian industry, or at least in the sectors that responded to our 
surveys. For example, these results show that the majority of 
respondents in research institutions and in the private sector have less 
than 10 patents. These results probably reflect the structure of the 
industry in Australia. Although quality research may be performed in 
Australian research institutions, there are insufficient resources to 
support large scale patenting. The private sector is largely made up of 
small upstream and intermediate companies that are also likely to lack 
the resources to support large patent portfolios. Of those companies 
that reported owning more than 50 patents, only one reported that the 
number of patents owned by the company was in the “thousands”. 
One other put the number at “hundreds”. Both of these were foreign 
owned companies. Only one respondent from an Australian owned 
company reported owning more than 150 patents. The rest fell 
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somewhere between 50 and 150. Most of these reported that their 
activities were primarily downstream, although one respondent said 
that their company owned 123 patents and engaged in both upstream 
and downstream research. 
 
Types of patents 
 
Survey respondents were also asked to identify the nature of their 
patents within the broad categories of: gene sequence, research tool, 
gene product, drug, diagnostic and other. The results are summarised 
in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Types of patents held 
 
Types Research 
institutions (%) 
Companies (%) Diagnostic 
facilities with 
research base (%) 
Gene sequence 6 (26) 14 (29) 1 (8) 
Research tool 9 (39) 8 (16)  
Gene product 5 (22) 8 (16) 1 (8) 
Drug 10 (43) 18 (37)  
Diagnostic 11 (48) 15 (31) 2 (15) 
Other 4 (17) 15 (31)  
 
These figures show the number of respondents with patents that 
include claims in each of these areas rather than the actual number of 
patents. A single patent may fall within a number of the categories 
listed in the survey questions, hence the total percentages add up to 
more than 100. These results are intended to provide broad guidance 
as to the areas in which patent applications are being made rather than 
precise quantitative data. In the category of “other” patent types, 
respondents listed such things as equipment, therapies, bioactive 
products and formulations and four of the company respondents listed 
devices. 
 
These results show that the types of patents held by respondents 
spread across the whole gamut from gene sequences to drugs. Some 
of the patents owned by Australian companies are likely to be 
foundational in nature (the GTG junk DNA patents being the prime 
example). However, as previously indicated, the majority of the most 
controversial foundational patents that have been discussed in the 
literature are foreign-owned.  
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Filing of patents 
 
Most respondents stated that they or their clients routinely patented in 
the United States and in a number of European countries. The next 
most favoured country was Japan. Some respondents stated that they 
started with a broad sweep of countries and then narrowed depending 
on a number of financial and other decisions. For example, one 
respondent stated that they would consider patenting in countries 
where a disease was prevalent as well as the countries with the largest 
markets. However, the cost involved in maintaining a patent in a 
number of countries was a major factor in deciding both where to 
patent in the first instance and where to keep patents active. 
 
Although most respondents said that they invariably took out patents 
in Australia, there was a certain degree of ambivalence about the 
value of Australian patents. Indeed, one respondent commented that 
his company filed in Australia only “out of nostalgia”. In general the 
reason given for the lack of enthusiasm about patenting in Australia 
was the small size of the Australian market for products sold under 
patent. Clearly this is a good reason for not patenting exclusively in 
Australia. However, it would be difficult for an Australian company 
to justify excluding Australia altogether from the list of companies in 
which to pursue patent applications. Indeed, although disparaging 
remarks about the value of Australian patents were common, in 
practice no single respondent actually said that they did not file 
patents in Australia.  
 
For some respondents, patenting in Australia seems to be more 
important from the public perception perspective than from a 
financial one. In particular, respondents from public sector 
institutions and public companies commented on the desirability of 
being seen to be giving something back to the Australian public: 
unless products are patented here they will not be marketed here. 
Public company respondents said that they simply had to do this for 
public interest purposes. For public research institutions, respondents 
commented that there was even stronger justification to patent in 
Australia because of the mandate to ensure benefit for Australia 
economically and socially.  
 
One respondent noted that, because of the small volume of patents 
passing through the Australian Patent Office and the relatively 
smooth process of examination, sometimes an Australian patent will 
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be pursued as a test case and used as a basis for other applications 
elsewhere. 
 
VIEWS ON PATENTS 
 
The Australian patent system 
 
One of the problems with the Australian patent system that was 
consistently identified by respondents was the breadth of patent 
claims that are granted here. Respondents noted that in contrast, the 
United States Patent and Trademarks Office is much more rigorous in 
its analysis of patent claims and will reject claims that go too far 
beyond the scope of the invention. However, another respondent 
expressed an entirely contrary view, that if anything the United States 
Patent and Trademarks Office grants broader patents than the 
Australian Patent Office. No other respondent backed up this 
assertion. Interestingly, a recent comparative study by Melanie 
Howlett and Andrew Christie of patent office practice in the United 
States, Europe, Japan and Australia relating to examination of EST 
patents provides no evidence to support these views. In fact, Howlett 
and Christie found that although the approach taken to examination 
differs slightly between offices, the results are essentially the same in 
that in all jurisdictions studied EST patents will often fail to fulfil the 
essential patenting requirements and hence will be rejected.176 
 
Many of our respondents emphasised the importance of obtaining 
good patents. The need for this will become apparent in later 
discussions. In summary, the argument is that if patents are overly 
broad or otherwise have uncertain validity they may be ignored by 
other players in the field. The patent holder will then have to 
undertake the costly process of enforcing the patent through 
infringement proceedings, which carries the additional risk that if a 
counterclaim is made the patent may be declared invalid.  However, 
as one patent attorney noted, a broad claim, even if invalid is very 
powerful in the right hands. 
 
Respondents identified as one of the major problems the lack of 
resources for the Australian Patent Office to do its job adequately. 
Although this problem is alleviated to a certain extent by the right to 
                                                 
176 M.J. Howlett and A.F. Christie An Analysis of the Approaches of the Trilateral 
and Australian Patent Offices to Patenting Partial DNA Sequences (ESTS) (2003) 
IPRIA Working Paper 09/03. 
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pre-grant challenge in opposition proceedings, this significantly adds 
to the cost of participating in the patent and commercialisation 
process. As one respondent commented: 
 
The Australian Patent Office is doing a good job for 
what it has. However, it is becoming more focused on 
a 3 hour examination. I have become disillusioned in 
that. It is being perceived as more of a rubber-stamping 
office. It should be letting through only good patents, 
but it lets through rubbish. Litigation is relied on to sort 
it out. This is against the purpose of the patent system.  
 
Some respondents made specific comments relating to the 2001 
amendments to the Patents Act 1990, which particularly affect 
novelty and inventive step. One respondent commented that these are 
unlikely to make much difference to the examination process. 
However, another expressed the opposite view, that the changes are 
significant because they will bring us in line with rest of world. This 
respondent went on to say that:  
 
You get the feeling overseas patents are worth a lot 
more than Australian patents. The changes will make a 
big difference. From our point of view it will be a big 
change. We now need to submit patent searches and 
education of researchers will be important. However, 
the grace period will not make a big difference. 
 
Other respondents also noted that whilst it is good to have a grace 
period in Australia, it will not really assist them because there is a 
lack of uniformity with regard to this provision world wide.   
  
The impact of patents on research and development 
 
Participants in each of the surveys were asked their views on the 
impact of patents on biotechnology research generally and on the 
impact of specific types of patents on their research. The results are 
summarised in Tables 5 and 6. 
 
Respondents were asked the following question: do you consider that 
allowing the patenting of biotechnology inventions has a positive or a 
negative impact on research in this industry? They were also asked to 
provide comments in support of their views. Some respondents noted 
that their answer depended very much on the type of patent. Those 
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answers are recorded in the “varies” column in Table 5 and Table 6. 
Some of their specific comments are reported more fully below. 
 
Table 5: General views on the impact of patents on research 
 
Industry 
sector 
Positive 
(%) 
Negative 
(%) 
Varies 
(%) 
Nil (%) No answer 
(%) 
Companies 
 
33 (68) 1 (2) 8 (17) 0 7 (13) 
Research 
institutions 
11 (50) 4 (18) 3 (14) 0 4 (18) 
Diagnostic 
facilities177 
0 5 (39) 3 (23) 3 (23) 2 (15) 
 
Table 6: Views on the impact of types of patents on research178  
 
Type of patent 
 
Positive 
(%) 
Negative 
(%) 
Nil (%) Varies 
(%) 
No answer 
(%) 
Gene sequence  
  Company 
  Institution 
  Diagnostic 
 
21 (43) 
3 (14) 
1 (8) 
 
14 (29) 
6 (27) 
10 (77) 
 
3 (6) 
6 (27) 
1 (8) 
 
0 
3 (14) 
0 
 
11 (22) 
4 (18) 
1 (8) 
Research tool 
  Company 
  Institution 
  Diagnostic 
 
18 (37) 
8 (36) 
5 (39) 
 
15 (31) 
5 (23) 
3 (23) 
 
5 (10) 
2 (9) 
2 (15) 
 
0 
4 (18) 
1 (8) 
 
11 (22) 
3 (14) 
2 (15) 
Gene product 
  Company 
  Institution 
  Diagnostic 
 
28 (57) 
10 (46) 
2 (15) 
 
6 (12) 
2 (9) 
9 (69) 
 
2 (4) 
3 (14) 
0 
 
0 
3 (14) 
0 
 
13 (27) 
4 (18) 
2 (15) 
Drug 
  Company 
  Institution 
  Diagnostic179 
 
36 (74) 
14 (64) 
- 
 
3 (6) 
1 (5) 
- 
 
1 (2) 
2 (9) 
- 
 
1 (2) 
2 (9) 
- 
 
8 (16) 
3 (14) 
- 
Diagnostic 
  Company 
  Institution 
  Diagnostic 
 
34 (69) 
13 (59) 
3 (23) 
 
2 (4) 
1 (5) 
5 (39) 
 
2 (4) 
2 (9) 
1 (8) 
 
1 (2) 
2 (9) 
1 (8) 
 
10 (20) 
4 (18) 
3 (23) 
Other180  
  Company 
  Institution 
  Diagnostic 
 
7 (14) 
3 (14) 
0 
 
1 (2) 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
41 (84) 
19 (86) 
13 (100) 
                                                 
177 Percentages are out of the respondents that undertake research (13), not the total 
number of respondents (18). 
178 Percentages for diagnostics are  out of the respondents that undertake research 
(13), not the total number of respondents (18). 
179 Diagnostics facilities were not asked this question. 
180 Includes targets, uses, formulations.  
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Respondents were asked which types of patents are likely to have 
either a positive or a negative effect on biotechnology research. Those 
respondents whose answers are recorded in the “varies” column noted 
that the impact of specific patents on research varied depending on a 
whole range of factors.  Some of their comments are reported below.  
 
Specific comments from company respondents 
Tables 5 and 6 clearly show that respondents in biotechnology 
companies generally view the impact of patents on their research 
positively. Indeed, survey respondents who provided specific 
comments generally considered that patents were essential for 
recovery of research and development expenditure and to ensure there 
was adequate incentive for investment in the industry. For example, 
one respondent stated that: “Patent protection must be sought for our 
company’s survival.” Another suggested that in the absence of patents 
“…there would be no industry.” One respondent offered the 
following comments on the benefits of obtaining patent protection: 
 
1.  It provides early tangibles of value; 
2.  The prosecution phase can provide early warning of 
any impending issues.  
 
Of the eight respondents who offered a qualified answer to the 
general question about the impact of patenting on research, most were 
of the view that patents were positive. However, certain aspects of the 
patent system troubled them. For example, one respondent who 
considered that patents are fundamental to the industry nonetheless 
stated: 
 
When properly adopted and implemented [the patent 
system] is positive and rewards innovation. If done in a 
reluctant haphazard manner – inconsistent, with no 
direction it has [a] negative impact. It is the best 
system [but] needs to be better used and administered. 
 
Patents that were too broad were a concern to two of these 
respondents. One also referred to the length of time it took to have a 
patent granted. Another respondent’s view was that they were 
undecided because “increasingly costs are becoming prohibitive for 
small companies – maintenance, prosecution and getting around 
[freedom to operate].” 
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And finally: “where an inventive step is involved, the impact is 
positive. Where the patent deals with a mere discovery, highly 
negative.” 
 
Interview respondents, on the whole, also expressed favourable views 
of the patent system as a means of protecting research results, 
although there were some reservations about the present system. The 
comment extracted below is typical: 
 
I see a sound robust patent system as a very good 
thing… I have some concern with the one that we have 
– it is relatively costly and cumbersome. At the end of 
the day it will have a long-term impact on the 
biotechnology industry, especially in Australia. 
 
Specific comments from research institution respondents 
Table 5 shows that research institution respondents also generally 
viewed patents as having a positive impact on their research. A 
number of the survey respondents made specific comments in support 
of their viewpoints. One of the important considerations in the 
research sector is that the availability of patents encourages ongoing 
investment in research programs. One respondent summed up what 
seemed to be the general feeling of many respondents thus: “no 
patents = no investment!” Another said that “a strong intellectual 
property position is essential for future internal investment and 
required to attract commercial partners.” 
 
Some respondents took a broad view of the issues associated with the 
impact of patents on research. For example, one person commented 
that “more inventions need to be commercialised because this is vital 
to Australia’s long term growth and economy” and another said that 
patents have “an extremely positive effect as without patent coverage 
the commercialisation/establishment of a biotechnology sector is 
impossible.”  
 
Generally, most respondents in the research institution sector seemed 
to accept patenting as a necessary part of the process of doing 
research, irrespective of its “effect” as such. For example, one 
respondent who expressed the view that all of the various types of 
patents have no effect on research qualified this by saying that: 
 
Patenting is generally necessary if a discovery is to be 
advanced to a useful application. It is considered part 
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of the process, as is publication, and as it is in any field 
of innovation. 
 
I don’t believe that patenting has no effect – it is just 
that the effect is multidimensional and should not be 
simply termed positive or negative – this presupposes 
there is a good and/or bad direction for research. 
 
Others commented on the dual effect of patents. On the one hand they 
“promote technology transfer from the bench to the clinic and 
industry”, but on the other hand they “restrict the use of the invention 
for further research by other parties and have the potential for 
companies to restrict a technology reaching the market.”  
 
The positive view about patents in the research sector is supported by 
the interview data. For example, one respondent expressed the view 
that all patenting is pretty much positive.  A number of interviewees 
in both the research and the company sector made more specific 
comments in relation to patent breadth and gene patents. These issues 
are discussed in the next two sections.   
 
Patent breadth 
 
There is extensive literature dealing with the optimal design of 
intellectual property rights.181 A subset of this literature deals with the 
effect of patent breadth on subsequent innovation, and debates the 
question of allocation of rights and co-ordination of later research.182  
 
We were interested in exploring the views of our respondents towards 
these issues of patent breadth and its impact on innovation. To this 
end, we asked our survey respondents a question dealing with 
inhibition of research. Twelve respondents to our company survey 
answered that the grant of broad patents has an inhibitory effect on 
research (24 percent). Probably around two thirds of these undertook 
research activities that could be classified as relatively downstream. 
Six of the 18 respondents to the diagnostics survey considered that 
                                                 
181 In the context of biotechnology, see, for example, J. Barton, ‘Patent Scope in 
Biotechnology’ (1995) 26 International Review of Industrial Property and 
Copyright Law 605. 
182 See, for example, Kitch above n130; Scotchmer above n141; R. Merges and R. 
Nelson ‘Market Structure and Technical Advance: The Role of Patent Scope 
Decisions’ in Jorde and Teece (eds) Antitrust, Innovation and Competitiveness 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 185. 
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broad patents had some sort of negative effect on research (33 
percent). Seven of the 23 respondents to the research institutions 
survey said that they thought patent breadth had some negative 
impact on research (30 percent).183 
 
A number of our interview respondents commented that the early 
patents in this area were exceedingly broad, particularly those granted 
in the United States in the early 1990s. However, there were various 
comments to the effect that the system appears to have worked itself 
out now, particularly in the United States where two important factors 
come into play: 
 
• broad patents that have already been granted are not being 
upheld in the courts; and 
• it is now much more difficult to get a broad patent than in the 
past.  
 
The importance of being able to obtain broad patent coverage was 
recognised by many respondents. For example, one patent attorney 
commented that all clients want broad patents, but that she has to 
work within the realms of patent law. She confirmed that United 
States claims are much more strictly limited to what is disclosed in 
the specification than Australian claims and that it is possible to get a 
much broader scope of claim here. Most respondents who commented 
on the issue of patent breadth in the interviews noted that they 
continue to seek as broad protection as they could, with one upstream 
company respondent summing up the matter as follows: 
 
It is difficult to answer questions about broad patents 
as it depends on where on the fence you sit… In my 
view the broader the patents the better. We are fairly 
aggressive in obtaining the broadest protection we 
can… But you have to obtain good patents. Many of 
patents at the moment are not sound enough. In the US 
you have to go through a lot to get a patent – the new 
requirements have really tightened up the system.  
 
A licensing consultant also commented: 
 
                                                 
183 One other respondent referred to the breadth of MTAs as being a problem rather 
than patents. 
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Australian practice is to have the first claim as broad as 
possible and have an omnibus claim as the last claim. 
Some patents have failed on validity on everything but 
the omnibus claim. People want broad patents to freeze 
others out. 
 
The risk to patent holders is that if claims are too broad they may be 
declared invalid if challenged. This carries with it various other 
problems, most particularly: 
 
• for patent holders there may be an unwillingness to enforce 
patent rights for fear of losing the patent;  
• for people wishing to work in the area of the patented 
technology, they may end up paying unnecessary licence fees, 
wasting resources in inventing around, ignoring the patent and 
risking infringement proceedings, or, at worst, abandoning a 
whole area of research; 
• for the consumer, there may be delay in access to new 
products, and there may also be detrimental effects on cost, 
quality and choice of products. 
 
However, some respondents did acknowledge that not all broad 
claims are necessarily invalid. As one respondent pointed out, where 
there is a truly novel invention it should be rewarded with a broad 
patent, and industry will generally respect such patents.  
 
The obvious desirability for some of our respondents of obtaining 
broad patent protection has to be tempered by the effect of broad 
claims on others, particularly for follow-on research.184 A 
consideration of broad patents and how they affect innovation within 
the industry is therefore important, and there has certainly been 
concern within the biotechnology industry that broad claims on 
fundamental inventions could have an inhibitory effect on follow-on 
research.185  
 
Impact of broad patents on research 
 
Given that a considerable number of patents granted in the last decade 
may be invalid, some respondents were content to ignore relevant 
                                                 
184 J. Barton ‘Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth and 
Sequential Innovation’ (1997) 65 Antitrust Law Journal 449; R. Merges and R. 
Nelson, above n141. 
185 See, for example, Barton, ibid. 
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patents and challenge their validity if approached by the patent 
holder. For example, one respondent involved in public sector testing 
and research stated that: 
 
Some patents are a little broad and if challenged 
would not stand up. In some ways it doesn’t matter if 
they are granted broadly. If you are infringing in a 
broad sense rather than narrowly, [you can] just let 
them pursue you. 
 
A number of other respondents made similar comments. Many of 
them said that they often waited to see what the outcome was likely to 
be. It remains to be seen whether the more stringent patent 
requirements, more rigorous examination procedures and court 
interpretations of patents will be sufficient control mechanisms. 
Certainly most respondents thought it was likely that the breadth issue 
would be resolved through these mechanisms. A number of 
respondents referring to more recent, narrower patents found that 
inventing around these patents had become more straightforward. 
Patents that were broad but genuinely valid were not considered to be 
a problem given that most respondents were strong advocates of the 
patent system.  
 
Interestingly, one respondent from a device company held the view 
that the court process was leading to broader interpretation of patent 
claims: 
 
The court system tends to be very cyclical. If there is a 
fuss about broad patents they tend to be more narrowly 
construed. Then it will go the other way.  
 
There is clearly a theoretical link between patent breadth and 
limitations on research, and it is often impossible to provide adequate 
rewards to both basic inventors and follow-on inventors.186 Despite 
this, most respondents were fairly optimistic about their ability to 
continue research despite the presence of broad patents, and felt that 
the problem of broad patents was dissipating as patent offices 
tightened up their examination procedures.  
 
                                                 
186 Scotchmer, above n141. 
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Gene patents 
 
The survey data presented in Table 6 clearly shows that all sectors of 
the industry have greater concerns about the potential for gene patents 
to have a negative impact on research than for any other types of 
patents. As with the survey data, a number of interview respondents 
expressed some doubt as to whether gene patents had a positive effect 
on research.  
 
Perhaps predictably, respondents at the downstream end of the 
research-development continuum tended to have more negative views 
about upstream patents than respondents at the upstream end. For 
example, one respondent from a large pharmaceutical company stated 
that in his view upstream patents generally have a negative effect on 
research, particularly gene sequence patents. Another downstream 
company respondent expressed the view that inventors just surmise 
function in this area. They use homologies, claim the gene, protein, 
antagonist, antisense for gene therapy. In his view, although the effect 
may not be great now, this will have an effect 10-15 years down the 
track on the development of new therapies. 
 
On the other hand, an upstream company respondent pointed out that 
the ability to patent function when the gene is known is essential to 
his company, and without it the company could not continue to exist. 
A number of respondents noted that there was a clear distinction in 
patenting of gene sequences between those sequences of unknown 
function and those of known function. One respondent said that: 
 
It is unhelpful patenting the sequence for the sake of it. 
This is also the case where you have a sequence and 
some computational analysis giving putative function. 
However, when you know function and know that this 
is useful for disease identification and treatment then 
patents are appropriate. General sequence information 
is not particularly useful to a given outcome. An 
enormous amount of work is still required to produce a 
therapeutic or diagnostic. A sequence patent can make 
things terribly difficult later on, re no inventive step, 
etc. But once value has been added, e.g. by finding a 
mutation relating to a disease that may lead to a 
diagnostic test, etc then patents are essential. Without 
them, you can’t get the invention commercialised.  
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Some company respondents indicated that they did not perceive gene 
sequence patents to present any difficulties given that many gene 
sequences are in the public domain. Of course, this is not the case 
with all gene sequences, and we also had comments that it really 
depended on the research being done as to whether or not a patent 
was problematic. Most respondents agreed that where the function of 
a gene sequence had been identified, there was a sufficiently 
inventive step to make a patent an appropriate form of protection. In 
essence: 
 
Gene sequence patents also have problems. The main 
issue is utility; there is nothing inventive about them. 
Really they just involve discovery. The real invention is 
finding a valid use, particularly in relation to homology 
claims. Utility will become an increasingly important 
requirement. 
 
Research tool patents 
 
A greater percentage of survey respondents expressed negative views 
about the impact of research tool patents on their research than for all 
other categories of patents. However, these views were not reflected 
in our interview data. The granting of research tool patents was not 
considered to be particularly problematic for a majority of our 
interview respondents. We extract a number of quotes below from 
interview respondents across all sectors of the industry. These quotes 
clearly demonstrate the lack of concern about enforcement of research 
tool patents in Australia. 
 
This [research tool patenting] hasn’t been a problem 
for us. In our research there is no patent we are aware 
of that we would infringe. 
 
Access has never really been a problem. One 
exception is Roche’s PCR technology. 
 
Research tool patents and gene sequence patents do 
not create any problems for us. 
 
I have never had to deal with patents over research 
tools. Never really come across a problem. This is may 
be because people are not aware that the patents exist. 
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We try not to license in research tools – we have no 
current research tool licences, but we will have to in 
future. I do not like patents on research tools or gene 
sequences – it is difficult to track universities using 
them. 
 
We have no real problems with access to enabling 
technologies. 
 
We don’t have any licences to use research tools. 
 
I haven’t done a research tool licence. 
 
In our view this may be because industry participants in Australia 
may not yet have been faced with the aggressive enforcement 
practices of some research tool patent holders that have occurred in 
the United States, either because the relevant research tools have not 
been patented in Australia or because attention has not yet been 
focused on the Australian industry. Much of our data was collected 
before it became widely known that GTG was enforcing its junk 
DNA patents. Hence, views on research tool patents may well have 
changed in the last few months. In addition, we believe that views 
expressed in interview data on research tool patents arise in part 
because respondents may interpret the term “research tool” in the 
narrow sense.187  
 
In conclusion, despite the negative views about the impact of research 
tool patents on research, we found hardly any evidence of research 
tool patents having an adverse impact on research and development. 
One upstream company respondent noted that that is probably 
because people are generally not aware that these patents exist. A 
number of respondents commented that research tool patents were 
notoriously difficult to enforce, and that this tended to decrease their 
value. Where complaints were made about research tool patents, these 
tended to be related to problems encountered in licensing-in, and the 
fact that holders of research tool patents frequently attempt to claim 
reach-through rights or royalties from licensees.  These particular 
issues form the basis of much of our discussion in Results Chapters 4 
and 5. 
                                                 
187 See Context Chapter 3 for a discussion of the definition of research tool patents. 
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CHAPTER 2: TRANSFER OF 
TECHNOLOGY 
 
Intellectual property represents the most important asset of virtually 
all participants in the biotechnology industry. One of the reasons for 
this is that self-exploitation is not the norm across the Australian 
industry. In most circumstances biotechnology companies cannot rely 
on product sales to recover costs and secure profits. In this regard, the 
Australian industry conforms with the structure of the international 
industry, in that many players in the industry are in the business of 
value-adding to technology before transferring it further 
downstream.188 Hence, technology transfer is a crucial process within 
the industry.  
 
Our results reveal that there are a number of strategies employed by 
owners of intellectual property when it comes to realising value on 
their technology. These strategies might include: 
 
• setting up a spin off company which is assigned ownership of 
the intellectual property from the parent research institution  
or given an exclusive licence; 
• exclusively or non-exclusively licensing with upfronts, 
milestone and/or royalty payments; 
• entering into a collaboration, with specific provisions relating 
to ownership of existing and future intellectual property;  
• co-ownership; 
• assigning for a flat upfront fee or with future royalties; 
• merger of entities or taking over another entity for the specific 
purpose of gaining a commercial advantage.  
 
Choice of strategy will often depend on the nature of any existing 
collaborative or other arrangements. From the research institution 
perspective, it may be that a research collaboration is entered into 
between the institution and a private sector partner prior to the 
generation of any intellectual property. Or there may be a more 
formal collaborative network, for example the CRC network, in 
which case arrangements for ownership and transfer of technology are 
likely to have been specified in the head agreement.  
 
                                                 
188 See further Nicol and Nielsen, above n4. 
Results Chapter 2 
________________________________________________________ 
94  
In other instances, intellectual property may have been generated 
using public funding, in which case industry partners are sought for 
the purpose of transferring existing technology. The arrangements for 
dealing with intellectual property rights will often be quite complex, 
particularly when partners bring existing intellectual property 
(background intellectual property) into their relationship. Agreements 
will generally specify the arrangements for dealing with background 
and foreground intellectual property. 
 
Private companies seeking to transfer their technology to downstream 
partners will also employ varying strategies, depending on the nature 
of the technology and a host of other factors. This chapter reports our 
findings relating to the issues associated with transfer of technology. 
We first report on the number and types of collaborations being 
entered into. We then report on the quantum of licensing-out of 
intellectual property  
 
 
SURVEY DATA ON COLLABORATIVE 
ACTIVITY 
 
Collaborative activity: research institutions 
 
Our survey and interview data reveals extensive collaborative activity 
within all sectors of the industry (at least amongst our respondents). It 
also reveals that the nature of this collaborative activity often 
determined ownership of any existing intellectual property or 
intellectual property generated by the collaborative arrangement. All 
three sets of survey respondents were asked a series of questions 
about collaborations. Collaborations were particularly common within 
the research institution segment of the industry, but were widespread 
across the industry. Nineteen of the 23 research institution 
respondents reported being involved in collaborative arrangements 
(83 percent), with all of these respondents reporting that they were 
involved in at least two collaborations. Table 7 lists the number of 
collaborations per respondent and Table 8 provides details as to the 
nature of these collaborative activities.  
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Table 7: Collaborative activity: research institution survey 
respondents 
 
Number of collaborations Number of respondents (%) 
0 3 (13) 
1 0 (0) 
2-4 5 (22) 
5-9 3(13) 
10-19 4 (17) 
20-49 4 (17) 
>50 0 (0) 
Number not specified 3 (13)189 
No answer 1 (4) 
 
Table 8: Types of collaborators and their geographical location: 
research institution survey respondents. 
 
Types of collaborators Number and geographical  
location 
Small or medium sized  
biotechnology company 
14: 9 Australian; 3 not specified;  
3 Australian and overseas 
Large company 
(biotechnology/pharmaceutical) 
15: 3 Australian; 3 not specified;  
1 Australian and overseas; 8 overseas 
Government 5: 4 Australian; 1 overseas 
Technology transfer company 3: 3 Australian 
Other research institution 13: 5 Australian; 3 not specified;  
4 Australian and overseas; 1 overseas 
CRC 8: 8 Australian 
Other 4 
  
Note that most respondents indicated that they had several types of 
collaborations. Hence, the total number of collaborations reported in 
Table 8 is greater than the total number of research institution survey 
respondents. By far the greatest number of collaborations were with 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies (as well as other 
research institutions), with 14 respondents reporting that they had 
arrangements with small or medium sized companies, and 15 
respondents reporting that they had collaborative arrangements with 
large biotechnology or pharmaceutical companies. This result is not 
surprising given the increasing trend of research institutions to 
commercialise their research results, and reflects a tendency to opt to 
partner with private companies that have the ability to commercialise 
that research. These results were backed up by the interview data that 
                                                 
189 One of these respondents said that their institution had been involved in “many” 
collaborations. 
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confirmed that research institutions increasingly seek industry backing 
and assistance in commercialising the outcomes of research projects. 
 
Collaborative activity: companies 
 
As a logical extension of the research institution data, high levels of 
collaborative activity were also reported in the company survey. 
Forty-three respondents to the company survey had entered into 
collaborations (88 percent). By far the majority of collaborations were 
with research institutions, although a considerable number of 
collaborative arrangements had been entered into with other 
companies. Table 9 lists the number of respondents who had entered 
into collaborations with various types of institutions, and the 
geographical location of those institutions.  
 
Table 9: Types of collaborators: company survey respondents 
 
Types of collaborations Number and geographical 
location 
Small or medium sized  
biotechnology company 
20: 9 Australian; 3 Australian  
and overseas; 8 overseas 
Large company 
(biotechnology/pharmaceutical) 
20: 3 Australian; 3 not specified; 
4 Australian and overseas; 10 overseas 
Government 0 
Technology transfer company 0 
Research institution 33: 24 Australian; 1 not specified; 
6 Australian and overseas; 2 overseas 
CRC 10: 10 Australian 
Other 3 (hospitals, research clinics) 
 
As with the research institution responses in Table 8, most company 
respondents indicated that they had more than one type of 
collaboration and hence the total number of collaborations reported in 
Table 9 is greater than the total number of company survey 
respondents.190 
 
These results reflect the strong research base of Australian research 
institutions, and confirm that they represent an important source of 
basic research to many upstream and intermediate companies within 
the Australian industry. In contrast, many of the collaborations 
                                                 
190 Note that two of the non-biomedical research respondents indicated that they had 
collaborations, one of which was with a large company and the other with a 
research institution and a small company. These data have been included in Table 9 
(the other two survey respondents from this sector did not report any collaborative 
activity). 
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entered into with other companies involved overseas rather than 
Australian companies. Again, the interview data presented below 
strongly supported these findings, suggesting that many Australian 
companies seek to export their technology to the larger overseas 
markets due to a lack of Australian funding opportunities. 
 
Collaborative activity: diagnostics facilities 
 
Significant collaborative activity was also reported by diagnostic 
facilities. Seven of the respondents to the diagnostics survey reported 
being involved in collaborations. Given that only 13 of the diagnostic 
facilities that we surveyed were involved in research activities, this 
represents more than half of diagnostic respondents involved in 
research of some kind (54 percent). Of the seven respondents, two 
reported only one collaborative agreement, three reported that they 
had between two and four agreements. One respondent reported over 
50 collaborations and another did not specify a precise number but 
said that they had ‘numerous’ collaborations. These collaborations 
were entered into with a mixture of Australian and overseas entities, 
as indicated in Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Types of collaborators: diagnostic facility survey results 
 
Types of collaborations Number and geographical  
location 
Small or medium sized  
biotechnology company 
1: 1 Australian 
Large company 
(biotechnology/pharmaceutical) 
3: 1 Australian; 2 overseas 
Government 1: 1 Australian 
Technology transfer company 0 
Research institution 4: 1 Australian; 1 Australian and  
overseas; 2 overseas 
CRC 0 
Other 0 
 
As with the research institution and company responses in Tables 8 
and 9, some diagnostic facility respondents indicated that they had 
more than one type of collaboration. 
 
Reasons for entering collaborative arrangements  
 
Collaborations are clearly an important component of the alliance 
activity of participants in the Australian industry, but how important 
is intellectual property as an impetus for collaborating? There many 
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be many reasons why institutions and companies enter into 
collaborative arrangements, including:191 
 
• obtaining revenues, for example from royalty payments; 
• accessing vertical capabilities;192 
• sharing products and technology; 
• reducing manufacturing or regulatory costs; and 
• attaining an international presence or gaining access to 
distribution networks. 
 
Motivations for entering into collaborations will vary depending on 
where in the product development pipeline respondents sit, and 
whether they are importing or exporting technology. The 
opportunities available will also influence the style of alliance. 
Research institution participants, for example, enter into 
collaborations primarily to assist them in developing, 
commercialising and exporting their technology. This is confirmed by 
their answers to a question that asked them to specify their reasons for 
entering into collaborative arrangements. Those reasons were given as 
follows:193 
 
• 12 said to secure access to intellectual property; 
• 11 said to enable the commercialisation of research through 
patenting; 
• 10 said to assist in meeting patent application costs. 
• five did so for the purposes of obtaining industry funding or 
contract research.194  
 
It is evident that research institutions rely heavily on industry 
assistance to enable them to commercialise research. The issues 
relating to technology transfer from research institutions to the private 
sector are canvassed in more detail below. Equally, however, 
obtaining access to intellectual property owned by another institution 
or company is an important basis for collaborating. Indeed, a vast 
                                                 
191 A Gutterman, Innovation and Competition Policy (London: Kluwer Law 
International Ltd; 1997) 125-7. 
192 Essentially this means that companies will seek to collaborate with companies at 
other stages of the research continuum to enable them to combine research 
capabilities. 
193 Where there may have been multiple reasons for entering a collaborative 
arrangement, respondents were asked to specify all of these reasons. 
194 Four other respondents gave answers – one said share skills/resources, one said 
strategic, one said useful application and the other said training. 
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majority of respondents said that they entered into collaborative 
arrangements to secure access to intellectual property. Only two 
respondents gave it as the sole reason for entering into a 
collaboration. These results were confirmed in interviews with 
research institution respondents, discussed below.  
 
Of the 43 company survey respondents who had entered into 
collaborations, 36 said that one of the reasons for doing so was to 
secure access to intellectual property owned by others (84 percent, 73 
percent of total respondents). This result is not surprising given that 
many companies occupy intermediate and downstream research 
categories, and even those involved in upstream research frequently 
need to access intellectual property held by others. Four of the 
diagnostic facility respondents stated that the reason for collaboration 
was to secure access to intellectual property. Of the others, one had 
collaborated to secure Research and Development funds, one to ‘get 
the work done’ and one because of common interests with their 
collaborator. 
 
Collaborations and patent ownership  
 
The research institution survey respondents were asked to specify 
what arrangements had been made for ownership of any intellectual 
property generated as a result of their collaborations. Ownership 
issues will usually be determined prior to the commencement of the 
arrangement. For example, there may be a term that all intellectual 
property must be assigned to the industry sponsor. In other instances, 
ownership may be assigned to another independent company. These 
issues were canvassed more fully in interviews, and are discussed 
below in the two concluding sections of this chapter. 
 
Four survey respondents said that the only arrangement they had was 
that their institution would own the intellectual property. In other 
cases, it would appear that a wide variety of arrangements had been 
entered into, and eight respondents listed more than one type of 
arrangement in relation to ownership. Eight respondents had entered 
into collaborations where newly-created intellectual property was 
owned by another participant in the collaboration, while 11 
respondents had entered into some arrangements where intellectual 
property was shared between participants.  
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SURVEY DATA ON LICENSING-OUT 
ACTIVITY 
 
Survey respondents were also asked about the extent to which they 
licensed-out their intellectual property and the nature of the licences, 
that is, whether they were exclusive or non-exclusive. The results are 
summarised in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Number and types of out-licences: research institution 
and company results 
 
Number Research institutions (%) Companies (%) 
0 8 (35)195 24 (49)196 
1 3 (13) 3 (6) 
2-4 3 (13) 9 (18 
5-9 2 (9) 1 (2) 
10-19 0 (0) 0 (0) 
20-49 1 (4) 1 (2) 
>50 1 (4) 0 (0) 
Number not specified 2 (9) 5 (10) 
No answer 3 (13) 6 (12) 
 
In addition, two of the diagnostic survey respondents reported 
licensing-out activity, one of whom reported two exclusive licences. 
The other did not specify the precise number of licences.   
 
In some respects, these results could be seen as surprising. Although 
82 percent of research institutions and 76 percent of companies 
reported that they owned patents, only 52 percent and 39 percent 
respectively, reported licensing-out activity. However, we need to 
look at the respondents who reported no licensing-out activity more 
closely. In the research institutions survey, of the eight respondents 
who reported no out-licensing activity, one had no patents. In the 
company survey, of the 24 respondents who said they had not 
licensed-out any patents, nine said they did not own any patents.  
 
                                                 
195 Note that one respondent said that a licence deal was under negotiation but had 
not yet been completed. 
196 Note that four respondents said that a licence deal was under negotiation but had 
not yet been completed. Also that one of the companies that reported no licensing 
out of their patents was from the non-biomedical research sector (the other three 
survey respondents from this sector did not own patents). 
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In Table 12 we provide short summaries of the status of the 15 
company respondents and the seven research institution respondents 
who reported that they had patent ownership but no out-licences. 
 
Table 12: Company and research institution respondents with 
patents but with no out-licences 
 
 Research Patents 
Companies   
1 Drug discovery Gene, tool, product, drug, 
diagnostic 
2 Drug discovery Drug 
3* Gene research, drug discovery Gene, drug 
4* Drug discovery, cancer Drug 
5 Diagnostic instruments Tool, drug, diagnostic 
6 Diagnostics Diagnostic 
7 Plant/ animal Drug 
8 Veterinary, drug Drug 
9 Drug discovery Research tools, synthetic 
processes 
10 Devices Devices 
11 Devices Devices 
12 Devices Devices, diagnostics 
13* Devices Devices 
14 Cancer Drug 
15 Not specified Gene, drug, diagnostic, 
manufacture 
Research 
institutions 
  
1 Gene, drug, vaccines, 
bioinformatics 
Drug 
2* Drug Drug 
3 Protein Treatment 
4 Gene, cancer, protein, drug Drug 
5 Gene, protein  Gene 
6 Enabling Tool, diagnostic 
7 Gene, cancer, virus, protein, 
drug, enabling, bioinformatics 
Gene, tool, product, drug, 
diagnostic, + others 
 
Companies and research institutions marked with an * stated that they 
had licence agreements under negotiation.  
 
It is possible that a number of the companies listed in Table 12 may 
be capable of bringing their products directly to market without the 
need to license-out. However, in several instances there may be an 
issue as to why a respondent’s patents have not been licensed-out. For 
example, we would expect company respondent 1, who indicated they 
Results Chapter 2 
________________________________________________________ 
102  
held 11 families of patents, to report some licensing-out activity. 
Similarly, it is perhaps surprising that company 14 reports no 
licensing-out activity. These figures are undoubtedly reflective of an 
industry in a growth phase. Some respondents may be endeavouring 
to get to the point where they are in a position to license-out, but may 
not have reached this point yet. Other respondents may exploit their 
technology themselves. Hence, the figures on the extent of licensing-
out activity should be read with some caution once the characteristics 
of companies who haven’t (or apparently haven’t) licensed-out are 
investigated.  
 
With regard to the research institutions listed in Table 12, although at 
least one said that they were open to licensing-out, it is likely that 
others utilise alternative strategies for transfer of patented technology. 
Two institutions noted that they had a number of collaborations, and 
these may well involve sharing or transfer of ownership rather than 
licensing-out. In the alternative, the institution may follow the 
strategy of forming a spin-off company to commercialise patented 
inventions instead of licensing-out.  
 
We can conclude that most patent holders are able to find ways to 
license-out their technology or to find other means of transferring 
their technology to other sectors of the industry. This conclusion is 
supported by our interview data. Many interview respondents 
confirmed that they were actively involved in licensing-out their 
technology, or were in the process of attempting to find parties 
interested in licensing their technology. Most respondents who had 
not entered into licensing agreements said that they intended seeking 
licensing-out opportunities when their technology was at a marketable 
stage.  
 
Nevertheless, respondents from all sectors repeatedly emphasised the 
difficulty of moving their technology out, and the long, drawn out 
process entailed in negotiating licences. Respondents from research 
institutions, in particular, stressed that the plethora of opportunities 
available to companies meant that they had difficulty making their 
technologies and products an attractive investment to companies. 
Even respondents from companies who were seeking to license-out, 
said that they had to work hard to attract commercial interest. Other 
studies support these findings. For example, Monotti and Ricketson 
point out the difficulty for patent holders in finding an appropriate 
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licensee who can pay an appropriate royalty and will pursue 
development of the invention to bring the product to market.197 
 
 
LICENSING, ASSIGNMENT AND MERGERS 
 
Our interview data suggests that participants in the Australian 
industry often lack the resources and infrastructure to self-exploit 
intellectual property, particularly in the area of drug development. 
However, this is less of a problem in other industry sectors, 
particularly in the device sector and in the non-human research sector. 
An inability to self-exploit is not in itself problematic provided that 
there are sufficient opportunities available for transferring technology. 
Few of our interview respondents who had intellectual property said 
that they didn’t exploit it because nobody would take it up, but in 
many cases the process of transferring technology contained many 
obstacles. The remaining question is which of the strategies for 
technology transfer is most beneficial to the Australian biotechnology 
industry.  
 
Interview respondents from both the public and private sector 
generally preferred licensing-out over assignment as a form of 
technology transfer. Many collaborative arrangements had licensing 
components, and many agreements involved considerable complexity. 
Whereas a licence gives a licensee the right to exploit aspects of the 
patented technology without infringing the patent, an assignment 
transfers ownership of the patent. Both licensing and assignment may 
be important components of collaborative relationships. Which 
strategy to adopt will depend on a number of factors including: 
 
• the importance of the technology to the patent holder; 
• the nature of the technology; 
• the likelihood of finding alternative investors; and 
• the negotiating strength of the parties.  
 
Licensing-out of intellectual property has a number of advantages 
over assignment. Perhaps most importantly, licensing allows the 
patent holder to retain control of the intellectual property in terms of 
ensuring the technology is exploited, and in terms of rights to 
                                                 
197 A. Monotti and S. Ricketson Universities and Intellectual Property (2003) 
Oxford University Press, Oxford at para 9.48 (hereafter Monotti and Ricketson). 
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improvements that are derived from the licensing relationship. For 
example, a licensing consultant said that: 
 
Assignment is not common and I don’t like to advise 
clients to do this because they lose control. This is 
particularly important when there is a royalty 
component and value adding through improvements. 
Generally a licensor will want a term that 
improvements are theirs or are licensed back royalty 
free. You don’t get this if you assign. 
 
Licence deals also assist patent holders in maintaining a more 
substantial patent portfolio, as well as the opportunity of an ongoing 
revenue stream. 
 
From the perspective of those respondents acquiring technology, a 
number said that they prefer to acquire it through assignment where 
possible, because of the increased control it gives them over 
exploitation of the technology. Other respondents preferred to 
licence-in technology because they were cautious about their ability 
to properly value technology for the purposes of assignment. 
Licensing allows valuation to be deferred to some extent. However, 
assigning-in has a major advantage over licensing-in in that it allows 
total control over the exploitation of the technology. A number of 
respondents suggested that this prompted them to make efforts to 
overcome any problems they encountered in valuation. Most 
respondents who were engaged in intermediate or downstream 
research agreed that their best position was to be able to exert as 
much control over the exploitation of the technology as possible, 
generally through an assignment or an exclusive licensing 
arrangement. The patent holder may dictate the decision to some 
extent, although the relative bargaining power of the parties will be an 
important consideration. 
 
Interview respondents generally reported being involved in both 
assignment and licensing deals. One respondent described an “active 
and dynamic” licensing environment within Australia. Certainly a 
large number of our interview respondents were involved in licensing 
activity, with most of them reporting that they had been involved in 
licensing deals. Those that hadn’t, in most cases, were approaching 
the point where they were looking for licence opportunities. 
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Assignment appeared to be utilised far less frequently than licensing. 
However, it does represent an important method of overcoming 
ownership problems. For example, some research institution 
respondents indicated that where students were involved in 
researching a particular area, assignment provisions were crucial to 
enable patented technology to be marketed free of difficulties in 
relation to title or ownership.198 
 
We were also interested to ascertain the extent of merger activity 
within the industry. It has been observed that there is a trend toward 
convergence within the international biotechnology industry, both in 
the biomedical and agricultural sectors.199 Accordingly we asked a 
series of questions on merger activity on the company survey. Nine of 
the 49 respondents to the company survey had acquired another 
biotechnology (18 percent). All of these respondents reported 
acquiring patents as a result of the acquisitions, however this was not 
necessarily the impetus behind the decision to acquire another 
company. There may be many reasons why a merger takes place, and 
we asked these respondents to identify the reasons for their 
acquisition. They characterised them as follows: 
 
• seven said they acquired some competitive advantage; 
• seven said it enabled them to gain access to other markets; 
• five said it boosted their product pipeline;  
• two said it allowed them to continue research blocked by 
patents; and 
• one required an injection of capital. 
 
Clearly, merger activity is not necessarily indicative of an attempt to 
obtain intellectual property, but it may have the effect of giving 
control over a significant portfolio of intellectual property.  
 
 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ISSUES FOR 
RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS 
 
As noted above, a range of strategies may be employed by intellectual 
property owners to transfer their technology for downstream 
                                                 
198 This issue is discussed in more detail in Results Chapter 3. 
199 See, for example, the latest international Ernst and Young report: Ernst & Young 
2003, above n1. 
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exploitation. In this section we look at some of the specific issues for 
research institutions in transferring their technology. Some of the 
most important strategies employed in this sector include licensing-
out and assignment to existing companies or creating spin off 
companies for the specific purpose of exploiting a particular form of 
technology. Where a spin off is created it is likely that the technology 
will either be exclusively licensed or assigned to it.  
 
One big threshold problem that was highlighted by research 
institution respondents was the lack of any real mechanism for 
searching out commercial partners. However, a licensing consultant 
pointed out that mechanisms are being developed to provide 
assistance in this area. For example, there are Internet bulletin boards 
that advertise technologies available for licensing. For example, the 
Dupont family runs one and the big accounting firms also have them. 
Apparently, the Licensing Executives Society is also talking about 
putting up a worldwide bulletin board. 
 
Technology transfer strategies 
 
Respondents emphasised the importance of being flexible in 
technology transfer negotiations. One technology transfer officer said 
that her institution uses various strategies, including assigning to spin 
offs, licensing and collaborations. A number of research institution 
respondents said that the favoured mechanism for exploitation of 
intellectual property is to create a spin off company as a vehicle for 
ownership. The institution then assigns or exclusively licenses 
intellectual property to the company and takes an equity share in the 
company.  A Report to the Prime Minister’s Science, Engineering and 
Innovation Council in 2001 strongly supported the strategy of 
forming spin offs.200 The Report noted at page 3 that: 
 
If we can grow 200-250 more Australian research-
based companies like five of those shown in this report 
over the next five years, the prize would be around 
AU$20 billion added to our annual export earnings. 
Australia would be well on the way to reducing the 
national debt and the cost of servicing it. 
 
Unfortunately, these figures fail to reflect the high failure rate of 
biotechnology products, particularly drug-related products. 
                                                 
200 PMSEIC, above n120 at 3. 
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Companies that are reliant on the success of single products have a 
high risk of failure. Monotti and Ricketson note that although they 
have no data on the survival rate of spin offs they are prone to failure 
because of a range of problems, including economies of scale, 
entering into inappropriate alliances and developing high-risk 
embryonic technologies.201 
 
One respondent said that he saw biotechnology as potentially heading 
down the same path as information technology, with a large number 
of overlapping start-ups and huge portfolios of licensing deals. He 
said that biotechnology is not there yet but heading that way. A 
number of company respondents reported that negotiations involving 
universities are slower than with other companies, because of “the 
bureaucratic wheel of the university”. It was generally accepted that 
things are getting better, although some comments were made that 
scientists and university administrators do not often appreciate the 
difficulties involved in dealing with a number of different parties. 
Delays are exacerbated when a number of parties are involved in 
negotiations. A technology transfer company respondent gave one 
example of: 
 
a project funded by government. Intellectual property 
was licensed to one company. The company didn’t 
want the intellectual property at the end of the project. 
It had to be transferred to someone else and the 
university had to sign off on it. This has been going on 
for a year, with four parties involved.  
 
One respondent mentioned that poor negotiating strategies in the past 
can have long term effect into the future. If too much intellectual 
property is given away and obligations with regard to background 
intellectual property and improvement intellectual property are tied 
too closely to the commercial partner, it may preclude further 
negotiations with other commercial entities well into the future.  If, as 
in the case of this respondent, the commercial partner runs into 
financial difficulties the implications for the development of past 
intellectual property and for future research could be serious. This is 
one good reason for having a large pharmaceutical company as a 
partner; their financial position is generally much more secure than 
that of small Australian biotechnology companies. 
                                                 
201 Monotti and Ricketson, above n197 at paras 9.59-9.68. See also P. McGinness 
Intellectual Property Commercialisation: A Business Manager’s Companion (2003) 
Buttterworths, Sydney, Chapter 21 ‘Spin-Offs’ at 309-320. 
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Various respondents confirmed that one of the biggest problems in 
Australia is naivety in bargaining, particularly for research 
institutions. Even if they have good technology they are not good at 
the bargaining side, particularly because they lack deal precedents. 
However, a large pharmaceutical company respondent did 
acknowledge that institutions are becoming more patent aware. He 
did not see this as a bad thing because research needs to be protected 
by good intellectual property. However, the difficulty that arises from 
this is lack of consistency in intellectual property management 
strategies across institutions (with Melbourne University being 
particularly problematic – but not insurmountably so) and 
overvaluation. He saw this as being a particular problem in Australia 
because it is not as “savvy” as other places. Valuation tends to be 
based on an optimistic view of success.  
 
Assignment and licensing 
 
It appears that assignment was a favoured technology transfer strategy 
for research institutions early in the biotechnology revolution because 
it was seen to reduce risk. By handing over all rights to the invention 
for an upfronts fee this essentially removed all risks. However, the 
cost is that it also removes all control. One respondent noted that if 
the assignee fails then the intellectual property is lost. More recently, 
there has been a growing trend for research institutions either to retain 
ownership of their intellectual property and license-out to industry or 
to form a spin off company for the purpose of commercialising a 
particular product.  
 
Two of the benefits of licences from the research institution 
perspective are that if ownership remains with the institution it can 
still be counted in the institution’s intellectual property portfolio, and 
that licences are not public documents whereas assignment must be 
publicly disclosed. On the other hand, from the company perspective, 
ownership of intellectual property is essential to ensure return on 
investment in the research project. One respondent from a device 
company expressed the view that the main headaches that arise in 
collaborations his company has are ownership and disclosure of 
information issues. This was echoed by a number of company 
respondents from all stages of the development continuum, and was a 
matter that most sought to resolve early in the collaborative 
relationship.  
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One company respondent noted that in 99 out of 100 cases, the 
research institution retains ownership, either independently or with 
the industry partner as a co-owner. This respondent noted further that 
if the company contributes funding to the research, then co-ownership 
is expected. Industry partners are understandably reluctant to advance 
funds for research without some assurance that they would realise a 
return on their investment. It appears that shared ownership is 
becoming increasingly common as research institutions assert their 
rights to technology developed as a result of collaborative ventures, 
although they may still face some opposition from private sector 
companies. This comment from a university technology transfer 
officer sums up the position of many research institution respondents: 
 
We may have collaborations to do a piece of work in 
which case the technology is shared. We consider all 
options and focus on what is best for the project. We 
want to make sure that we get a good deal. I don’t get 
involved in these negotiations. They are pretty hard 
headed. 
 
A number of respondents reported that where there is industry 
funding of a research and development program the company sponsor 
will at least require a right of first refusal to intellectual property and 
know how derived from the project. This may become problematic 
when an institution is funded to carry out research relating to 
improvements to existing intellectual property. One respondent 
commented on the particular difficulties that may be encountered in 
negotiating who has rights to the improvements on existing 
intellectual property owned by the company sponsoring the research, 
particularly when they are separately patentable. The problems 
associated with rights to improvement and rights to future intellectual 
property more generally are discussed in detail in Results Chapter 4. 
 
One of the crucial licensing decisions is whether to grant an exclusive 
or a non-exclusive licence. The nature of the licence would seem to 
depend very much on the technology. For example, it is likely that 
gene patents will be non-exclusively licensed, unless they are 
exclusively licensed to a spin off company which then non-
exclusively sub-licences. Drug-based licences tend to be exclusive. In 
many cases there will be different licences for different aspects of the 
technology: some components may be non-exclusively licensed 
whereas other components are exclusively licensed. We discuss the 
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issues associated with exclusive and non-exclusive licensing more 
fully in Results Chapter 4. 
 
 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FROM 
UPSTREAM TO DOWNSTREAM INDUSTRY 
SECTORS 
 
In this section we turn our attention to the specific issues for upstream 
and intermediate companies in transferring their technology further 
downstream. Challenges exist both for researchers and companies 
wanting to move their technology or products out, and for companies 
seeking to add value by further developing technology. As a global 
market, biotechnology has some unique features. Most notably, a vast 
majority of the private sector players are small to medium-sized 
companies, and the business of biotechnology is very distributed. The 
cumulative nature of biotechnology research means that intellectual 
property needs to be assembled in order to develop a platform. As one 
company respondent commented, “you need to license in three 
patents to get one out.”  
 
Technology transfer strategies 
 
Few participants in the industry have the ability to “go it alone.” 
Many industry participants in Australia are involved in drug 
discovery but very few produce the final products. As one respondent 
put it “we will not produce a product for anyone ever”. The reasons 
generally given are both that the costs of clinical trials are simply too 
high and that it would be wishful to think that a small Australian 
company could compete with a big multinational. Thus, “it is better to 
get in bed with  [large pharmaceutical companies]”. 
 
One consequence of this is that most Australian companies are 
unlikely to raise revenue from product sales, either at present or in the 
foreseeable future. On-licensing to more downstream companies is far 
more likely to be the primary source of revenue for most companies. 
As such, licensing-out of intellectual property and associated know 
how would appear to be the most important strategy for many 
Australian biotechnology companies. Although the terms of 
technology transfer agreements may frequently be contentious, it is 
probably fair to say there were few cases where technology transfer 
did not proceed at all once negotiations had commenced.  
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One industry sector that is a notable exception to this licensing trend 
is the device sector. Device companies do not tend to license-out their 
technology but supply directly to end-users. Interestingly, some of the 
most successful companies in the Australian biotechnology industry 
are device companies. Two companies, Cochlear and Resmed, have 
been particularly successful.202 This success may in part be attributed 
to the lower regulatory requirements for devices when compared with 
drugs. These same arguments could also apply to the diagnostics 
sector of the industry, for the same reasons. However, the two 
respondents to the diagnostics survey who reported that they owned 
patents both said that they licensed-out their technology. 
 
Attracting downstream partners 
 
In order to survive and expand, upstream drug development 
companies must ensure that they have projects that are attractive to 
downstream companies. Ideally, these companies are looking to add 
value to research institution inventions and to sell or license their 
projects to one of the large multinational pharmaceutical companies. 
However, large pharmaceutical companies are only interested in 
potential blockbuster drugs that are likely to be worth AU$1 billion. 
Although the large pharmaceutical companies are constantly trawling 
for potential new products, they can pick and choose from many 
options. Consequently, if there are any problems with a particular 
project it is unlikely that it will be chosen. On the other hand, some 
respondents noted that if the technology is good enough there will be 
a willingness to work through any impediments that stand in the way 
of product development, irrespective of how intractable they might 
appear. Nevertheless, even when this is the case the route from 
invention to product is not an easy one. In response to the question “if 
there is a good invention is it easy to commercialise?” one research 
institution respondent answered: 
 
No it is an extremely hard slog. It takes a lot of work 
on the part of the researcher and a lot of institution 
resources. In one case it split the lab because a spin off 
company was formed. This took a huge amount of time 
                                                 
202 See, for example, M.N. Barber ‘Research Priorities for Australia: Setting Our 
Future’ Telstra Address to the National Press Club, Canberra, 26 June 2002, 
available at: 
http://www.science.org.au/academy/media/26june02.htm (accessed 20 November 
2003). 
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and good people were lost to the spin off company in 
the process. 
 
Many respondents from companies seeking to maximise the 
commercial potential of their technologies or products commented on 
the difficulties in attracting partners and reaching a negotiated 
agreement. In many cases, respondents felt they had little choice in 
selecting partners, and characterised the market as a “buyers’ 
market”. Some companies have managed to attract attention and 
garner an international presence, but a considerable number are still 
grappling with finding partners interested in their technology. The 
main issues that arise for these respondents is gaining and maintaining 
exposure among investors, and communicating the marketability of 
their product. 
 
In relation to intellectual property, problem areas were identified as 
unclean patent ownership, uncertain validity and insufficient scope. 
Each of these problems might make a particular project unattractive to 
potential downstream licensees. For example, one respondent 
reported that clean chain of title is essential because “if intellectual 
property is not clean, pharma will not touch it”. These intellectual 
property issues form the basis of much of our following discussion.  
However, it must be acknowledged that there is a whole range of 
other problems, not associated with intellectual property as such, 
including disease coverage, insufficiency of clinical data, etc. 
  
Those respondents involved in research on drug targets say that they 
now have to functionally validate targets themselves in order to attract 
downstream partners. Those involved in drug development reported 
that to give their products maximum marketability they must produce 
as much clinical data as possible in house, preferably well into phase 
II clinical trials. One respondent reported that his company develops 
to proof of concept in phase II clinical trials before looking to license-
out. However, another commented that it is necessary to go even 
further: proof of concept was enough in the old days but now the 
bigger companies want toxicology to be done and completion of 
phase II trials.  Clinical data obviously will increase the opportunity 
for attracting large pharma interest and it also the value attached to 
licences. One respondent noted that: 
 
A lot of biotechnology companies take products into 
phase III then make a huge amount of money from 
pharma. Royalties of up to 20 percent are being 
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offered. This is really worthwhile as you don’t have to 
pay for any more development and manufacturing 
costs. If you are before phase III and are offered 10 
percent you feel like you are being ripped off. Probably 
in the end you can get around 15 percent and aim for a 
large up-front fee. If you get to phase III you are 
looking at earning AU$20-30 million up front. The up-
front fee is a very important component of the deal. 
You don’t get this if you licence-out too early. 
 
On the other hand, another company respondent commented that their 
company had never been as far as phase III because of the expense. 
The involvement of large pharmaceutical companies is necessary to 
provide funding and resources and also to provide the knowledge base 
to comply with United States drug registration requirements. It would 
seem that even the largest Australian companies would baulk at 
undertaking phase III trials because of their enormous expense.  
 
There is considerable risk to small companies in investing in clinical 
trials. If a particular product cannot ultimately be on-sold or licensed 
the investment in it might be lost. One respondent commented that the 
odds of a product making it to market are pretty awful, probably 
around 20:1. It takes a number of products for one to make it through 
to the end. Hence, the odds are very much stacked against one-
product companies. As one respondent put it: 
 
Start up companies generally rise and fall by a single 
product. There is not a great deal of success. All tend 
to float a little early. They often have a drug that is 
very active in vitro but to make it into a product is very 
difficult. They don’t factor in costs and run out of 
money. They also have problems with patents. They 
need to create a picket fence around their technology 
with a range of patents: formulations etc. They must 
have this to get deals with international companies. 
 
Even when industry participants are looking for partners other than 
large pharmaceutical companies, they still tend to favour 
international players, particularly United States companies. For 
example, one respondent from an upstream biotechnology company 
commented that their company tends to license-out to small United 
States biotechnology companies engaged in drug screening. Another 
respondent noted: 
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For licensing-out our main market is the US. I have 
just taken my 5th trip in 7 months. I have been talking 
to biotechs, gene therapy companies and pharmas, 
across most of the biotechnology industry. Our profile 
is slowly increasing.  We mainly do strategic alliances 
and freedom to operate agreements. The terms are 
variable. There are six different market segments. One 
of them is retail – supply of reagents to biotechs. 
These agreements tend to be exclusive. Drug 
companies using our technology in house go for non-
exclusive arrangements. Companies doing research on 
gene therapies for cancer go for exclusive licences 
based on disease gene targets.  
 
However, one of the big problems identified for Australian companies 
is lack of the ruthlessness that many of their international counterparts 
have developed. Hence they tend to cave in too easily when 
negotiations become difficult. In part this may be because they don’t 
appreciate the value of what they are acquiring and giving. 
 
In some circumstances organisations may enter into horizontal 
licensing arrangements with competitors. For example, one 
respondent commented that:  
 
In relation to one of our areas of research, we have a 
number of competitors with products on the market. 
Part of our licensing strategy is to approach them. 
They tend to look at known targets whereas we are 
looking at a mutation we have discovered. This market 
is significant. 
 
However, this mechanism for earning licensing income would appear 
to be the exception rather than the norm.  
 
 
LICENSING-IN 
 
Issues associated with licensing-in of technology form the basis of 
much of our further analysis, particularly in Results Chapters 4 and 5. 
We note some of the key issues raised by respondents here.  
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Many respondents confirmed that often they needed to license-in 
technology to avoid infringing existing patents in an area. In most 
cases, due diligence performed prior to the commencement of 
research in an area enables identification of patents that might be 
infringed if research proceeds, and most researchers become aware at 
this stage of other patents in the area and made decisions about 
whether or not licences would be required. 
 
Where access to a patent was necessary to enable research to proceed, 
approaching a patent holder to request a licence was first choice of 
tactic for some of our interview respondents, while a significant 
number of other respondents listed it as their last choice. Licensing 
agreements were entered into at various stages of the research 
process. Many respondents sought licences directly after conducting 
due diligence. On the other hand, some respondents reported 
proceeding with research and waiting to be approached by a patent 
holder before entering into negotiations for a licence.203 
 
In many cases, deciding whether or not to approach a patent holder 
for a licence depended on how receptive the patent holder was likely 
to be to negotiations. Many respondents commented that whether or 
not they would contemplate seeking a licence depended to a large 
extent on the identity of the patent holder. A number of respondents 
from small to medium-sized biotechnology companies admitted that 
if they learned a patent to which they required access was owned by a 
large multinational, they would think twice about seeking a licence.   
 
 
LICENCE TERMS 
 
Most respondents engaged in licensing agreed that they licensed on 
the most favourable terms they could negotiate. A number of terms 
were referred to consistently by respondents as being the subject of 
debate in negotiations:204 
 
• fees. Licence fees were consistently referred to by our 
respondents as being the most difficult terms to settle in 
                                                 
203 Sometimes in doing so, a blocking patent situation might arise so that a cross-
licence deal becomes attractive. In this case, the researcher will be in a stronger 
position when bargaining: see further the discussion on cross-licensing in Results 
Chapter 7. 
204 See also ALRC, above n18 at 155-6. 
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licence negotiations. We discuss issues associated with fee 
structure and quantum below; 
• reach-through rights to future inventions. These terms are seen 
as being particularly likely to raise access restriction and 
anticommons issues, and are discussed in detail in Results 
Chapters 4 and 5.  
• exclusivity. One of the crucial licensing decisions is whether 
the licence should be exclusive or non-exclusive. The nature 
of the licence would seem to depend very much on the 
technology. For example, it is likely that gene and other 
research tool patents will be non-exclusively licensed, unless 
they are exclusively licensed from a research institution to a 
spin off company which then non-exclusively sub-licences. 
Drug-based licences tend to be exclusive. In many cases there 
will be different licences for different aspects of the 
technology: some components may be non-exclusively 
licensed whereas other components are exclusively licensed. 
We discuss the issues associated with exclusive and non-
exclusive licensing more fully in Results Chapter 4 because 
exclusive licensing could raise access issues, particularly if the 
technology is foundational in nature;  
• reversionary rights. Many interview respondents, particularly 
those from research institutions said that they insisted on 
reversionary rights to any intellectual property they licensed-
out which was not subsequently utilised. Revocable licences 
were common amongst research institution respondents, 
particularly where the arrangements were exclusive. The 
justification for this requirement is because of problems 
encountered in the past with licensees failing to develop 
licensed technology. Research institution respondents stressed 
importance of a clause specifying reversion rights if the 
licensee fails to adequately exploit the invention within 
appropriate time frames. It seems that some of the early 
agreements failed to provide reversionary rights in such 
situations. This also is a problem for private sector companies. 
A number of respondents referred to the example of the flu 
drug Relenza, developed by Biota Holdings and licensed to 
Glaxo SmithKline;205 
• performance clauses. These were referred to by a number of 
respondents. These may take several forms, for example, an 
                                                 
205 Glaxo scaled back on marketing the drug following poor initial sales, causing 
disastrous consequences on Biota’s share prices. 
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exclusive licence may revert to a non-exclusive licence if the 
invention is not worked, and/or the invention may revert to the 
patent holder. In some instances, determining whether the 
licensee has expended their best efforts in exploiting or 
commercialising the invention may be problematic. This is a 
significant transaction cost associated with licensing; 
• retention of right to research. Research institutions, in 
particular, often attempted to retain the right to research and 
work the invention, and in many cases this right will be 
granted provided there is no commercial purpose. In these 
circumstances, any attempt to commercialise a product may 
cause any resulting intellectual property to flow straight to the 
licensee; 
• indemnities. Indemnities, particularly where materials had 
been transferred were not generally referred to as being 
problematic, although other studies have found that this is a 
particularly prominent issue.206 One of our respondents did 
refer to difficulties presented by requests for indemnities when 
licensing-in;  
• title to the patent. Title can be an issue for potential licensees, 
and many interview respondents stressed the importance of 
clean title to patents before they were prepared to enter into 
licensing negotiations. In the absence of clean title, entering 
into an agreement became too problematic. In addition, 
defining the licensed patent may be difficult where there is a 
mixture of applications and registered patents. 
• material transfer agreements (MTAs). These have their own 
sets of issues. MTAs, particularly where verbal, can prove 
problematic as one technology transfer officer pointed out:   
 
Where there is a commercial interest the problems 
tend to be in terms of materials (reagents etc.). 
They tend to be given to us as gifts with no real 
obligations. If there is no written agreement the 
difficulty is in knowing what the terms are. MTAs 
are standard – we make sure there is an MTA 
when material goes out. A lawyer goes through 
the MTA when material comes back in. We give 
this special attention. If anyone gives us materials, 
                                                 
206 See NIH, above n37 at 10. For example, problems may arise where universities 
are requested to provide indemnities against liability arising from the use of 
patented research tools and materials.  
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they retain ownership of them and any intellectual 
property they generate. For example, we might 
put a patented gene sequence into another vector, 
They own the vector, and so intellectual property 
ownership is a real issue. It is generally non-
negotiable but there are ways around this. 
 
• length of term of licence. The duration of the licence may 
become an issue, as may the method of determining the 
duration; 
• field of use restrictions. Common restrictions include 
prohibitions on sharing research tools or materials with other 
researchers or institutions, using materials for commercial 
purposes, or using them for research outside the particular 
project for which they are licensed.207 From our interviews, it 
would appear that restrictions of some kind arise in a 
considerable number of agreements. One licensing consultant, 
in particular referred to such restrictions as being problematic 
in a considerable number of negotiations. Field of use 
restrictions are common, particularly where licences are non-
exclusive, but he considered that restricting the field can be 
quite difficult. One CEO from a research institution 
considered terms dealing with the scope of the licence to be a 
real sticking point, stating that: 
 
You could have a licence to one company for one 
thing, [and to] another company for another. For 
example, where there is an antibody and a small 
molecule, the first company [would want] both 
because the other company is their competition. 
But they are often split. Also territory – can have 
rights to single markets. 
 
One study also raised the concern that scientists in public 
sector institutions may find it difficult to abide by these terms 
given that they are unaccustomed to having restrictions 
imposed on the manner in which they deal with materials;208  
• dealing with infringement. One sticking point in negotiations 
will sometimes be who is responsible for enforcement of the 
patent; and 
                                                 
207 See NIH, above n37 at 9. 
208 Ibid. 
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• right to sub-license. Some respondents said that they would 
insist on the right to sub-license if they were seeking a licence, 
and in many cases they successfully bargained for the 
inclusion of this term.  
 
Fee structure 
 
Fee structure is hugely variable and depends on a whole range of 
factors, including: 
 
• the technology: products or processes; broadly applicable 
platform technologies or specific research tools. For example, 
one respondent reported that in general research tool licences 
will be non-exclusive with a small up front fees and low, if 
any, royalties; 
• the technology: core or non-core. If the technology is non-core 
then it is likely that it will be licensed-out for a small upfront 
payment. If core technology is licensed-out at all it will be at a 
much higher rate and it is likely that some control will be 
maintained over future developments of the technology in the 
form of both milestone payments and royalties;  
• the parties: competitors or collaborators. For collaborators it 
may be desirable to maintain the ongoing relationship, 
whereas for competitors a one-off payment is more likely; 
• the relative bargaining power of the parties. It is generally 
recognised that public sector patent holders tend to start from 
an inferior bargaining position. However, this is not always 
the case. In determining the appropriate fee structure, much 
depends on the strength and novelty of the technology, and, of 
course, a thorough understanding of these factors by the 
person negotiating the licence;  
• the financial strengths or weaknesses of the parties. Some 
respondents emphasised the importance of being fully briefed 
on the financial status of the other party prior to the 
commencement of negotiations. It will not be desirable to 
maintain an ongoing relationship if there is some doubt about 
the financial viability of the other party to the negotiation. 
 
The goal of most research institutions is to recover research and 
patenting costs. This is also the case for the smaller research and 
development companies. One respondent noted: 
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We want a return on our investment. We look at 
research costs, licence costs, assignment costs, 
ongoing patent maintenance costs. We want to recover 
all of this and make a return.  
 
For licensees, on the other hand, fees will be dependent on the 
downstream value of the product or process and not on the costs 
incurred in bringing it to that particular stage. “The other side 
measures the deal in terms of future value – what they are prepared to 
pay.”   
 
In general there will be upfront, milestone and royalty components. 
All respondents reported that they wanted some form of upfront 
payment. When licensing-out, research institutions tend to take risk-
averse strategies, for example preferring higher upfronts payments 
and lower royalties. For them, a one off upfront fee may be the 
preferred option because it removes the risk factor. The fluidity of the 
market structure is a factor that encourages some company 
respondents to prefer one-off payments rather than continuing 
royalties. One respondent commented on the high level of 
convergence and change in company structures and the difficulty this 
created in re-establishing your rights. 
 
A large pharmaceutical company respondent commented that in his 
experience early clinical phase licensing is likely to have a milestone 
component in it as well as royalties. Early research tends to be more 
milestone focused, later more royalty focused. However, none are 
purely one or the other. A milestone component is seen as important 
for encouraging ongoing development of the licensed technology. 
Milestones are particularly important when there is a “long and 
tortuous path to market”. A number of respondents commented on 
problems encountered with licensees sitting on licensed technology 
and not being willing to put money in to further develop it, hoping to 
on-license without any further development.  
 
Fee quantum 
 
One research institution respondent commented that their upfront fees 
tend to be in the 10s of thousands rather than the 100s, although 
another commented that upfronts of around AU$100,000 are possible.  
A patent attorney said that in his view AU$100,000 is probably the 
norm with some milestones and around three percent royalties. 
However, it was well recognised that royalties tend to be a long time 
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in coming, particularly for drugs, a decade or more. One respondent 
commented that if an exclusive licence is being granted and the 
technology is “out the door” they would want upfronts of hundreds of 
thousands. But for things like monoclonal antibodies, where products 
get to market fairly quickly, there would be more focus on the royalty 
component. Drugs, on the other hand, are a “black hole”. The royalty 
component is likely to be as small as one percent for targets.  For 
enabling technology, it is more likely that a single access fee will be 
required, with no continuing obligation to pay royalties.  
 
Royalty percentages are hugely variable. Research institutions can 
generally expect a very low royalty rate, depending on their 
technology and the number of steps from product development. From 
our interviews, we have formed the impression that an average figure 
is probably around one to two percent. One respondent reported a 
deal with a large pharmaceutical company where the patent holder 
was happy with a three percent royalty rate. When research is further 
downstream it may be possible to get a much higher royalty rate. 
However, one patent attorney noted that a high royalty rate may be an 
indication that the product will not make it to market. Ultimately, the 
rate depends very much on the nature of the technology. Royalty 
structures are also variable. They may start high and decrease over 
time, or start low and increase. Where product sales become good 
royalty rates may decrease. Or royalties may be flat. 
 
A trade association representative said that: 
 
If your product is a niche product it does not matter 
how much you ask. A commodity product would 
probably get three to five percent. Around 0.5-3 percent 
starts to hurt. In between three to seven percent is not 
unreasonable. A complex area would probably demand 
around seven to 12 percent, a borderline product 12-15 
percent - a licensee can substantiate the price at the 
other end. Above 15 percent you need a huge margin. 
But it depends how much it will cost to manufacture, 
how much you have invested and how much you can 
sell the product for. 
 
High royalty rates can be agreed to in some circumstances. For 
example the OECD Report states that royalties can be up to 10 
percent for “must-have” technologies and that they can sometimes 
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reach as high as 20 percent.209 Some of our respondents reported that 
small molecule patents tend to be very lucrative and are likely to be 
licensed exclusively with high royalties. Broad technology may also 
be lucrative, but this is more likely to result from many small 
payments for non exclusive licences. For drug companies, one of the 
particularly difficult areas is formulation patents. It appears that 
formulation companies tend to ask high royalties, as much as five 
percent and want a fee for service as well.  
 
Negotiation failures 
 
Negotiations can fall through for a whole range of reasons, including 
disputes about ownership, onerous terms and breakdowns in 
relationships (which is perhaps the greatest cause). Although price is 
a major negotiation issue, a licensing consultant suggested that it is 
not as likely to be a cause of negotiation breakdown. However, an 
upstream company respondent said that price is a sticking point, 
particularly the need to get return for investment in research costs, 
licence costs, ongoing patent costs etc. As previously noted, the focus 
for the party seeking to license-in is future value which is harder to 
evaluate and may be quite different from costs incurred. One 
respondent said that licensing negotiations never run smoothly but get 
bogged down in detail.  However, a trade association representative 
put difficulties in negotiation solely at the door of the negotiator: 
 
Wherever a licence has proved problematic you should 
look at the skills of the negotiator. Generally you will 
find bad development, bad negotiator, and egos. In my 
view deals are not problematic. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
This chapter demonstrates the difficulties encountered by Australian 
industry participants in transferring their technology downstream to 
enable product development. Clearly, biotechnology is a high-risk 
business. There are major challenges both for research institutions and 
companies wanting to move their technology or products out, and for 
companies seeking to add value by further developing technology.  
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We have already seen that the Australian research sector is a rich 
source of innovation. However, benefit to the public will only be 
realised if product development is facilitated. As would probably be 
expected, the usual business strategy of an organisation is to exclude 
competitors from the immediate area of interest and from as broad a 
penumbra around the area of interest as possible. This is the general 
rule irrespective of whether the area is of immediate interest or is a 
component of the future strategic plans for the organisation or even 
when it is only of peripheral interest and may be abandoned in the 
future. This raises a number of important public interest issues that 
will be discussed more fully later this report. It is particularly 
important to highlight the delicate balances involved in determining 
both the extent of the penumbra that should be allowed around areas 
of interest and the extent to which it is permissible to shield areas of 
interest when there is no immediate or long term intention to exploit 
them. 
 
Most of the participants in our study indicated that there is extensive 
collaborative activity across all of the industry sectors. Collaborative 
activity is seen within and between research institutions, small and 
medium companies, large companies, government agencies, co-
operative research centres, and so on, both within Australia and 
internationally. In many cases one of the reasons for such activity is 
to enable access to existing or new intellectual property. These types 
of arrangements are likely to facilitate technology transfer provided 
that appropriate provision is made for dealing with intellectual 
property ownership and licensing at the outset. Absent these 
collaborative arrangements, it seems that it is very difficult to for 
research institutions and companies to find suitable technology 
transfer partners and negotiate agreements that are mutually 
beneficial. In the past, the licence deals entered into by Australian 
institutions and companies may not have fully reflected the value of 
the technology. Negotiating strategies are improving, but, as we have 
already noted, we got the impression from our respondents that there 
is still a “buyer’s market” 
 124 
RESULTS CHAPTER 3: IMPACT OF 
PATENTS ON THE RESEARCH 
SECTOR 
 
 In this chapter we report on a number of specific issues faced by the 
research sector in its internal dealings with intellectual property. We 
focus on the strategies employed by research institutions in managing 
their patents, with particular reference to: 
 
• changing attitudes towards commercialisation; 
• the impact of patents on publication; 
• quantum and quality of patent applications; 
• ownership and clean title; and 
• valuation of intellectual property. 
 
It appears to be generally recognised that research institutions, which 
were traditionally poor at managing their intellectual property, have 
improved greatly over the last decade or so. Some of the larger 
institutions have their own technology transfer office, staffed by 
people with expertise in patent prosecution, deal negotiation and 
science. In some instances these offices have been spun off into 
technology transfer companies. Other institutions may have a single 
technology transfer officer or business manager. Some still have no 
one at all, or have part time assistants with a low level of expertise. A 
number of institutions have arrangements with companies set up 
specifically for the purpose to advise on patent prosecution, 
commercialisation and technology transfer.  
 
It was widely recognised by respondents that one of the important 
features of good intellectual property management is good dialogue 
between researchers and technology transfer officers. In a number of 
institutions it is an essential requirement to report all potential 
intellectual property to the technology transfer arm of the institution. 
One important issue that was emphasised by some respondents is the 
need to keep good laboratory note books – particularly if patents are 
lodged in the United States because of the first to invent rule. 
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CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARDS 
COMMERCIALISATION OF 
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH 
 
There are still some research institutions for whom commercialisation 
is not a core activity. This situation exists where the institution is still 
able to get the bulk of their funding from the public sector. However, 
the number of such institutions is ever decreasing. For most, 
commercialisation is a reality, albeit an unwelcome one for some. For 
example, one respondent said that researchers hate patents, and see 
patenting as prostitution, but they pay the bills. Another said that 
some researchers just don’t want to know about patents and others 
make jibes about the patent system. He described attempts to change 
attitudes about patents in the research sector as “trying to turn around 
a big ship”.  
 
Many respondents acknowledged that patenting is having an effect on 
traditional scientific practices. For example one upstream company 
respondent commented that patenting has closed down the free 
exchange of science between researchers. However, it was generally 
recognised by respondents that research institution researchers are 
getting much better playing the commercialisation game, including 
identifying patentable inventions and protecting secrecy. One 
respondent stated that: 
 
 Those that are very good at research may be more 
willing to take their intellectual property to market. 
There are two motivations. The main one is whether it 
is the core activity of their employer. The other is the 
willingness to look outside the square. The best 
scientists are willing to commercialise. For those that 
are not willing this is because commercialisation is not 
the core activity of their institution or that 
commercialisation is seen as a dirty word. 
 
And a technology transfer officer noted that: 
 
There are two types of researchers: those that always 
have their eye on further activities. For them, 
intellectual property is the currency. They know that it 
is an important part of their work. Others (generally 
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older academics) find it really annoying. They find it 
difficult to understand corporate bodies, ownership of 
intellectual property and employment issues. But this 
culture is changing. We rarely come across problems 
now. 
 
These positive views about commercialisation are mirrored in other 
studies. For example, Anne Monotti and Sam Ricketson reported the 
results of a survey of academics from Monash University in 1997. 
The survey revealed that 68 percent of respondents agreed or strongly 
agreed that academic staff should explore the commercial potential of 
their research and teaching materials.210  
 
On the other hand, a number of respondents commented on the 
equally important goal of ensuring that academic researchers retain 
the independence to pursue their own independent research even 
though this may be at the cost of lost commercialisation opportunities.  
 
Respondents acknowledged that one of the main reasons for the 
change in research culture to research with commercial potential is 
because of funding preferences of such organisations as the ARC and 
NHMRC for this type of research. Other reasons include the need to 
obtain funding from the private sector because of shortfalls in public 
sector funding, the desire for economic viability, and perhaps for 
some a perception that a fortune can be made for “blockbuster” 
inventions. For example, one respondent said that patents are seen as 
being sexy. Researchers are aware of others making large amounts of 
money out of commercialising their intellectual property and have 
become jealous of their own intellectual property.  
 
However, there are particular issues for research institutions that need 
to be addressed. In part these arise from the differences in research 
culture between the research sector and the private sector and lack of 
expertise in the process of commercialisation in the research sector.  
 
 
PATENTS AND PUBLICATION 
 
One of the biggest challenges for researchers based in research 
institutions is to balance the need to publish their research results in 
high quality peer reviewed journals against the need for secrecy and 
                                                 
210 Monotti and Ricketson above n197 at para 9.17. 
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limited disclosure to protect the patentability of inventions. Because 
non-disclosure is such an important issue in terms of patent validity, 
and because disclosure of research results is a key performance 
measure in the research sector, it is recognised as being essential for 
those research sector organisations for whom commercialisation is a 
core activity to have strategies in place to manage publication of 
patentable inventions.  Respondents indicated that researchers 
generally are conscious that the key issue when protecting intellectual 
property is not to publish. One university technology transfer officer 
said that in her view the organisation had not lost any intellectual 
property through publication to date. She noted that the university has 
a package telling scientists how to keep track of their intellectual 
property. Another said that patents and publications can be 
complementary if managed properly and that publications can be used 
strategically by scientists to get their names into the public domain. 
Thus it would seem that the requirement to maintain secrecy is not 
necessarily a problem provided that this does not unduly delay 
publication of research results. As Monotti and Ricketson put it: “it is 
not secrecy per se that is the problem, but the length of the delay.”211 
 
Participants in the research institutions survey and in the diagnostics 
survey were asked to comment on the impact of patenting 
requirements on their ability to publish their research results. 
Responses were varied. They are summarised in Table 13. 
 
Table 13: Views on the impact of patents on publication in the 
research institutions and diagnostics sectors 
 
 Pos (%) Neg (%) Nil 
(%) 
Neg/nil 
(%) 
Pos/neg 
(%) 
No answer 
(%) 
Research 
institutions 
2 (9) 4 (18) 7 (32) 4 (18) 2(9) 3 (14) 
Diagnostic
facilities212 
2 (15) 6 (46) 3 (23) 1 (8) 0 1 (8) 
 
Specific comments from research institution respondents 
 
A number of research institution respondents provided comments to 
justify their views on the impact of patents on publication. Most of 
those respondents who expressed negative views based them on 
delays in publication. For example, one respondent noted that delays 
                                                 
211 Monotti and Ricketson above n197 at para 11.49. 
212 Percentages are based on the 13 survey respondents involved in research. 
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are such that “by the time publication is allowed data from around 
four to six papers is usually condensed to one (or not published at 
all).” Others also referred to the general negative impact on the 
dissemination of information.  
 
Other respondents viewed patents as having more of a neutral effect, 
on the basis that once a provisional application is filed, publication 
can proceed without any significant delays. In such cases, it would 
seem that the slight delay in publication while the provisional is 
prepared and filed is not a major issue. However, some respondents 
added the rider that the process must be properly managed because 
otherwise there may be delays in publication of 12 months or so. One 
person noted that the impact depends on the agreement with the 
funder and that publication “is only one problem out of many so far.” 
 
A few respondents viewed the impact much more positively on the 
basis that it focuses on better outcomes and management processes 
and encourages early publication post-patenting. For some, the impact 
could be both positive, by focusing the researchers in getting all of the 
necessary information together, and negative, because of the stress 
involved in filing prior to publication. 
 
The comments of one respondent appeared to focus more on the 
negative impact of publication on patents on the basis that  
 
Many provisional patent applications are hurriedly put 
together because of pending disclosures. Scientists do 
not inform intellectual property managers prior to 
submission, because the delay in patenting allows 
scientists’ competitors to publish first. 
 
Specific comments from diagnostic facility respondents 
 
A number of respondents to the diagnostics survey provided quite 
detailed responses to questions about the impact of patents on the 
delivery of genetic tests to end users. These results are presented later 
in the section that specifically addresses end user issues. Only a few 
respondents provided comments to questions on the impact of patents 
on publication. Of those who did respond, a number expressed similar 
views to many research institution respondents, that the requirement 
for researchers to patent their inventions had no impact on their 
ability to publish their research results, particularly if managed 
properly. One respondent commented: 
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There is no impact, from extensive personal 
experience. Once protected by patent (at draft 
manuscript stage) we proceed with submission of 
manuscript to journals for publication. 
 
However, other respondents expressed entirely contrary views - that 
patents have a negative effect because of the delays they cause in 
publication and knowledge dissemination. For example, one said that 
patents “can delay publication for years and reduce the ability to 
obtain a PhD.” And another commented on the problem of balancing 
“the need to patent prior to disclosure versus the need to publish or 
perish mentality of the research funding system.” 
 
Interview data 
 
Most research institutions have a requirement that all publications 
have to be vetted and signed off either by the head of the research 
group or a technology transfer officer. Some have arrangements with 
industry that require that the industry partner inspects and approves 
all publications. These arrangements inevitably slows the publication 
process. However, the length of delay is extremely variable. If the 
only requirement is that the group leader checks the publication then 
the delay may be as short as 24 hours. Where an industry partner is 
involved the delay may be up to three months, although provisions of 
this nature seem to be far less common now than, say, five years ago. 
One respondent said that generally in their contracts there is a clause 
allowing an arbitrary 30-day period for review, but ordinarily turn 
around is likely to be much more rapid. One technology transfer 
company respondent said that they aim for a two-week turn around 
but realistically they usually look at six weeks. Another said that 
CRCs have a “30-day deal” for vetting publications. A research 
institution respondent said that the maximum delay is two to three 
weeks and that this is not a big turn around. Conversely, another said 
that they experienced a three-month turn around, which is meaningful 
in science.  
 
Even if there are no contractual limitations on publication, care still 
has to be taken in making the decision whether to publish or not. One 
technology transfer officer said that if publication occurs before the 
patent has been granted in the United States then large pharmaceutical 
companies in particular would not be interested. This comment was 
backed up by a research institution researcher who said that you don’t 
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really want to write anything until two to three years after the patent 
has been filed to make the patent as strong as possible. 
 
Granting agencies are increasingly recognising intellectual property 
ownership as a measure of academic excellence. However, this is not 
necessarily the case for the research institutions themselves. One 
university technology transfer officer said that because of the impact 
of intellectual property on publication academic promotions policy 
needed to be amended to reflect this. On the other hand, another 
respondent noted that some academic institutions do realise that 
scientists coming back from industry will lack a strong publication 
record and this will not be taken against them. This same respondent 
pointed out that it would be naïve to go to a company thinking that 
you could continue to publish.  
 
Impact of publication on patenting 
 
The above discussion focuses on the impact of patents on publication. 
Some respondents commented on this issue from the other 
perspective, namely the impact of publication on patents. This issue 
arises because the need for scientists to publish was widely 
recognised. One company respondent said that his company 
recognises and respects the right to publish. In his particular case he 
noted that because the company’s own scientists and collaborating 
research institution scientists are aware of the issues associated with 
publication and patenting, no problems have been encountered. 
However, one of the problems that some respondents identified is that 
sometimes it would be better to keep information proprietary as secret 
know-how, but because of the publishing ethos it is necessary to file 
provisional patent applications instead. Company respondents noted 
that is not always beneficial to put too much information into the 
public domain, particularly when research is really in the pre-
commercial phase. However, the pressure of publication may force 
companies to do so. Some further implications of this pressure to 
patent at the preliminary research stage are discussed in the next 
section below.  
 
 
QUANTUM AND QUALITY ISSUES 
 
Following an early reluctance to patent, it appears that some scientists 
have become over-enthusiastic in their adoption of a pro-patenting 
stance, to such an extent that patents are taken out when there is little 
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or no likelihood of commercial exploitation. One respondent noted 
that the pressure to generate income is causing lots of patents to be 
filed but that licensing income from them is generally low, about two 
percent return for investment (although a couple of universities have 
hit the big time). This data is supported by other studies. Monotti and 
Ricketson, for example, comment that there has been an increase in 
the propensity to patent but that even in the United States this hasn’t 
been matched by increased output, with the bulk of technology 
transfer revenue coming from a few successful inventions, the “big 
hits” or “blockbusters”.213  
 
One problem with the quality of patent applications is that often 
provisional applications will be rushed through to allow research 
results to be published or presented at a conference. An intellectual 
property advisor noted that:  
 
Generally there will be no intellectual property 
strategy and the patent will have been filed at the last 
minute. The patent attorney will not have been given 
adequate advice about strategy. Fair basing will be a 
problem – it may be necessary to re-file unless claims 
are broad enough. 
 
A number of respondents reported that organisations are finding 
solutions to these problems by becoming much more proactive about 
intellectual property management and education. As one respondent 
noted, the focus is on looking for and developing genuine commercial 
opportunities, looking for commercial partners early in the process 
and drafting good provisional patent applications. The biggest issue 
continues to be financial. Research institutions have to find 
commercial partners within a very short time frame because they 
often do not have sufficient financial resources to take patents beyond 
the provisional phase. One respondent reported that because they 
have to find a partner before the complete application needs to be 
filed, this means that they may have to settle for a couple of 
percentage points less on royalties.  
 
For the most part, research institution respondents stated that they 
look for a commercial partner after the provisional is filed. One 
respondent explained that the reason for this is that patents are 
important commercial bargaining tools. In addition, in their view if it 
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is too early to patent it is also too early to be talking to potential 
partners. Others are less averse to finding partners prior to filing the 
provisional.  
 
 
OWNERSHIP AND CLEAN TITLE 
 
Perhaps the most important aspect of any intellectual property 
management strategy is ensuring that there is no uncertainty about 
ownership of the intellectual property. It is generally recognised that 
where intellectual property is created by an employee during the 
normal course of their employment then ownership vests in the 
employer, absent any agreement to the contrary. However, in the 
research institution setting the issue is complicated by a number of 
factors including, but not limited to, the following: 
 
• uncertainty as to the “normal course of employment”; 
• involvement of students and visiting scholars in particular 
research projects generating intellectual property; 
• funding arrangements; 
• collaborative arrangements; and 
• background intellectual property and know-how brought to 
particular projects by individual researchers. 
 
A recent Report commissioned by the Commonwealth Department of 
Education, Science and Training (the DEST Report) provided a 
detailed analysis of the complex legal issues associated with patent 
ownership in public research institutions.214 There is no Australian 
equivalent to the United States Bayh-Dole Act 1980, which enables 
research institutions to claim ownership of intellectual property 
created using government funding in certain circumstances. To a 
limited extent, equivalency is achieved through: 
 
• common law rules regarding ownership of intellectual 
property created during the course of employment (normally 
vesting in the employer); together with  
                                                 
214 A. Christie, S. D’Aloisio, K. Gaita, M. Howlett and E. Webster Analysis of the 
Legal Framework for Patent Ownership in Publicly Funded Research Institutions 
(Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia; 2003) (hereafter DEST Report). 
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• the National Principles of Intellectual Property Management 
for Publicly Funded Research215 whereby funding agencies do 
not assert ownership rights over intellectual property arising 
out of projects that they fund.  
 
The DEST Report recommended that the Australian position should 
be further clarified in order to remove impediments to effective 
management and commercialisation of intellectual property in the 
public research sector. Its recommended position was that ownership 
vest in the research institution by default.216 Our research indicates 
that most research institutions are already moving towards this 
position, with the notable exception of Melbourne University.217 A 
number of respondents commented on the unusual arrangement at 
Melbourne University, where ownership is in the inventor. However, 
the patent holder still has to obtain permission from the university for 
assignment. 
 
Commercial partners will be disinclined to invest in development of 
technology if there is any uncertainty about ownership of the 
intellectual property that is tied to the technology. However, some 
respondents suggested that if the project is good enough, there may be 
a willingness to work through difficult ownership issues. 
Nevertheless, if the issues are too difficult partners will simply walk 
away. One respondent reported an instance where a project was 
abandoned as a result of messy ownership, despite the fact that AU$4 
million had been invested and that there had been over two years of 
work done on the project. Conversely, if a project is likely to bring in 
many millions of dollars, payment of a small amount to clean up 
ownership is worthwhile.  
 
As with most other aspects of intellectual property management, it 
appears that research institutions are getting much better at dealing 
                                                 
215 Australian Research Council; Australian Tertiary Institutions Commercial 
Companies Association; Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee; Department of 
Education, Training and Youth Affairs; Department of Industry, Science and 
Resources; IP Australia; and National Health and Medical Research Council, 
National Principles of Intellectual Property Management for Publicly Funded 
Research (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia; 2001). Available at: 
http://www.arc.gov.au/pdf/01_01.pdf (accessed 1 May 2003). 
216 DEST Report, above n213 at n212 
217 We refer specifically to Melbourne University because a number of our 
respondents drew our attention to the University’s unique arrangements regarding 
ownership. We note further that the DEST report, above n212 also makes specific 
reference to the ownership arrangements at Melbourne University. 
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with ownership issues. Most research institutions now have 
intellectual property policies in place which have provisions 
regarding ownership. Nevertheless, one respondent cautioned that 
people still don’t cross the t’s and dot the i’s.  
 
One licensing consultant emphasised the importance of having 
assignment deeds in place and ensuring that all researchers are 
content with the arrangements. This would certainly appear to be a 
welcome change in strategy. One respondent commented that she had 
been involved in one research project in which essentially all of her 
day to day work was licensed off to the commercial partner without 
her knowledge. She acknowledged that there is much more 
transparency now, with researchers being included in negotiating 
commercialisation agreements. Generally, research institutions have 
arrangements whereby inventors get a share in the profits of the 
commercialisation of their inventions. The general rule is that 30 
percent goes to the inventor, 30-40 percent to their research lab or 
department and 30-40 percent to the institution.  
 
In general, it appears that research institutions now routinely have 
provisions in place requiring assignment of ownership by employee 
researchers as well as students and visiting researchers.  
 
 
UNDER- AND OVER-VALUING 
 
One of the most difficult issues in any technology transfer 
arrangement is settling on the value of the technology. It was 
generally recognised by respondents that in the past Australian 
research institution researchers tended to under value their intellectual 
property, giving it away too soon for too little. One technology 
transfer officer gave an example of an assignment of intellectual 
property rights in return for a research assistant’s salary for three 
years. However, a number of respondents reported that attitudes may 
now have swung too far the other way, with some researchers over-
valuing their intellectual property. As one respondent reported: 
 
Some people clearly over value. Because it has taken 
10 years and several million dollars to develop their 
intellectual property they want around AU$5 million 
upfronts. This is ridiculous when all they have is a 
provisional that has never been tested and the patent is 
not granted yet. In the past academic intellectual 
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property got sold off very cheaply. There is a mixture 
between these extremes now. People don’t want to be 
caught selling it off too cheaply. But if they get 
reasonable advice from a technology transfer company 
this should bring them back to reality. 
 
Part of the problem is in making the distinction between research 
outcomes and commercial products. As one upstream company 
respondent put it: 
 
It is a fair statement to say that universities and 
research institutions overvalue their intellectual 
property. When dealing with one public sector body 
there was an instance where we walked away. They 
insist on having a book value rather than market value 
on their intellectual property, which is ridiculous. We 
don’t care what they have spent on it, the question is 
what it’s worth to us. They try to salami when they 
should get an exclusive and vice versa. 
 
Another company respondent noted that: 
 
A number of institutions have an unrealistic idea of 
what their IP is worth. The up-fronts usually kill 
you…Licence agreements contain very limited 
structures and often it is just not worth it. 
 
On the other hand, a technology transfer officer reported that even 
though scientists do want more for their money now, in the past they 
wanted far too little. Hence, the amount they are seeking now is 
probably a far more realistic estimate of the true value of their 
contributions and it is fair for them to get a reasonable return on their 
intellectual property. Nevertheless, this respondent described research 
and development companies as being “outraged” by the amounts 
being requested by research institutions for their technology. One 
upstream company respondent stated that it is the continuing royalty 
stream that is a problem and that they prefer upfront payments. In the 
end, what universities get will be determined by what the market will 
bear.  
 
Some respondents reported that it is not necessarily the researchers 
themselves who have unrealistic expectations about the value of their 
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intellectual property, but their host institutions: technology transfer 
officers lacking experience, universities expecting too much return.  
 
It should be noted that research institutions are not alone in not fully 
understanding how to value their research and intellectual property. 
One company respondent commented that Australian companies also 
tend to licence too early with a promise of royalty payments 10 years 
down the track. Another commented that Australian companies and 
institutes tend to cave in when negotiations get bogged down and fail 
to fully appreciate the value of what they are acquiring and giving.  
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
In summary, we find that there is much to be optimistic about in 
terms of intellectual property management in Australian research 
institutions, at least amongst our respondents. Researchers are 
becoming more positive about the commercialisation and patenting 
process. Ownership issues are being resolved early in the process and 
the tension between the need for secrecy during the patent filing 
process and the need for rapid publication of research results is being 
managed. Nevertheless, there are huge challenges involved in the 
technology transfer process from the research sector to the industry 
sector. Major obstacles include finding partners, valuing the 
technology and acquiring appropriate negotiating skills. The process 
could be made far more efficient by education and consolidation of 
resources and knowledge bases both at the local and at the national 
level. 
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RESULTS CHAPTER 4:  
RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO 
UPSTREAM PATENTS 
 
As explained in Context Chapter 3, it is important when considering 
foundational patents to consider the impact of restricting access to a 
particular patented invention. Technologies necessary for biomedical 
research fall into a number of different categories, and whether we 
should be concerned about access to technology being restricted will 
depend on the nature of the patented technology in question, and 
whether the person seeking access is in a competitive relationship 
with the patent holder. These categories are as follows:  
 
• technology is being used by the patent holder and another 
researcher to conduct similar research, and the other 
researcher subsequently finds the technology is already 
patented (for example, where a lead compound being used for 
development of the same drug by competing researchers is 
covered by patent); 
• the patented technology is useful for a range of follow-on 
uses, the products of which will ultimately compete (for 
example where a lead compound is being used for research 
into two different drugs that may ultimately compete with one 
another); and  
• the patented technology is useful for a range of non-
competing, follow-on uses (PCR is a prime example).  
 
The instances of restricted access with which we are primarily 
concerned fall into categories two and three. It is in these instances 
that there may be significant social cost associated with restricting 
access. Society would want, for example, patented inventions that fit 
into category three to be widely disseminated. In this way, broad 
innovation will be promoted and society will benefit through the 
introduction of a variety of new products. On the other hand, society 
accepts that there will be some reduction in competition associated 
with the patent system, and is accordingly less concerned with 
restricted access to patented inventions that fall into category one. 
Although there may be a cost disadvantage where competing 
researchers are precluded from developing competing products, there 
is unlikely to be a reduction in products available to consumers.  
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The second category is more problematic, and the desirability of 
promoting access becomes more equivocal. Broad access is desirable 
because the potential of the invention is more likely to be maximised 
through having a variety of innovators exploiting the invention. 
Walsh, Arora and Cohen cite the examples of Geron’s exclusive 
licence for human embryonic stem cell technology and Myriad’s 
diagnostic test licensing as having a dampening effect on research.218 
In most cases, the scope of the patent claims will clearly become an 
important issue, because this will determine the breadth of follow-on 
research affected by the patent.  
 
Although it is not always clear which category a particular patented 
invention is likely to fit into, we have attempted to bear this 
distinction in mind when considering whether our data gives us any 
insight into issues associated with restricted access to patents. This 
chapter presents evidence relevant to whether or not participants in 
the Australian biotechnology industry are having difficulties 
accessing patented upstream products or technologies that are 
required to enable them to conduct research.  
 
In the United States, the preconditions for restricted access to 
foundational patents certainly appear to exist, because a number of 
important, broad-ranging research tools are patented.219 In some 
cases, these research tools can be used for a range of follow-on 
research activities. Furthermore, some patent holders are vigorously 
enforcing their patent rights in the United States.  
 
As a result of this, concern has arisen that access to crucial patents 
will be blocked, and an array of follow-on research activities will be 
precluded at the expense of innovation. This concern may be lessened 
to some degree in Australia given that our research has revealed that a 
number of these fundamental patents have not been patented in 
Australia. It seems fair to assume that this may be the case in respect 
of a number of other patents over research tools. 
 
These research tools can therefore be used for research and 
development in Australia without fear of liability for infringement. 
Whether any commercial products of research using these research 
tools can be exported into markets where they are patented depends 
                                                 
218 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28 at 333. See also above Context Chapter 3. 
219 See Heller and Eisenberg, above n131; Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28. See 
also A. Rai ‘Genome Patents: A Case Study in Patenting Research Tools’ (2002) 77 
Academic Medicine 1369. See also the discussion above in Context Chapter 3. 
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on the jurisdiction in question. Governments in many of the major 
markets have prohibited such a practice.220 For example, in the United 
States, the importation of intellectual property protected products, 
produced offshore without the consent of the owner of the technology 
is not allowed.  However, the recent court decisions in Bayer AG v 
Housey Pharmaceuticals221 cast some doubt of the ability of these 
provisions to protect patent holders where a drug is developed using a 
patented method. This litigation involved the Method of Screening 
patents discussed in Context Chapter 3, and had the following 
outcomes: 
 
• the patents are restricted to research methods and do 
not include manufacturing methods; 
• the provision in United States patent law prohibiting 
importation for the purpose of sale or use of a 
product made by a process patented in the United 
States only applies to patented manufacturing 
processes and not to research processes; and  
• importation of products produced using those 
research methods in other jurisdictions does not 
infringe the patents. 
 
This may, to some extent, place participants in the Australian industry 
at an advantage over participants in other jurisdictions.222 Despite the 
status of these foundational inventions, there is no doubt, however, 
that other important methods and technologies which will be required 
for biomedical research are patented in Australia. The patent 
landscape is becoming increasingly complicated, and many upstream 
inventions have now been patented. In addition, it may be that 
research being conducted by the Australian industry is likely to be 
seen as increasingly threatening as Australian companies and 
institutes gain an international presence. In addition, although it 
would appear that patent rights have not been enforced as vigorously 
as they have in other jurisdictions, this is something that seems 
certain to change. Both overseas and Australian companies are 
starting to take a more aggressive approach to enforcement. A good 
                                                 
220 The essential issue here is the composition of provisions in national intellectual 
property legislation for parallel importation, which is the practice of importing 
products developed offshore (in a jurisdiction where the technology is not protected 
by patent) using the patented technology. While some jurisdictions allow parallel 
importation, most developed countries prohibit the practice. 
221 Housey cases, above n108. 
222 See Context Chapter 3. 
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example of this is the stance taken by GTG in relation to their junk 
DNA patents.223  
 
The issue of restricted access to patents is therefore an important issue 
for the Australian industry. Even though a considerable amount of 
upstream research is conducted by the Australian industry, 
respondents in all of the sectors we investigated, frequently require 
access to upstream patents. Even upstream researchers may need to 
access patents over particular research tools that are crucial to their 
research, as not every upstream researcher is in the position of having 
developed and patented every research tool they may need to conduct 
their research. 
 
In their study of the United States industry, Walsh, Arora and Cohen 
were cautiously optimistic about limitations on access. They warned 
that although research in broad therapeutic areas has not been blocked 
to date, this may be through a combination of luck and institutional 
response, and the potential to impede progress in a broad research 
area still exists.224 To some extent, the same potential exists for the 
Australian industry.  
 
In investigating this issue we consider evidence relevant to: 
• the existence of blocking patents in the industry; 
• whether licences are being refused; 
• the effect of exclusive licensing; 
• costs and delays associated with successful negotiations for 
access to patents; 
• the effects of particular terms in licensing agreements; and 
• failure to exploit patents.  
 
 
BLOCKING PATENTS 
 
What do we mean by “blocking patents”? 
 
In the company survey, we asked respondents whether their company 
had ever had to change its research program because a patent blocked 
access to key research tools or materials. Nine respondents reported 
that they had changed their research program, (18 percent) and as 
                                                 
223 See Context Chapter 2. 
224 Walsh, Arora and Cohen above n28 at 335. See also Straus, Holzapfel and 
Lindenmeir, above n35 at 9-11. 
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would be expected, several of these respondents indicated that 
existing patents heavily influenced their research programs, with one 
other commenting that only slight changes in the scope of their 
research were required to avoid infringing patents.225  One indicated 
that they left the field completely if they were unable to work with 
patent holders to enable them to access necessary patents. Another 
four respondents provided comments that indicated they had come 
across patents that would potentially impact on their research 
programs. We did not go on to ask how the companies’ research 
programs had changed, however this was an issue we explored in 
more detail in the interviews.  
 
Of the 18 diagnostic institutions surveyed, only one reported access to 
patents necessary to conduct research being blocked (five percent). 
The patents in question were the BRCA1 and BRCA2 patents. Four 
of the 21 research institutions surveyed reported having to change 
their research program because a patent blocked access, and their 
responses were qualified. It may be that this figure was significant 
because they are less concerned about proceeding without a licence 
given that they rely on the existence of a research exemption.    
 
We are careful here in using the term, “blocking patents”, as the term 
has a specific legal meaning. Blocking patents occur where one patent 
holder holds a broad patent over an invention (the dominant patent) 
and another patent holder holds a narrower patent over an 
improvement to that invention, or a new invention (the subservient 
patent).226 The holder of the subservient patent requires a licence from 
the holder of the dominant patent, and the holder of the dominant 
patent would be precluded from exploiting the improvement without a 
licence. In most cases, once an improvement is developed and 
commercialised a licence from the holder of a pioneering patent that 
blocks the improver from practising the improvement, would be 
required. The blocking patents doctrine has a limited application, and 
the question referred to above was intended to include situations 
where research to develop improvements was stymied in that it was 
perceived that a licence to a foundational blocking patent might not 
be granted. It essentially sought to determine whether any 
respondents had taken steps to avoid a blocking patent situation. 
                                                 
225 Note that two of these responses were received from non-biomedical companies. 
Both of these respondents described their activities as falling into the category of 
plant/animal research. 
226 See Merges and Nelson, above n138 at 860-861, and also at their note 96, which 
discusses the intuition behind the grant of blocking patents. 
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Evidence of blocking patents 
 
A significant number of interview respondents considered blocking 
patents to be a real issue within the industry. Many respondents 
commented that they could not see the value of companies obtaining 
patents purely for blocking or defensive purpose. Having said this, 21 
respondents to the company survey had applied for a patent for 
strategic reasons, that is, to allow them freedom to operate (43 
percent). In most cases, that patent had been granted. It was not clear 
whether those particular patents were subsequently exploited or 
licensed-out, however many respondents who participated in 
interviews either had patents that they did not currently exploit, or 
knew of companies who did not currently exploit. In many cases, 
these patents were not licensed or otherwise transferred, although this 
may have been due to a number of reasons.227 In a number of 
instances respondents subsequently let patents lapse they did not 
exploit, and routinely undertook audits of the patents on their books 
to enable them to identify these patents. 
 
Although the occurrence of the blocking patents doctrine has 
traditionally been considered to be fairly limited, one patent attorney 
we interviewed had experienced many instances of blocking patents, 
as “[e]verything (in biotechnology) uses other people’s patented 
technology.” As this respondent put it, researchers need to either 
tiptoe around the prior art or seek a licence.  
 
A significant number of respondents we interviewed reported 
avoiding research in an area because they were aware that another 
company held a patent to which they required access, and they 
considered they would have difficulty gaining access to that patent. In 
many cases, this was a clear competing products case as outlined in 
category one above, because these respondents indicated that they 
were in a horizontal relationship with the patent holder. In some 
cases, however, it was less clear that this was the case and it was 
more likely that the patented technology fell into category two.  
 
Some respondents engaged in academic research reported having 
difficulties gaining access to necessary patents. It would appear that 
patent holders are becoming increasingly wary of infringement by 
                                                 
227 For example, the patents may have had limited commercial value, or may not 
have been very marketable. The difficulties associated with licensing or otherwise 
transferring technology out were canvassed in Results Chapter 2.  
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academic researchers as the line between academic research and 
commercialisation becomes increasingly blurred. Again, it appeared 
in a number of cases that the technology in question fell into category 
two, although our data does not allow us to form a strong view on 
this. This clearly poses a problem if a single patent has broad 
applicability, and restricting access has the potential to block off 
whole areas of research that cannot be foreseen at the present time. 
The question here as we pointed out earlier, is whether these patented 
inventions to which access was blocked, comprise foundational 
discoveries that are key to broad areas of subsequent research.  
 
The result of these licensing practices is also, as one respondent 
pointed out, that the patent holder will lose ground by failing to allow 
anyone to work on their patents. There must be some social cost 
associated with this, as well as the strategic cost to the patent holder 
of falling behind.  
 
Overcoming blocking patents 
 
Of the interview respondents who commented that they had 
encountered difficulties of some kind with patents blocking research, 
many of them said they had overcome these difficulties by changing 
the direction of their research so as to avoid infringing the patent(s). 
In some cases, these patents were owned by competitors and the 
problematic patents were patents over technology that would compete 
with any technology derived from the research program if it 
continued (category one). In this situation, although it is to be 
expected that being granted access to a competing patent is unlikely, 
one research institution respondent said that a licence deal might even 
be attractive to a competitor if you have a skill set that they want.  
 
Other respondents required licences to research inputs to enable them 
to proceed, and tended to avoid research areas (or subsequently 
change the direction of their research) unless they were relatively sure 
they could obtain a necessary licence.228 Successful licence 
agreements were often reached. In a considerable number of cases 
where a licence was required and the researcher approached the 
patent holder, respondents indicated that a successful licensing 
outcome was eventually negotiated. One licensing manager 
contended that 99.99 percent of licensing deals within the industry 
                                                 
228 This becomes an anticommons issue where a number of patents block research 
and access to them proves to be problematic. 
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run smoothly, and only about 0.01 percent stand out as anomalies. In 
his view, it is not correct to say that there is any blockage to research 
except in exceptional cases.  
 
However, in many instances, respondents did not even try to negotiate 
a licence as they were of the view that the patent holders would be 
unlikely to enter into negotiations with them. In a majority of cases, 
these respondents fell into category one, although a number fell into 
category two.  
 
Licensing was the main strategy by which access to patents could be 
negotiated. In the case of blocking patents, cross-licensing is a 
mechanism by which a blocking patents situation may be overcome. 
While only a small number of interview respondents had been 
involved in any cross-licensing activity, a significant number 
considered that cross-licences would become more common within 
the industry.229 
 
Some respondents (particularly where the technology to which they 
required access fell into category one) reported that inventing around 
was a strategy they had employed to enable them freedom to operate, 
while others redirected their research efforts to avoid infringing 
relevant patents. Respondents from the pharmaceutical sector were 
generally of the view that it is not possible to obtain broad patents that 
block research in the pharmaceutical industry because of the ability of 
researchers to invent around. It was evident that these pharmaceutical 
patents represent a clear case of patents that fall into category one. 
The issue of inventing around will be canvassed in more detail in 
Results Chapter 7 while redirection of research in relation to 
anticommons issues will be discussed in Results Chapter 5. 
 
Note also that the Australian Patents Act 1990 provides that a 
compulsory licence may be granted where an applicant seeks access 
to a patent and also a patent that blocks them from exploiting that 
patent.230 The applicant will only be successful in obtaining a 
compulsory licence where the new invention involves an important 
technical advance of considerable economic importance on the other 
invention.231 Although the compulsory licensing provisions under the 
                                                 
229 See also Results Chapter 7. 
230 See sections 133(2) and 133(3B)(a). 
231 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) section 133(3B). For further details on when a 
compulsory licence may be granted, and the conditions on which a grant is 
predicated, see ALRC, above n18 at 234-36; Nicol and Nielsen above n4 at 370-71. 
Restrictions on Access 
________________________________________________________ 
145 
Patents Act have been utilised only very rarely, the threat of an 
application for a compulsory licence probably provides an impetus to 
industry to enter into licensing negotiations and ultimately into 
contractual arrangements.232  
 
 
REFUSALS TO LICENCE 
 
Of the companies that responded to the company survey, six reported 
being refused a patent licence (12 percent). Two other respondents 
did not indicate that they had encountered a refusal to license, 
although their answers to later questions implied that they had.233 The 
question was intended to elicit responses as to unilateral refusals to 
licence, although it would appear in one case at least that the refusal 
was predicated on unreasonable terms. Of the six companies who 
were refused a licence, none reported being in a vertical relationship 
with the patent holder, and three reported being in a horizontal 
relationship.234 We did not receive responses about the nature of the 
relationship between the parties from the other three. 
 
Reasons for the refusal were given by three respondents: two reported 
that exclusive licences were granted to another party, and the other 
stated that they were in competition with the patent holder.235 It 
would be fair to say that a majority of these companies were 
significant in terms of size as measured by number of employees and 
revenue, with most of the respondents reporting revenue in excess of 
AU$5 million. Three were internationally owned. All of the 
companies had a significant number of patents ranging from eight to 
“thousands”. We also asked respondents about the kind of patent for 
                                                 
232 IPCRC, above n47 at 162; F.M. Scherer ‘Comments’ in R. Anderson and N. 
Gallini, (eds) Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights in the 
Knowledge-Based Economy (Calgary: University of Calgary Press; 1998) 104-109 
at 106; Nuffield, above n40 at 55. See also the discussion on compulsory licensing 
in Part 3 of this report. 
233 Note that one of these respondents was engaged in plant/animal research rather 
than biomedical research, although the patent for which a licence was apparently 
refused was described as an active drug patent. 
234 The respondent referred to above at n219 also reported being in a horizontal 
relationship with the patent holder. 
235 One other respondent who did not provide an affirmative answer to the refusal to 
license question, cited unreasonable terms as a reason for a refusal to license – it is 
not clear whether there was a refusal or not, but it seems in any event that it was not 
a unilateral refusal to license. 
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which a licence was refused. Four respondents provided this detail,236 
with one answering research tool, two answering gene sequence,237 
and one answering active drug patent.238 We surmise from the 
information concerning relationships with the patent holder or 
exclusive licensee, that a number of these patents fell into category 
one, however this is not altogether clear from the limited data 
available. Given the kinds of patents to which access was refused, it 
may be that in one or two instances the patented technology fell into 
category two. 
 
Of the research institutions that responded to the survey, only two 
reported that they had been refused a licence (nine percent), and only 
one of those institutions had had to abandon a particular area of 
research because of the refusal. None of the diagnostic institutions 
surveyed had encountered a refusal to license, probably due primarily 
to the low level of research and licensing-in being undertaken within 
the diagnostics sector. 
 
The interview data 
 
This perception that unilateral refusals to license are not a pervasive 
issue within the industry was reinforced by the interview data. Most 
of the company and research institution respondents we spoke to had 
not encountered outright refusals to license, although one respondent 
whose companies were involved in downstream development 
activities offered the following: 
 
The responses we have had in requesting licences have 
been a mixed bag. We have only negotiated with US 
companies. Many small to medium sized US 
companies have told us to go away, they would rather 
not risk losing a potential market. Larger companies 
have not been such a problem – they are willing to 
license and realise they will not enter this area. We 
have not been offered licences on restrictive terms, we 
have only had outright refusals to license. 
 
                                                 
236 One other respondent who had not answered yes to the refusal to licence 
question, answered this question – enabling technology. They also said the patentee 
was in a horizontal relationship with them. 
237 One of these was also described as diagnostic. 
238 What we don’t know is whether the patents were being exploited in any event by 
either the patentee or another licensee. 
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This account appeared to be somewhat isolated. Another respondent 
engaged in downstream development activities reported that there had 
been an occasion where a research tool patent holder did not want to 
license them, but ultimately licensed their partner which solved their 
problem in any case. One university technology transfer officer stated 
that they had been refused licences but generally the problem was that 
terms were unacceptable. 
 
One interpretation of this data is probably that refusals to license were 
not encountered because often it did not get to the stage that licences 
were requested. This was acknowledged by many of our respondents. 
As reported elsewhere, researchers and companies stated that they 
avoided particular areas of research if patents were held by 
competitors, or if it looked as though obtaining a licence might prove 
to be too problematic. In some cases technology clearly fell into 
category one, but in other cases it is likely that the patented invention 
fell into category two. For example, a respondent from a large 
pharmaceutical company stated that if it was clear the patent holder 
would not give a licence over a target, they tended not to pursue it. 
They had a large number of targets to choose from, so abandoning 
targets because they could not obtain the necessary licences to 
continue research was not hugely problematic. Another respondent 
from a large pharmaceutical company agreed that refusals to license 
do happen, but thought that deals that didn’t work out were probably 
unsuccessful because of the low probability of success rather than 
other aspects. 
 
To summarise, in line with the survey results a few interview 
respondents expressed frustration at difficulties in licensing-in 
enabling technologies, but these were greatly outnumbered by the 
number of respondents who had not experienced any problems. Some 
respondents complained that owners of research tool patents, while 
willing to license, unreasonably demanded reach-through royalties.239 
 
Patented research tools were also frequently used without licences, 
particularly by universities where it was unlikely or unclear whether 
or not a commercial product would result. It was conceded by a 
number of respondents that it would be impossible to know what 
every lab or company was doing, so policing use of your research tool 
patent would be extremely difficult. A patent attorney we interviewed 
                                                 
239 See discussion dealing with reach-through rights in Terms, below, and Results 
Chapter 5. 
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agreed that research tool patents are very difficult to enforce, 
particularly at present when many research tool patents are owned by 
multinational companies. 
 
The basis of refusals to license 
 
Similarly, most respondents engaged in licensing-out their technology 
(including research tools) appeared to hold the view that it made good 
business sense to engage in fairly liberal licensing practices. This is 
not to say that exclusive licensing practices, or licensing-out on terms 
that may be problematic to one party, are not common within the 
industry. It seems clear, however, that there are some parties with 
whom a patent holder would not contemplate a licence arrangement. 
Many respondents intimated this, and one respondent was more 
specific. Engaged in upstream research and development activities, 
this respondent gave three reasons why a requested licence might be 
refused. These were first, where the licence grant would conflict with 
their own business development, or with a licence granted to another 
party, particularly an exclusive licence. Second, a licence would be 
refused where the potential licensee was problematic in terms of 
finances or reputation within the market place. Finally, a licence 
would be refused where the intended application of the patented 
technology was unethical. 
 
The first ground was undoubtedly the most common ground on which 
a licence would be refused, and this is in line with the survey results. 
It is to be expected that when a patent holder has a product patent, 
they are likely to refuse to license their own competitors or license 
two parties in competition. As stated by this respondent, “You have to 
be very careful not to licence to two competitors.” Again, we reiterate 
that patented inventions falling into category one are unlikely to be 
widely disseminated, and this is unlikely to entail significant social 
cost. Consistent with the objectives of the patent system, some degree 
of exclusion is to be expected.  
 
In contrast, in situations where the products developed constitute 
broadly applicable foundational discoveries, failing to license broadly 
may have some consequent effect on downstream research. This 
respondent also pointed out that in circumstances where “…we may 
have given a licence for gene therapy to treat breast cancer, and 
someone else wants it for all cancers”, a licence would also likely be 
refused. Although there could clearly be a conflict for an exclusive 
licensee in such a case, it would certainly be questionable whether a 
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company engaged in researching gene therapy for breast cancer 
competed with a company engaged in researching gene therapy for all 
cancers. This is more likely to be an instance that fits into category 
two, and that is more problematic in terms of restricted access. It is 
difficult to say with any precision how frequently such a scenario 
might arise. 
 
A consideration then, that has major bearing on whether patent 
holders are willing to license others, is the technology in question. 
Whether the technology is core to the activities of the patent holder 
will be an important variable. Patent holders will be understandably 
reluctant to license inventions that fall into category one, and in some 
instances category two. However, it became evident to us while 
conducting interviews that patent holders are more likely to license 
non-core technologies. This may mean that patent holders are willing 
to license technology falling into categories one and two. Where they 
were not licensed, in many cases it would appear that the inventions 
were being exploited in any event, although we did receive reports of 
inventions not being exploited.240  
 
Broadly applicable research tools (falling into category three) are 
more likely to be widely licensed because this is a method of 
maximising revenue on them. Permitting others to use some enabling 
technologies is unlikely to impact significantly on the competitive 
advantage a patent holder or licensee may have. We can conclude that 
our respondents reported no instances of licences to technology 
falling into category three being refused.  
 
A similar conclusion was reached by Walsh, Arora and Cohen after 
conducting their interviews;241 in particular their respondents 
complained of restrictions on the use of targets.242 In considering a 
number of examples, however, their conclusion was that it was only 
in a number of limited instances that access to a target was 
completely restricted or limited, and in most cases the target was 
being exploited by at least one party.  It should be remembered, 
however, that there may be some social cost or impact on innovation, 
when few parties are working on solving one problem.243 This is most 
                                                 
240 See discussion on Failure to Exploit Patents below. 
241 And see also Straus, Holzapfel and Lindenmeir above n35 at 7. 
242 Walsh, Arora and Cohen above n28 at 310-14. 
243 See Merges and Nelson, above n138 who argue that innovation will be best 
served by a variety of innovators working on improvements, rather than relying on 
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likely to be an issue in respect of technology falling into categories 
two and three, with the former being the most problematic in practice. 
 
 
EXCLUSIVITY 
 
The effect of exclusivity on research 
 
In considering the issue of exclusivity, it should again be emphasised 
that exclusivity is the cornerstone of the patent system. Exclusivity is 
part of the patent bargain, and the price society pays for the disclosure 
of invention. Without monopoly rights, the patent system would cease 
to function. The aim of this discussion, therefore, is to consider 
whether there are instances in which exclusive licensing practices are 
likely to hinder innovation in that use of an invention will be 
restricted. Again, the category into which technology will fall will be 
important, in that ideally non-exclusive licensing of inventions falling 
into category three (and probably two) will take place. 
 
Our research has revealed that while many patent holders initially aim 
to disseminate their technology widely, licensing decisions are often 
driven by revenue considerations. Our data indicated that a majority 
of our respondents were involved in licensing-out technologies falling 
into categories one and two. Our respondents frequently expressed a 
desire to non-exclusively license these technologies where a number 
of licensees had been identified. But in many cases in order to extract 
the best bargain they were required to license on an exclusive basis. 
Pharmaceutical companies in particular, demand exclusivity, 
particularly in relation to drug targets. Where licensing decisions are 
dictated to some extent by the bargaining power of the respective 
parties, licences may be granted to fewer licensees than would be 
considered to be socially optimal. This is particularly the case where a 
category two invention may not be licensed to its full capacity, and 
other competing uses of an invention may be precluded. 
 
Exclusive licensing in practice 
 
Exclusivity can take a number of forms including geographical 
exclusivity, exclusivity for a limited period, or field-specific 
exclusivity. Licensing on an exclusive basis is commonplace within 
                                                                                                                  
the patent holder to coordinate development of subsequent innovation through 
licensing.  
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the industry. Of the 22 respondents to the company survey who had 
requested licences, 16 of those respondents had entered into licences 
on an exclusive basis (73 percent of respondents who had licensed-in, 
33 percent of total respondents).244 Ten parties had licensed-in on a 
non-exclusive basis, and five reported having both kinds of 
agreements. Two parties failed to provide details of the kind of 
arrangements entered into. 
 
Sixteen of the 22 respondents who had licensed-out patents provided 
details of the kinds of licensing-out agreements they had entered 
into.245 Twelve respondents had entered into exclusive licensing-out 
arrangements (54 percent of respondents who had licensed-out, 24 
percent of total respondents). Only six respondents had entered into 
non-exclusive arrangements, and four reported both exclusive and 
non-exclusive deals. 
 
Eight of the 12 research institution survey respondents who had 
requested licences had entered into non-exclusive licensing 
arrangements (67 percent of respondents who had licensed-in, 35 
percent of total respondents), and three had entered into exclusive 
arrangements (25 percent of respondents who had licensed-in, 13 
percent of total respondents). Thirteen research institutions had 
licensing-out arrangements, and 11 of these provided details of the 
type of arrangement. Seven said they had entered into exclusive 
arrangements, (54 percent of respondents with licensing-out 
arrangements, 33 percent of total respondents) and four said they had 
entered into both exclusive and non-exclusive arrangements (36 
percent of respondents with licensing-out arrangements, 19 percent of 
total respondents). None said they had only entered into non-
exclusive arrangements. 
 
Of the three diagnostic facilities who had entered into licensing-in 
arrangements, one said they had entered into exclusive arrangements, 
and one non-exclusive. Only two respondents had licensing-out 
arrangements, and both of these were exclusive agreements.  
 
                                                 
244 All but two provided details of the kinds of arrangements entered into. Ten 
parties had licensed-in on a non-exclusive basis (one of these was involved in 
plant/animal research), and five reported having both kinds of agreements (again, 
one of these was involved in plant/animal research). 
245 One party informed us their agreement had expired, two were in negotiations or 
planning to enter into an agreement, one party cited confidentiality and two did not 
know or did not provide an answer. 
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Exclusive licensing appears to comprise a significant portion of 
licensing arrangements within the industry. This was confirmed by 
the interview data, which highlighted the role of exclusivity in licence 
agreements. The interview data also confirmed that whether a licence 
agreement is exclusive or non-exclusive will depend largely on a 
number of factors including: 
 
• the nature of the invention being licensed;  
• the negotiating power of the respective parties and their 
position in the drug or therapy development pipeline; and 
• the nature and number of potential licensees. 
 
The nature of the invention or licensed product 
 
Respondents reported being more willing to exclusively license where 
the technology was not core to their activities. A number of 
respondents exclusively licensed-in technology in order to shore up 
their patent portfolios, recognising that they were far more likely to 
be granted an exclusive licence where the patent holder had no 
intention of using the patented technology. Under these 
circumstances, the generally held view was that although they may 
not want to use the technology, this was unlikely to be of concern to a 
patent holder who was unlikely to use the technology and realise any 
value on it themselves. 
 
Exclusive arrangements were viewed as appropriate where a licence 
was being sought with a particular commercial outcome or product in 
mind. Respondents also reported being reluctant to enter into non-
exclusive arrangements where the price demanded was excessive. On 
the other hand, respondents were generally willing to expend 
significant amounts for exclusive licences.  
 
A patent holder may exclusively license the whole subject matter of 
an invention, or a particular component of an invention. It is 
important to recall that specific fields of an invention may be 
separately licensed on different bases. The nature of the invention or 
the licensed component will be an important variable in licensing 
negotiations, as it will determine to some extent whether an exclusive 
or non-exclusive licensing deal will be more lucrative. As explained 
by a respondent involved in a biotechnology commercialisation 
company: 
 
Restrictions on Access 
________________________________________________________ 
153 
Whether to licence exclusively or non-exclusively 
depends on the project. For example, when working 
with animal models most licences will be non-
exclusive, devices will be exclusive. The type of 
licence depends on the type of technology and what 
you want to licence; service, compound, device etc. 
Each has its own quirky nature. 
 
Gene targets may be licensed either exclusively or non-exclusively 
depending on how wide any applications of the gene are. A gene 
patent may have a number of applications and one particular 
application or function (such as a diagnostic or therapeutic 
application) may be exclusively licensed, and others non-exclusively 
licensed. That is, a licence over a gene patent may not be totally 
exclusive, but may be field specific. Such arrangements were reported 
to exist by a significant number of respondents from both research 
institutions and companies. 
 
A number of respondents confirmed that product based inventions (or 
components of inventions) are often exclusively licensed, while 
broadly applicable technology based inventions are generally licensed 
on a non-exclusive basis. Platform technologies, assays, reagents such 
as monoclonal antibodies, and diagnostic tools for example, are 
generally licensed on a non-exclusive basis, while compounds and 
other drug targets, and particular applications of gene patents are 
often licensed on an exclusive basis. In short, technologies falling into 
category one are generally exclusively licensed, while broadly 
applicable technologies falling into category three are more likely to 
be non-exclusively licensed. Category two is more problematic, and it 
would appear that technologies falling into this category were in some 
instances licensed on a fairly limited basis. This was due to the fact 
that products were likely to compete, but also the other factors 
discussed below. 
 
The negotiating power of the parties and their position in the 
development pipeline  
 
Many company respondents said that they insisted on exclusive 
licences from university or biotech start-ups, while some generally 
bargained for assignments, exclusive licences and non-exclusive 
licences in that order. Many respondents stated that they just tried to 
get what they could. Everything seems to be negotiable, but the other 
factors discussed here will impact on how licensing negotiations play 
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out. Respondents from universities, for example, stated that a non-
exclusive licence would in many circumstances be desirable. 
However, in order to achieve a satisfactory licensing outcome they 
had to accept that given the number of research opportunities 
available for licence, their product would need to be licensed-out on 
an exclusive basis or not at all.246 Many respondents at various stages 
in the development pipeline had licensing arrangements with large 
multinational firms, and agreed that there was often little choice but 
to license exclusively. 
 
In some instances, respondents said they were forced to non-
exclusively license their patents where they were being infringed, or 
risk a challenge to the validity of their patents that they could ill 
afford to defend. 
 
Potential licensees 
 
The licensing decisions of many companies are dictated to some 
extent by their identification of potential licensees. For example, if 
only one or two companies would potentially be interested in the 
intellectual property, they would realise more benefit by licensing-out 
on an exclusive basis. Where there are “a number of players in the 
area”, one respondent involved in upstream research and development 
activities stated that they tried to license non-exclusively to extract 
more value from the intellectual property. Indeed, where this was the 
case, an exclusive licence would not be desirable unless the potential 
licensee had a significant share of the relevant market. Thus, 
identification of the markets to be serviced is an important part of any 
licensing decision. 
 
Of course, the factor mentioned previously will come into play here; 
the ability of patent holders to enter into non-exclusive licensing-out 
arrangements where there are a number of licensees available, may be 
hindered to some extent by who the licensees are and what 
                                                 
246 See also Henry and others, above n42; this study found that in the US, non-profit 
organisations are far more likely to grant exclusive licences. Sixty-eight percent of 
licences granted by non-profit respondents were exclusive compared with 27 
percent of licences granted by private firms. The authors recognised there could be 
several reasons for this: the exclusive licensing mandate of the Bayh-Dole Act; a 
desire by universities to reduce licensing expenses; a perception that universities are 
more likely than their industry counterparts to licence targets for drug discovery; 
and the fact that private companies may generate different types of invention to 
non-profit institutions. 
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arrangements they are prepared to enter into. For example, although 
many respondents said they would probably license-out on a non-
exclusive basis if they had a choice, they admitted their choice of 
licensing arrangement was dictated to some extent by the demands of 
licensees, who often insisted on exclusivity. 
 
An interesting comparison can be drawn with the device sector of the 
industry, with one respondent from a company engaged in developing 
devices explaining that they non-exclusively license to competitors on 
a regular basis, and in fact competitors are likely to be the only parties 
interested in licensing their technology. In many cases, these deals 
involve cross-licensing which seems to be common within device 
companies. 
 
At the downstream end of the chain, respondents from pharmaceutical 
companies stated that they insisted on exclusive licences for 
compounds used as drug targets. Other respondents involved in 
downstream product development activities confirmed that they 
would only license-in products on an exclusive basis on the grounds 
that they could not afford to invest in research and development of a 
product under the threat of competition. Most licensees involved in 
licensing-in product based inventions from research institutions 
sought exclusive licences, and were reluctant to enter into agreements 
on any other basis. Price is obviously a consideration here, as 
products licensed on a non-exclusive basis will always be available at 
lower cost. 
 
With reference to research tool patents, a number of respondents who 
could be characterised as operating at the downstream end of the 
development continuum, predictably expressed a desire for non-
exclusive licences for all broadly applicable research tools.247 The 
Cohen-Boyer patent for recombinant DNA technology was mentioned 
by a number of respondents as a kind of ideal to be sought after in 
relation to licensing research tool patents. Exclusive licensing of 
research targets was more likely to be tolerated.248  
 
By contrast, one respondent we spoke to was involved in the 
bioinformatics sector. This respondent could think of only one or two 
                                                 
247 One respondent from a large pharmaceutical company stated that they would like 
to see guidelines for the licensing of research tools in line with the Guidelines 
released by the NIH. However, these guidelines have had a limited impact on the 
actual dissemination of patents over research tools; see above Context Chapter 2. 
248 See also Henry and others, above n42. 
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examples of exclusive licensing deals involving software within the 
sector, and spoke of the sector maintaining an ethos of free, 
unrestricted access, and licensing occurring on a non-exclusive 
basis.249  
  
 
COSTS AND DELAYS ASSOCIATED WITH 
LICENSING PATENTS  
 
A number of commentators and industry participants have agreed that 
transaction costs within the biotechnology industry are significant and 
have arguably resulted in hold-ups in technology transfer for the 
industry.250 Many transaction costs arise in the context of licensing 
intellectual property.251 Broadly defined, these include the costs of 
searching for a licensee or licensor, negotiating a licence, monitoring 
performance, and enforcing the terms of the licence and protecting 
against infringement.252 Additional costs may arise. For example, 
inventing around or conducting research and development overseas 
may give rise to transaction costs. It may have the effect of reducing 
research and development efficiency with a resulting cost to social 
welfare.253 Transaction costs are invariably high in industries where 
many intellectual property rights have been granted, and they raise the 
cost of research and product development.254 One important issue for 
the biotechnology industry is whether companies who are able to 
license-in and proceed with research, nonetheless encounter lengthy 
and costly negotiations, because even successful negotiations delay 
the moment when patented technologies can be put to use.255 
 
Transaction costs exist for all participants in the industry, and whether 
or not transaction costs involved in negotiating agreements are 
                                                 
249 Software is generally licensed for use as enabling technology. Note that 
proprietary databases have for the most part been licensed exclusively or semi-
exclusively. 
250 See, for example, Eisenberg, 2001 above n21 at 232-4; C. Long ‘Proprietary 
Rights and Why Initial Allocations Matter’ (2000) 49 Emory Law Journal 823 
(hereafter Long); OECD, above n39 at 61. 
251 To some extent, a number of the same costs will arise in relation to assignment 
of intellectual property, although licensing entails a number of ongoing costs.  
252 Long above n250 at 827-8. 
253 See Walsh, Arora and Cohen above n28 at 314-5. 
254 Walsh, Arora and Cohen above n28 at 314-16. 
255 See, for example, NIH, above n37 at 7; OECD above n39 at 65; Walsh, Arora 
and Cohen above n28 at 314-9. 
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prohibitive probably depends on the size of the negotiating parties. 
This suggestion was also put forward by Walsh, Arora and Cohen.256 
Dealing with input technologies in biotechnology-based projects 
involves considerable complexity, and in relative terms this is likely 
to be more problematic for small biotechnology companies than 
larger companies, particularly pharmaceutical companies.  
 
Costs and delays associated with negotiations 
 
Difficulties in negotiating on a one-off basis were reported by our 
respondents. Often, while our respondents may not have been refused 
licences and been allowed access to the technology they required, 
access was achieved with some difficulty, or after protracted 
negotiations. Identifying patents which may affect the conduct of 
research, scrutinising these patents, approaching the patent holder and 
conducting negotiations are all lengthy processes, and were discussed 
by a considerable number of interview respondents from all three 
sectors.257 These problems have always existed. One respondent from 
a sizeable downstream company explained her perception of the 
situation as follows: 
 
The number and difficulty of licences is only one 
factor. There is a whole range of factors…These issues 
happen every day; licensing has always been a real 
issue. It’s not new. 
 
In line with this another respondent said: 
 
Licensing-out deals generally start with an agreed term 
sheet. Then you get bogged down in detail. They never 
go smoothly. 
 
Although the respondents in the Walsh survey claimed that a 
proliferation of intellectual property rights have exacerbated costs and 
delays in negotiations for technology transfer, the authors considered 
that demand for legal resources within the [United States] industry is 
unlikely to have increased significantly in recent times.258 This does 
not mean however, that demands on in-house resources have not 
                                                 
256 Walsh, Arora and Cohen above n28 at 316. 
257 See also Results Chapter 5. 
258 Walsh, Arora and Cohen above n28 at 316-7.  
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increased,259 and our interview data certainly confirms that these 
demands have substantially increased. 
 
In line with this, a number of our respondents had experienced 
increasing difficulties in conducting negotiations, particularly in 
terms of delays. A respondent from an upstream company who had 
been involved in frequent deals260 estimated that it can take months to 
negotiate a licence, which can damage cash flow projections. In 
addition, some parties may be becoming increasingly difficult to deal 
with. About a third of our industry interview respondents commented 
that they were encountering difficulties dealing with universities, and 
that often the problem did not lie with the scientists who were often 
willing to provide unrestricted access to technology and materials, but 
with technology transfer or business management personnel.261 At the 
same time, a few respondents said that they felt the increased 
expertise within universities and in the industry generally was 
actually streamlining the negotiation process. 
 
In negotiations generally, the same terms and conditions are often 
included when negotiations start as a kind of “wish list”, so that 
negotiations have to take the same path time and time again.262 Thus, 
costs and delays in achieving an acceptable licensing or assignment 
outcome were reported. In a number of cases, it was considered likely 
that the force with which international companies are able to bargain 
contributed to these costs and delays to some extent. And as a 
licensing consultant pointed out, often the path that negotiations take 
will be technology dependent. If a research institution or small 
biotechnology company is competing with a number of other 
technologies their licensing-out position will not be as strong. On the 
other hand, if their technology is sought after, they will hold a 
valuable bargaining chip in negotiations. 
 
Theoretically, licensing is less likely to be a viable option where the 
transaction in question is low-value. Transactions may be worthwhile 
despite high transaction costs where the transaction is a high-value 
                                                 
259 This was recognised by Walsh, Arora and Cohen above n28 at 316; one of their 
respondents from a large pharmaceutical company referred to the significant in-
house resources demanded by the biotechnology division of the company compared 
with the small molecule division. 
260 This respondent had had to negotiate access to PCR in the 1980s and referred to 
the difficulties his company went through. 
261 These issues are canvassed in detail in Results Chapter 3. 
262 See also Eisenberg 2001 above n21 at 223; NIH Report above n65 at 2. 
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one, but in some cases the transaction costs of the exchange will 
exceed any gains that could be realised and the transaction is unlikely 
to proceed.263 This may be the case whether multiple low value 
agreements are required for each research project (ie, an anti-
commons effect), or when particular high value research tools are 
difficult to gain access to.264 Eisenberg contends that this may be a 
particular problem for universities. Although deals on behalf of most 
private companies are likely to ultimately go forward and in many 
cases it is possible to invent around required technology, this may not 
necessarily be the case for university scientists. Eisenberg suggests 
that even in the case of private firms, terms and conditions sought in 
negotiations may prove to be a stopping point, and the speculative 
value of much follow-on research makes negotiations difficult.265  
 
Our data aligns with this in that respondents from both company and 
research institutions were unlikely to pursue costly negotiations if the 
transaction in question involved technology that was peripheral to 
their research interests. A number of respondents reported that where 
a research project has the potential to produce a high value output, 
costs and delays in conducting transactions will generally not be 
impediments to successful bargaining. However, projects that could 
be classified as being of marginal or intermediate value to a company 
were often derailed where the costs of negotiation proved prohibitive. 
We did not have any evidence on this point from research institutions, 
although this may be because research often proceeded in the absence 
of negotiations in that an informal research exemption was relied on. 
 
The cost of monitoring infringement 
 
Many of our company interview respondents confirmed that they 
expend considerable resources monitoring infringement. Monitoring 
infringement was widely acknowledged to be difficult, however often 
this cost of enforcing intellectual property was seen as worthwhile 
because of the opportunity for generating licensing revenue. Walsh, 
Arora and Cohen found that litigation costs may also prove 
considerable in terms of out-of-pocket expenses, and opportunity 
cost.266 However, few of our interview respondents were involved in, 
                                                 
263 This point is explored in some detail by Eisenberg 2001 above n21 at 232-4. 
264 Ibid at 234 discussing the findings of the NIH study in relation to universities. 
265 Ibid at 232-3. 
266 Walsh, Arora and Cohen above n28 at 315; litigation is a long and costly 
process, not only because of the costs of running litigation, but also in terms of the 
burden it imposes on company personnel. 
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or had been involved in, litigation at this stage.267 Often, the problem 
was one of a lack of resources in that many patent holders simply do 
not have the resources to protect and enforce their intellectual 
property.  
 
Inventing around 
 
Finally, inventing around may involve a number of transaction costs. 
Diverting projects to avoid infringing intellectual property 
undoubtedly involves some cost to researchers and companies as well 
as wasted resources There may also be some social cost in that 
projects with social value do not proceed. We found that the industry 
is engaged in significant inventing around activity, so it would be fair 
to assume there are significant costs associated with this from a social 
perspective.268  
 
 
RESTRICTIVE TERMS 
 
Two questions in the company survey were designed to elicit 
information about restrictive terms in licence agreements. The first 
question asked whether respondents had ever licensed-in a patent on 
terms that they considered restrictive. Nine respondents answered yes 
to this question, (18 percent) and one answered ‘expect so’. Of the 
nine respondents, five reported that the terms related to cost or royalty 
structure,269 (10 percent of total respondents) and three reported that 
problematic terms were those related to reach-through rights or grant 
backs (six percent of total respondents).270 One respondent reported 
the licence was blocking, one complained of field of use restrictions, 
and one reported species application restrictions. 
 
The second question asked respondents whether they had ever 
abandoned licensing-in a patent due to restrictive terms contained in 
the licence. In other words, this question sought to ascertain whether 
respondents had ever encountered a breakdown in licensing 
                                                 
267 In a 1999 survey, Ernst & Young found that some eight percent of companies 
surveyed had been involved in patent infringement litigation in the 12 months 
preceding the survey.  This figure was considered to be fairly low by international 
standards, but was unsurprising to the authors of the Report given Australia’s low 
levels of corporate litigation generally; Ernst & Young, 1999, above n1 at 35. 
268 See below, Results Chapter 7. 
269 Note that one of these respondents was involved in plant/animal research. 
270 See the discussion on reach-through rights below. 
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negotiations due to the terms insisted on by the patent holder. Seven 
respondents stated that they had abandoned licensing-in a patent, (14 
percent) and four of these reported discontinuing a particular aspect 
of research (eight percent of total respondents). A number of these 
seven respondents were Australian based companies of medium size 
(with reference to number of employees and revenue),271 and all but 
one had significant patent portfolios ranging from five to 150 plus 
patents.272  
 
Interestingly, all but one of the respondents who reported that they 
had been refused a licence, also responded in the affirmative to at 
least one of these two questions. Fourteen companies in all had 
encountered what they considered to be restrictive licensing, or been 
refused a licence. Clearly this number is not as significant as one 
might expect, and again might be due to the fact that companies were 
unlikely to seek licences they did not think they would be able to 
obtain, or be able to obtain on reasonable terms. As one research 
institution researcher we interviewed put it:  
 
We have had situations where we fail to get a licence 
– it is not refused but it clear that we wouldn’t be able 
to get a licence. This can have a severe impact on the 
research project. Generally the problem is to do with 
the terms – outrageously high financial terms, out of 
all proportion to the value of the IP. However, this is a 
rarity. In one case the company appeared to want to 
take a deliberately blocking approach. 
 
We included a question on the survey that asked whether difficulties 
encountered in licensing-in patents had an inhibitory effect on 
research. Ten respondents were of the view that there was some 
inhibition of research due to difficulties in licensing-in, and only five 
of these were among the 14 respondents who had also reported a 
refusal or restrictive licensing issue. The remainder of these 14 
respondents clearly did not feel that any problems they may have had 
in licensing-in had an inhibitory effect on research. They were 
relatively large companies with significant patent portfolios, so it is 
likely that their companies had the resources to redirect research in 
the event that they did encounter difficulties in licensing. 
                                                 
271 One of the respondents did not provide the basic information as to the 
company’s activities on the grounds that they considered it to be confidential and 
possibly identifying. 
272 One respondent did not report any granted patents or patent applications. 
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Many interview respondents referred to difficulties in negotiating 
licences, and often these difficulties stemmed from the fact that they 
held an inferior bargaining position. As a licensing consultant 
explained: 
 
The choice of what licence to use depends on who is 
more powerful. We had one deal where the US 
licensor insisted that we had to use their agreement. It 
was ambiguous because they tend not to use English 
as precisely as us. But they refused to look at our 
licence. 
 
Of the respondents who discussed licence terms, the same terms 
appeared to be problematic in a number of instances.273 Although 
parties to licensing arrangements seek to have some parity between 
licensing deals in which they are involved, respondents acknowledged 
that every deal is different. Although the terms included in licences 
tend to be more or less equivalent, most negotiations are in effect 
started afresh, as various companies engaged in different activities, 
and licence deals require different coverage. In the opinion of one 
respondent, “The market is ad hoc; this is rather inefficient. The 
transaction process lacks marketplace mentality.” Transaction costs 
involved in licensing mean that the process of licensing is resource 
intensive, and successful outcomes relatively costly.274  
 
Whether or not negotiations could overcome differences of opinion in 
the terms to be included in licence agreements seemed to depend to a 
large extent on whether the technology for which a licence was 
sought was core to the licensee’s research interests. As one 
respondent put it: “We have had situations when terms are too 
onerous. If peripheral to your own research interests, you simply part 
company. If core, then you fight for it and be prepared to share the 
spoils.”  
 
Many of the terms that can be problematic in licence agreements were 
outlined in Results Chapter 2. When asked whether restrictive terms 
had been imposed in licence agreements, respondents highlighted a 
number of those terms. Field of use restrictions, for example, were 
frequently contentious and regarded by licensees as problematic. 
                                                 
273 See also Eisenberg 2001 above n21 at 223-50. 
274 See section above dealing with ‘Costs and Delays’. 
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Prohibitive royalty structures can be deal breakers, particularly from 
the large pharmaceutical company perspective. One respondent from 
this sector stated that they would not pursue a deal with a complex 
royalty structure particularly for unvalidated targets. An even bigger 
risk is that if a licensor asks too much the validity of the patent may 
be challenged and the patent may be lost. One respondent gave the 
example of the Cohen Boyer patent to demonstrate the importance of 
setting an appropriate royalty fee. She noted that this covered basic 
recombinant DNA technology and was probably invalid, but because 
the royalty rate was so low everyone paid. The terms that respondents 
considered to be most restrictive, however, were terms claiming 
reach-through rights. 
 
Reach-through rights 
 
Other studies have found that reach-through rights in licences are one 
of the most pervasive issues that arise in licensing negotiations, and 
are problematic for participants from all industry sectors.275 Reach-
through rights in licence agreements may take the form of rights to 
royalties over future inventions, exclusive licences over future 
inventions or ownership (or a licence) of intellectual property over 
future inventions.276 Usually they are contained in licences of 
inventions that can be classified as fairly upstream, or material 
transfer agreements (MTAs). They often give the licensor broad 
rights to inventions that may not have been foreseen at the time the 
licence was entered into. The issue of reach-through rights in the 
context of licence stacking is canvassed in detail in Results Chapter 5. 
 
In relation to rights to future inventions or improvements, one 
respondent involved in frequent licensing-out deals stated that:   
 
We have a number of licences where there is provision 
for the new technology to be licensed back to us. For 
                                                 
275 See NIH, above n37. Reach-through rights were problematic for both private 
sector and university respondents in this study. Many complaints were encountered 
in relation to broad spectrum research tools such as databases, instruments and 
reagents that could be used in a variety of research questions, but they were 
certainly not limited to these tools. From the perspective of private firms, reach-
through rights were generally a method of controlling the risks associated with 
providing research tools to scientists or NIH-funded institutions; see at 12-16. See 
also Straus, Holzapfel and Lindenmeir, above n35 at 17 (licence negotiations are 
more cumbersome due to insistence on provisions giving reach-through rights).  
276 See Heller and Eisenberg, above n131 at 699; Eisenberg 2001, above n21 at 230, 
NIH, above n37 at 8. 
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example, this might include gene targets or gene 
therapy using our technology. We want the first option 
to commercialise or at least to get hefty royalties. All 
our licences have provisions dealing with background 
and foreground intellectual property and licensor and 
licensee improvements. These are at the core of 
negotiations and are the hardest part. We try to get as 
much downstream as possible. This is the core of our 
growth path. We need to be careful how we deal with 
it. It can be a deal breaker. 
 
These terms appear to be problematic in a large number of 
negotiations. Respondents from most industry sectors made some 
reference to these provisions, a large number of respondents involved 
in licensing-out stating that they insisted on such rights, other 
respondents stating that they tried to avoid them. One patent attorney 
we interviewed was involved in a deal that almost broke down 
because of reach-through rights to improvements; his comment was 
that “The patentee wants as much as possible whereas the licensee 
wants as little as possible.” A licensing consultant explained: 
 
The licensor’s first position is to own any 
improvements and grant back a licence to the licensee. 
The idea for this is that if they give out a number of 
licences they are able to put all the technology 
together. However, the licensee wants to own the 
technology and license back to the licensor. 
 
Most respondents who were involved in a high volume of deals did 
encounter these provisions regularly. A number of respondents 
specifically stated that they try to keep away from such terms when 
licensing-in because they can be so problematic. In instances where 
they licensed-in, research institution respondents tried to avoid such 
terms because they would have the effect of detracting from their 
exploitation of any improvements or new technology developed by 
them. Technology transfer personnel in particular, appear to be 
putting up more resistance to the inclusion of reach-through 
provisions in agreements that license-out their technology. In a 
significant number of cases, however, provisions giving reach-
through rights were still included, and one public sector researcher we 
interviewed stated that in his experience there is a general trend 
toward these sorts of agreements becoming more restrictive. 
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One respondent from a university technology transfer office offered 
the following in relation to research collaborations: 
 
Rights to future intellectual property was a Pandora’s 
box in the old agreements. The problem here is when 
we have an agreement that involves research done by 
us and there are rights to improvements, essentially it 
deals with licensing of intellectual property that 
doesn’t yet exist. I think that if something is separately 
patentable it is more than an improvement. We have to 
be very careful in these deals. We need to define what 
an improvement means. There must be a threshold 
where the intellectual property is no longer a mere 
improvement in which case the company should not 
own it. We are not strictly contract researchers 
therefore improvements which are separately 
patentable should go to the project. This is one of our 
biggest problems. We are continually battling with 
these types of things. The companies have wanted to 
have rights to future intellectual property. However, 
things are changing. In the past when deals were done 
researchers were not told much. There is much more 
transparency now. 
  
Only two respondents to the research institutions survey stated that 
they had encountered difficulties when licensing-in due to reach-
through or ownership provisions, (nine percent) and no diagnostic 
facilities reported entering into licences containing such terms. In 
many cases, however, scientists rather than technology transfer 
personnel who probably encounter more difficulties negotiating these 
terms, may have completed the surveys, particularly in relation to the 
research institutions survey.277 Given this, it may be that this figure is 
not representative of the actual situation. It may also be the case that 
these terms are becoming less contentious as they become more 
common and are more readily accepted. There were also reports by 
both research institution and company interview respondents that 
universities more frequently seek to include provisions giving them 
reach-through rights.278 Another comment from a university 
technology transfer officer was: 
                                                 
277 A similar conclusion was drawn by the NIH; NIH, above n37 at 9. 
278 Consistent with this finding, the NIH Working Group found that university 
technology transfer personnel often start at the same point as private firms, 
Results Chapter 4 
________________________________________________________ 
166  
  
In the MTAs that we have negotiated with some US 
institutes they have tried to get in terms saying that 
they want rights to anything coming out of our 
research. We fight against this. At the same time we 
would want a clause of that nature in our out-licences. 
It might be for licensing back, joint ownership etc. It is 
a matter for negotiation. 
 
This encapsulates what we heard from participants in the industry 
generally. While many respondents saw the obligation to give rights 
to future inventions as onerous, at the same time they sought reach-
through rights as a matter of course. This emphasises that perceptions 
depend very much on the ability of industry participants to bargain for 
a particular outcome.  
 
Where universities are committed to give rights to future intellectual 
property as a condition of a licence or MTA, they may have difficulty 
attracting funding from other bodies for any research that uses the 
patented technology or materials.279 This may decrease incentives to 
engage in research if rights to outcomes are already given away. 
 
Again, it would appear that a number of variables will determine 
whether or not reach-through rights to future inventions are likely to 
be included in a licensing arrangement: 
 
• the nature of the technology or product being licensed; 
• whether or not the licensed technology is core to the activities 
of the licensee; and 
• the relative bargaining power of the negotiating parties. 
 
The nature of the licensed technology 
To a large extent, whether or not reach-through rights are sought will 
depend on the technology being licensed. If, for example, a university 
is in the business of licensing reagents, it is unlikely that reach-
through rights will be sought. Generally terms claiming reach-through 
rights are most problematic when research tools and materials are 
being licensed-in (that is, technology falling into category three). A 
number of respondents also made the point that problems are less 
                                                                                                                  
presenting agreements that contain many of the same terms they complain about 
receiving from private firms; NIH, above n37 at 10-11. 
279 See also NIH, above n37 at 8. 
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likely to arise where the licensor and licensee are coming from two 
different platforms, because in this instance it is easier to divide the 
spoils that come from improvements or new inventions. If the 
improvement is to a particular platform, the owner of that platform 
will be entitled to the intellectual property. As one downstream 
company respondent stated, platform companies are unlikely to 
request rights to inventions developed by them.  
 
A distinction should also be drawn between improvements and new 
inventions. While both are separately patentable, more protracted 
disputes may arise over rights to so-called “new” inventions. 
Although the issues that arise in respect of both are similar, arguably 
reach-through rights to new inventions are likely to be more 
problematic.280   
 
Finally, the cumulative nature of biotechnology research tends to lend 
itself to disputes about rights to future inventions. Respondents from 
device companies who develop through to end-product stage, reported 
that they had no difficulties with reach-through rights to future 
inventions given that no new intellectual property is generated by 
their licensees. 
 
Core technology 
A related point is whether or not the improved technology is core to 
the activities of the parties. If so, they are more likely to dispute the 
inclusion of reach-through rights to improved technology. Likewise, 
the inclusion of reach-through terms is likely to be more desirable to 
parties who are licensing-out core technology. Respondents indicated 
they would be particularly opposed to reach-through rights in respect 
of licences over inventions falling into category three. Although 
strong opposition to reach-through rights was frequently voiced, there 
was likely to be less issue with reach-through rights over technology 
falling into category one. 
 
Relative bargaining power 
Most respondents who discussed reach-through rights to future 
inventions stressed that the inclusion of provisions dealing with 
reach-through rights is generally a matter for negotiation. The 
bargaining strength of the parties will be an important component of 
any negotiation on reach-through rights to future inventions. For 
                                                 
280 On the issue of what constitute improvements and what might constitute new 
inventions, see M. Lemley ‘The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property 
Law’ (1997) 75 Texas Law Review 989 at 1007-1013. 
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example, one respondent from a technology transfer company 
suggested that large pharmaceutical companies are far less flexible in 
negotiations than small biotechnology companies. As he put it, “It is a 
dominance issue: big party versus small party dealings.” In some 
instances, a licensee will have no alternative but to agree to joint 
ownership. This confirmed the views of other company and research 
institution respondents. This respondent also made the point that in 
negotiations in which he had been involved, research institutions are 
generally the weaker party, even if their technology is ‘hot’. This is 
because they don’t have deal precedents, and usually get a negotiated 
outcome that is less favourable to them than it could be. 
 
On the other hand, many parties licensing-in patents, particularly 
research tool patents, and materials, will be forced to give rights to 
future inventions to the patent holder or owner of materials.281 In 
some instances, they will have to compromise and agree to joint 
ownership in order to conclude negotiations and enable their research 
to proceed. 
 
FAILURE TO EXPLOIT PATENTS 
 
We asked interview respondents about patents that were granted but 
not exploited. As reported above, a number of respondents stated they 
could not see the sense in retaining patents but not exploiting them. 
At the same time, many respondents either held patents they did not 
exploit, knew of patents that were being held but not exploited, or 
speculated that this was certain to be the case. Some respondents 
suggested that larger companies might employ the strategy of 
patenting in order to exclude competitors from areas of research they 
considered they might enter at some stage. The position seems to be 
that many respondents we spoke to employ a defensive patenting 
strategy and in effect “fence in” their intellectual property position by 
obtaining families of patents.282 As one respondent from a 
downstream company put it, “[I am] positive about patents, but there 
is definitely a lot of over-patenting going on.” 
 
                                                 
281 See also R. Eisenberg ‘Streamlining the Transfer of Intellectual Property Rights’ 
(1999) 74 Academic Medicine 683. 
282 See also D. Dierker and P. Phillips ‘The Search for the Holy Grail? Maximizing 
Social Welfare Under Canadian Biotechnology Patent Policy’ (2003) 6 IP Strategy 
Today 45-62. 
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We sought to ascertain the level of defensive patenting taking place in 
the industry. By defensive patenting, we mean patenting with a view 
to building a proprietary position that enables freedom to operate. We 
asked survey respondents whether they had ever applied for a patent 
for strategic reasons. This may include patents applied for where there 
was no intention to exploit a patent. Twenty-one of the 49 company 
respondents said that they had (43 percent). This figure is not 
surprising given what we know about the high levels of patenting 
within the industry: defensive patenting strategies are crucial in order 
to ensure freedom to operate. Defensive patenting is far more 
prevalent within the company sector than other sectors. Only five of 
the research institutions surveyed said that they had applied for a 
patent for strategic reasons (22 percent), while one diagnostic facility 
answered this question in the affirmative (five percent). 
 
Most interview respondents engaged in patenting agreed that they 
patented very broadly. A number of respondents reported that their 
companies had patents (or licences) on their books that they did not 
exploit. Their research options were so rich that they had many 
patents they just didn’t have the resources to exploit themselves. Gene 
validation targets, for example, are being generated at a rapid pace. In 
addition to this, some respondents reported that they had identified 
technology they did not wish to see exploited, and paid the patent 
holder to sit the intellectual property on a shelf and to not seek 
licensing opportunities. 
 
Where patent holders did not exploit patents, they resolved this non-
exploitation in some instances by either letting the patents lapse or 
licensing them out. One problem appeared to be that it wasn’t often 
that licensing opportunities were sought, or available. In the case of 
many academic institutions, potential licensees had so many research 
opportunities, that many patents were not taken up and exploited. 
Marketing technology and products to overseas companies is difficult. 
If a potential licensee approached the patent holder, often this led to 
some sort of negotiated arrangement. If not, often the patents stayed 
on the books of the patent holder. It may be the case in this instance 
that these patents were not worth working in any case in the sense that 
a commercial outcome was unlikely. Alternatively, it is possible that 
they were simply not on the radar of potential investors, or that the 
patent holders did not actively seek licensing opportunities.  
 
One respondent considered that in many cases there is a lack of effort 
on the part of patent holders to license-out their technology. 
Results Chapter 4 
________________________________________________________ 
170  
Alternatively, he suggested that research institutions in particular, file 
patent applications fairly indiscriminately due to pressure to generate 
income.283 A trade association representative, who criticised the 
tendency of research institutions to patent inventions without a 
commercial outcome in mind, shared this view. 
 
A number of respondents commented that they could not see the point 
of obtaining patents (or licences) and not exploiting them. 
Maintaining patents in this instance was a waste of valuable funds, 
and their view was that they could not afford licence fees unless they 
intended exploiting the licensed technology. The main value of a 
patent was, to many respondents, a licence agreement or preferably, a 
number of licence agreements. This was particularly the case where 
the technology was core to the interests of the company or institution. 
Nevertheless, there was some divergence of views in respect of non-
exploitation. 
 
Some respondents let patents sit on the shelf if they did not wish to 
currently exploit them, but thought they may be useful down the 
track. One respondent involved in a technology transfer company 
suggested: 
 
There are thousands of cases of non-exploitation of 
patents. For example, it may be that research is the 
priority and commercialisation is non-core. Why 
obtain patents? Usually it is a push from one person, a 
view that they may be useful one day. You need to 
look systematically for what to keep, what to dump, 
etc. For example, if a provisional has been filed, you 
need strong interest to keep it going. 
 
On the issue of licensed products and technology that are not 
exploited, one respondent from an upstream company stated that his 
company did not engage in much licensing-in. However, they would 
seek an exclusive licence where patents owned by other researchers 
and used for different purposes, created holes in their patent portfolio. 
In such circumstances: 
 
You don’t necessarily want to use the technology, but 
without it someone else could burrow into your area. 
Other companies are willing to [licence to you] if the 
                                                 
283 See further Results Chapter 3. 
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patent is of no use to them whatsoever. It gives them 
something for it that they wouldn’t otherwise have. If 
the technology is not core to the organisation you are 
approaching it is not too difficult.  
 
In summary, respondents who indicated that they had patents or 
licences they did not exploit, indicated that this was for two main 
reasons: 
 
• they considered the technology may become useful at a later 
stage; 
• they wished to prevent someone else from exploiting the 
technology. 
 
Aside from these motivations for sitting on technology, few 
respondents maintained technology they had no intention of 
exploiting. Although respondents in general did not express concern 
that their technology would become obsolete, this was specifically 
mentioned as a problem by respondents from the device and 
bioinformatics sectors of the industry. Thus, concern at technology 
losing its value was not generally referred to as a motivation to 
license-out. The short life span of technology in the device sector 
prompted vigilant management of companies’ patent portfolios. In the 
bioinformatics sector, the rapid pace of technology made intellectual 
property protection of dubious value. 
 
Another university technology transfer officer had encountered 
negotiations for deals where the company was attempting to license to 
stop the product being developed by the university from being 
commercialised. Revocable licences are one way of safeguarding 
patents in which patent holders have a strong research interest by 
preventing licensees obtaining licences with no intention of exploiting 
them.  
 
Another safeguard exists in that the Australian Patents Act 1990 
provides for the issue of compulsory licences for failure to exploit an 
invention. More specifically, an application for a compulsory licence 
can be made where the reasonable requirements of the public have not 
been satisfied, and the patent holder has failed to provide a 
satisfactory explanation for failing to work the invention.284  
 
                                                 
284 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s133(2). 
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Nevertheless, it seems that there are still some patents that are not 
exploited, and it may be that patent holders and licensees have no 
choice but to pursue the most commercially promising lines of 
research. There may, however, be some social cost where patents that 
may not lead to a commercially valuable outcome but are nonetheless 
relevant to some socially valuable research, are not exploited.285  
 
 
SUMMARY 
  
There is certainly evidence of exclusionary practices within the 
industry, but it must be remembered that the essence of a patent right 
is the right to exclude others. Given this, we do not find it surprising 
that respondents complain of some restrictions on free access to 
patented technologies and products. This is despite the fact that there 
are a significant number of patents within the industry that block 
research to some extent.  
 
Our data demonstrates that there has been some evidence of restricted 
access to patents within the industry. This is particularly the case 
when we consider the technology to which access is restricted. Few of 
our respondents complained about access to technology being 
restricted where that technology fell into category one. They accepted 
this as a necessary element of the patent system, and given (generally 
speaking) their support of the patent system, were content to bear this 
cost. 
 
It also became evident that technologies falling into category three 
have been widely disseminated. In most cases, references to these 
technologies were to the foundational technologies discussed in 
Context Chapter 3. Category two presents more difficulties in that 
there may have been some instances where access was restricted. 
What our data does not tell us is whether the technology was 
nonetheless being exploited, which would, to a degree, lessen the 
social cost that restricted access entails.  
 
However, it is probably fair to say that few of our respondents were 
concerned at the long-term effects of restricted access, and in most 
cases research was able to proceed albeit in a modified fashion. In a 
number of instances respondents indicated that their research was able 
to proceed, but the modification of research meant that various lines 
                                                 
285 See further the discussion on compulsory licensing in Outcomes Chapter 1. 
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of research which could have led to promising results were not 
pursued. Of course, it is difficult to gauge the effects of exclusionary 
practices without knowing where particular lines of research are 
likely to lead. It should also be noted that access issues are alleviated 
to some extent by rapid technological advance within the industry 
which makes it more likely that alternatives to foundational 
inventions will be developed. Walsh, Arora and Cohen concluded that 
future problems resulting from exclusionary licensing practices in the 
United States could not be ruled out, and called for continued 
vigilance to defend open science.286 We would endorse this finding. 
                                                 
286 Walsh, Cohen and Arora, above n28 at 335. 
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RESULTS CHAPTER 5: 
ANTICOMMONS ISSUES 
 
To reiterate, the essential preconditions for an anticommons within a 
particular industry are: 
 
• a proliferation of intellectual property rights over essential 
research inputs; and  
• high transaction costs that make exchanging these rights 
difficult. 
 
The existence of an anticommons in the medical biotechnology 
industry is likely to be particularly problematic because of the 
important role that this industry has in providing innovative 
diagnoses, treatments and therapies to alleviate human suffering 
caused by disease. An anticommons in this industry has the capacity 
to slow the pace of innovation, which is most unlikely to be in the 
public interest.  
 
There may be a number of different manifestations of an 
anticommons, each of which has the capacity to impede research to a 
particular degree. First, the most extreme manifestation is project 
abandonment. This is more likely to occur where there are multiple 
overlapping intellectual property rights than when there are small 
numbers of rights. If negotiations are required to be undertaken with a 
number of parties, the risk of negotiation breakdown is increased. If 
negotiations break down with any one of these parties, the investment 
of time, effort and money in the project will need to be reassessed. 
Depending on the stage at which breakdown occurs, this may mean 
that projects are either not commenced or are abandoned at some 
stage into the research process. The later projects are abandoned, the 
greater the waste of resources. In other instances, considerable 
research effort may need to be put into inventing around the area 
protected by intellectual property rights in order to enable the project 
to proceed. As the number of relevant intellectual property rights 
increases, the task of inventing around becomes more onerous, and 
project abandonment may become inevitable.  
 
Secondly, to a lesser degree, an anticommons may exist even when 
negotiations are concluded successfully with all relevant intellectual 
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property rights holders. If multiple in-licences are entered into, 
requiring the payment of licence fees and/or royalties, projects may 
be able to proceed but at considerable cost. If multiple commitments 
are made to provide a percentage of royalties on downstream 
products, the risk is that this royalty stacking will make the project 
outcomes so unattractive to potential downstream partners that 
technology transfer is not feasible. Similar difficulties are likely to 
arise if reach-through right stacking occurs. Hence, greater levels of 
encumbrance will reduce the attractiveness of the technology and 
lower the probability of it reaching the market. 
 
Thirdly, due diligence may lead parties to avoid particular research 
areas entirely or redirect their research efforts away from heavily 
encumbered areas in order to avoid the need to negotiate access. In 
this way, research funds are not wasted on projects that are later 
abandoned and breakdowns in negotiations and royalty stacking are 
avoided. Nevertheless, anticommons issues still arise, because 
projects that may otherwise be in the public interest are not 
undertaken. 
 
The anticommons doctrine is sound in theory. However, there is little 
in the way of empirical evidence to show that an anticommons does, 
in fact, exist in the medical biotechnology industry, and, if it does 
exist, that it is, in fact, slowing the pace of innovation. We have 
already discussed some of the empirical research that has been 
conducted to analyse this issue in the United States287 and Europe.288  
 
In this chapter we address this issue from the Australian perspective. 
Before we discuss the question of whether and to what extent an 
anticommons actually exists in the Australian medical biotechnology 
industry, we first consider the question of whether or not the 
preconditions to an anticommons exist in Australia. We then discuss a 
range of factors that are likely to be indicative of an anticommons. In 
determining which factors to consider, we used the theoretical 
manifestations discussed above, and were also guided by the other 
empirical studies of these issues. We particularly wanted to know 
whether there was evidence of: 
 
• increasingly onerous patent searching obligations; 
                                                 
287 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28; NIH, above n37. 
288 Straus, Holzapfel and Lindenmeir, above n35.  
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• excessive numbers of in-licences, project abandonment and/or 
redirection of research efforts; 
• royalty stacking; and 
• reach-through right stacking. 
 
 
PRECONDITIONS TO AN ANTICOMMONS 
IN AUSTRALIA 
 
John Walsh and his colleagues refer to a number of factors that could 
be used to characterise an environment in which the preconditions for 
an anticommons exist. Most importantly, they say that the essential 
precondition is the existence of multiple patents covering different 
components of a single product, its method of manufacture, or inputs 
into the process through which it is discovered.289 As already 
discussed, there can be little doubt that the patent landscape has 
become dramatically more complex over the last ten years for the 
following reasons: 
 
• a large increase in the number of patent applications and 
granted patents. For example Walsh, Arora and Cohen cite an 
increase from 2000 issued patents in the United States in 1985 
to 13000 issued patents in 2000.290 Similarly the OECD has 
estimated that between 1990 and 2000 the number of United 
States biotechnology patents rose by 15 percent each year. 
The increase was 10 percent per year in Europe and five 
percent worldwide.291 Whilst the number of Australian patents 
has not risen quite so dramatically, there has, nevertheless, 
been a rapid and significant rise;292  
• an increase in the number and diversity of companies and 
other industry sectors filing patents; 
• granting of broad patent claims over foundational patents. 
Whilst patent offices in some jurisdictions are much less 
willing now to allow broad claims than in the past, broad 
patents granted in the 1990s remain active. Should any of 
these patents be challenged in the courts, it is likely that 
                                                 
289 Walsh, Arora and Cohen above n28 at 293. 
290 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28 at 293. 
291 OECD, above n39 at 8. 
292 See Context Chapter 3. 
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particularly broad claims will not be upheld.293 However, we 
have seen in Part 1 of this Report that challenges to 
biotechnology patents are extremely rare in Australia and it is 
perhaps unlikely that such challenges will increase in the 
future. There is little incentive for competitors to challenge 
patents if it means that undesirable precedents will be set. The 
cost and risk of litigation will deter others, particularly when 
the patent holder has litigation insurance;294  
• filing of a number of defensive patents in respect of a single 
invention. Some of our interview respondents commented that 
their patent strategy included filing a number of patents 
around their key technology to create a “picket fence”;  
• granting and enforcement of research tool patents. Clearly, the 
main purpose of research tool patents is to impose restrictions 
on the use of these novel technologies in the research context. 
If these are enforced aggressively there is a real danger that 
downstream research will be restricted. 
 
Together, these factors suggest that there are far more impediments to 
the conduct of a successful research project than was the case 10 
years ago and that for any given research project more in-licences will 
be required than used to be the case. We discussed in Results Chapter 
4 some of the issues that arise in negotiating individual licence 
agreements and the problematic terms of such agreements, 
particularly those relating to royalty rates and reach-through rights. 
What we are concerned with here is that, if there are a number of 
relevant patents and if it is necessary to enter into multiple in-
licensing agreements, there is the potential for an anticommons.  
 
An anticommons can only exist if the relevant patents which lead to it 
exist. Potentially, a large number of candidate patents could fulfil this 
role. However, we have already noted in Context Chapter 3 that a 
number of the research tool patents that are said to be aggressively 
enforced in the United States have either not been filed in Australia, 
or, where applications have been filed, the patents have not been 
prosecuted. Clearly, these factors are likely to reduce the detrimental 
effects of restricted access on innovation in Australia, as discussed in 
Results Chapter 4. They may also provide some guidance as to the 
                                                 
293 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28 at 299 cite the EST patent as examples of 
patents likely to be construed narrowly by the courts. 
294 Note that Genetic Technologies Ltd, the holder of the junk DNA patents, has 
such insurance and is reported to use it as a bargaining chip in licence negotiations. 
See ABC Four Corners, above n7. 
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presence or absence of an anticommons in Australia. If a number of 
research tool licences are required to be entered into for a particular 
research project to proceed, the preconditions for an anticommons are 
likely to exist. If the relevant patents do not exist or are not being 
enforced, there is no requirement to licence-in. However, these 
propositions should be treated with some caution for a number of 
reasons. In particular, the patents referred to in Context Chapter 3 are 
only a small sample of a large number of research tool patents already 
filed and granted in the United States. New research tools will 
continue to be developed and it is likely that new applications will be 
filed here as the awareness of the growth of the Australian industry 
increases. 
 
We suggest that although there are gaps in patenting of research tools 
in Australia, it would be premature to conclude that the preconditions 
for an anticommons are entirely absent. On this basis, we consider 
that it is necessary to explore further whether any of the hallmarks of 
an anticommons can be found in the Australian industry.  
 
 
PATENT SEARCHING OBLIGATIONS 
 
Conducting patent searches 
 
Our survey results show that 84 percent of company respondents 
routinely conduct patent searches to ensure that their research does 
not infringe patents held by others. However, the percentages are 
much lower for research institutions (50 percent) and diagnostic 
facilities (12 percent overall, 23 percent of those facilities conducting 
research). One explanation for these lower percentages for research 
institutions and diagnostic facilities is the commonly held view that 
patents don’t block research. For example, one research institution 
respondent commented that: 
 
In the academic area most people don’t think about 
infringement. We never do patent searches. You only 
do them if you’re about to put in a patent yourself.  
 
This is perhaps a naïve view for a number of reasons, including: 
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• the United States decision in Duke v Madey,295 discussed in 
Context Chapter 3, creating uncertainty abut the ambit of the 
experimental use exemption in the United States; 
• the lack of clear guidance as to the existence of a research 
exemption in Australia; and  
• the increasing willingness of companies to make the hard 
decision (from a public perception perspective) of enforcing a 
patent against research institutions.296  
 
It would certainly be foolhardy to presume that research with a 
commercial goal is immune from infringement proceedings.297  
 
The general view in the industry is that searches are expensive but 
necessary to ensure freedom to operate. As one respondent said “you 
don’t want to spend 18 months developing new technology and then a 
competitor gets an injunction against you.” Another said:  
 
Patent searching is the same as title searching if you’re 
in the business of selling land. It is necessary to spend 
money on professionals and build up a network. It 
hasn’t really become more onerous for us. It would be 
crazy not to use professionals. Searching happens on a 
weekly basis. After the first couple of years we now 
get very few surprises. 
 
Time for undertaking patent searches 
 
The time at which searches are undertaken in relation to particular 
research projects is highly variable.  Most industry players have 
procedures in place to search the patent databases regularly, as often 
as once per month, to ensure that they have a clear view of the state of 
the field. Even then, occasional surprises still come up. Of course, 
when the time comes to file a patent, further searches will have to be 
done to satisfy the prior art requirements.  
                                                 
295 Madey, above n87. 
296 Comments made by Francis Collins and others in response to GTG’s pursuit of 
licences with academic institutions illustrate the depth of feeling about this issue. 
See ABC Four Corners, above n7. 
297 Note that a survey is currently being conducted by the Advisory Council on 
Intellectual Property, seeking views on the relationship between the patent system 
and research and development, including the extent to which experimental use is 
exempt from infringement. Available at:  
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/about/acip_survey.shtml (accessed 5 December 
2003). 
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A number of company respondents commented that they do detailed 
searches as soon as they have an interest in a new research project, as 
part of their due diligence. For example, a respondent from an 
upstream company commented that the company generally ensures 
freedom to operate first by doing full due diligence for every project. 
Decisions are then made on what licences are required, what patents 
can be worked around, what patents can be ignored and whether or 
not the project will go ahead. Many companies have their own in 
house systems set up for patent watches. Patent attorneys also provide 
this service to some clients.  
 
In research institutions it is generally expected that the scientists 
themselves will know what is going on in their field through normal 
scientific means of publication searches, attending conferences etc. It 
would seem to be quite rare for patent searches to be done at the early 
stages of research projects. A number of respondents expressed the 
view that it is unnecessary to ensure freedom to operate at this stage. 
For example, one technology transfer officer said that: 
 
When research projects start we don’t do patent 
searches at this stage. It is far too early. It is not done 
in a directed or focused way at this stage because we 
are a basic research institute. We search when the 
results start to look interesting.  
 
A patent attorney added that: 
 
The little guys come just before publication and 
haven’t done any searches yet. However, they are 
generally fairly aware about what is happening in the 
literature and wouldn’t tamely follow someone else’s 
research – they are quite aware of what is out there. 
Often the most damaging publications are their own. 
 
More commonly, searches will be done when the commercial 
potential of a particular research project becomes apparent, which is 
when the option of lodging a provisional patent application arises. 
One respondent from an upstream company similarly commented that 
searches are not done until after a researcher has come up with 
something that is commercially useful. However, he added that as the 
company grows it will be doing patent searches before embarking on 
further research programs. In this way, intellectual property can be 
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mapped, holes can be found in intellectual property held by 
competitors and new directions can be found for research.  
 
Complexity of the patent landscape 
 
All of our respondents were of the view that patent searching is an 
onerous and expensive process. These views mirror the findings in the 
Walsh study. Their respondents generally acknowledged that the 
patent landscape has become more complex and that there are often a 
large number of patents potentially relevant to a given project.298 One 
of our downstream company respondents put the cost at tens of 
thousands of dollars per year and noted that the complexity of 
searching is increasing. The vagueness and openness of the 
terminology used in patents adds to the difficulties. Another 
respondent commented that due diligence is becoming more difficult, 
particularly for a small company with a small team. He mentioned 
one target that has 350 patent applications pending over it. Added to 
this, he noted there may be method of use patents.  
 
A patent attorney noted that search requirements are expanding 
massively and that approximately 10 times more searching is done 
now than five to 10 years ago. Whilst the time and cost of searching 
depends very much on the class of claims, she estimated that an 
average freedom to operate search takes about two to three weeks in 
Australia at a cost of around AU$3,000. The cost of paying for a 
patent attorney to analyse the results and provide a summary is an 
additional AU$5-6,000 or even more. However, another patent 
attorney estimated the cost to be much less, around AU$2,000, 
depending on the quality of analysis. 
 
It should be noted that some respondents had very different views on 
the changing nature of patent searching requirements. One company 
respondent said that searching has always been a headache and is no 
more so now than it was 10 years ago. Indeed, some of the modern 
databases, particularly Derwent, have made searching considerably 
easier. A number of company respondents said that they subscribe to 
a range of databases. Others said that they have their own databases 
of the intellectual property of their competitors and continually add to 
this as new competitors become known. The more commercially 
focused research institutions also have procedures in place for 
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keeping abreast of the developments in the area. One technology 
transfer officer said: 
 
As well as subscribing to a number of databases for 
patent searching we also keep an eye on what our 
competitors are doing – for risk analysis. We use 
commercial and university databases so that we can 
cover the whole ground. We download patents all the 
time. We also have watching briefs. We expend a fair 
amount of our budget on these tools. It is onerous, it 
takes a lot of work. We are expanding our group to 
assist with this. 
 
One of the problems is that researchers tend to be focussed very much 
on their own particular area. However, because of the breadth of some 
patents it is necessary to search across a broad area. One respondent 
commented that the titles can often be deceptive, for example, the title 
“improvements in electrophoresis gel” could describe a whole range 
of patents. The costs increase dramatically once the content of patents 
has to be examined. Ideally, following preliminary searches the 
number of patents that require detailed evaluation should be reduced 
as much as possible. However, a number of respondents expressed the 
view that the quantum of patents that require this detailed 
examination is in fact increasing.  
 
Number of problematic patents299 
 
Interestingly, although the number of patents that require detailed 
analysis would seem to be increasing and the cost of searching and 
analysis is escalating, the final number of patents that are likely to 
impact on a particular research project still seems to be quite small. A 
patent attorney commented that:  
 
When searches are done, there will usually be less than 
10 problematic patents. If there are more than 10 there 
is a real problem. We look at finding a niche 
                                                 
299 The term “problematic” was often used by our respondents to describe the 
patents that they saw as having the potential to impact on a particular research 
project. For convenience, we have adopted this terminology, and use it to describe 
patents that are likely to be infringed during the course of a particular research 
project unless action is taken to avoid infringement (for example, licensing or 
inventing around). Hence these problematic patents have the potential to block 
research (see our discussion of blocking patents in Results Chapter 4). 
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mechanism or trying to get a licence. We need to be 
able to accurately define area of overlap. 
 
Another patent attorney reported that on average there will be 20-30 
patents that need to be looked at if fairly specific search terms are 
used. Following analysis, the number of problematic patents can often 
be reduced to two to three. One respondent succinctly described the 
situation for her company: 
 
With regard to patent searches, when we are looking at 
freedom to operate we find anything from more than a 
dozen to 30-40 that are relevant. We analyse these. In 
the end there may be only one or two or a few more that 
are blocking.  
 
These figures are consistent with data from other studies. For 
example, in the Walsh study it was reported that respondents have to 
consider a large number of patents initially (sometimes hundreds) but 
that the number of problematic patents is small, six to 12 in a 
complicated case, zero in others.300 Thus, they conclude that although 
the number of patents (and thus licences) that are relevant to a 
particular project has increased over the past decade, the number is 
still manageable.301  
 
We do nevertheless interpret these results with some caution. We 
suggest that, because of the youth and lack of financial security of the 
Australian industry, a much lower level of encumbrance can be coped 
with, when compared with the better established United States 
industry. There would seem to be a low threshold to the number of 
relevant patents that will be tolerated – if there are any more the area 
of research may be abandoned.  For example, the respondent who 
noted above that there may be only one or two blocking patents added 
that: 
 
Anything beyond three is probably too many. It makes 
it very difficult if there are different parties. We need 
all of them to agree and we don’t want to sign on for 
one if we can’t get the others. Negotiations are 
becoming more difficult – there are more patents, 
                                                 
300 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28 at 294. 
301 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28 at 295. 
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more parties and the deals are more costly. The 
number of patents we have to consider has grown. 
 
 
SURVEY DATA ON NUMBER OF IN-
LICENCES 
 
In each of the surveys respondents were asked if they had requested 
licences to use patented tools and/or materials in their research. 
Twelve of the research institution respondents (52 percent) and 22 of 
the company respondents (45 percent) reported licensing-in activity. 
Only three out of the 18 diagnostics respondents reported licensing-in 
activity for research purposes (17 percent, 23 percent of respondents 
conducting research).302 Participants were then asked to specify the 
number of licensing-in agreements. Research institution and company 
responses to this question are summarised in Table 14. Of the three 
diagnostics respondents who reported that they licensed-in, two said 
that they had one licence and one did not specify the number of 
licences.  
 
Table 14: Numbers and types of in-licences 
 
Number Research institutions (%) Companies (%) 
0 10 (43) 26 (53)303 
1 5  (22) 5 (10)304 
2-4 5  (22) 9 (18) 
5-9 0 (0) 2 (9) 
10-19 0 (0) 0(0) 
20-50 1 (4) 1 (2) 
Number not specified 1 (4) 5 (10) 
No answer 1 (4) 1 (2) 
 
In most cases respondents said that their licensing-in agreements were 
entered into on a commercial-in-confidence basis (only two of the 
research institution respondents and four of the company respondents 
said that there was no commercial in confidence requirement).  The 
majority of licensing-in agreements (around 60-70 percent) were with 
                                                 
302 Note that licensing-in for clinical purposes is discussed in Results Chapter 6.  
303 One of these stated that its parent company had licensed-in, but it had not 
licensed-in in its own right. 
304 Note that two of the company respondents who reported that they had one in-
licence were from the non-biomedical sector (the other two respondents from this 
sector reported no in-licences). 
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United States patent holders and around 30 percent were with 
Australians. Other jurisdictions included the European Union, Israel, 
Canada and New Zealand. 
 
These results clearly demonstrate that the majority of our survey 
respondents report having to enter into small numbers of in-licences. 
Forty eight percent of research institution respondents and 29 percent 
of company respondents reported between one and four in-licences. 
In addition to this, around half of the respondents in each category 
reported that they had no licensing-in agreements whatsoever. These 
results, of themselves, suggest that there is no anticommons in 
Australia. Indeed, they suggest the opposite: that Australian research 
institutions and companies have broad freedom to operate in their 
particular areas of interest. We note further that the survey question 
only asked respondents to identify the total number of in-licences. We 
did not ask respondents to identify the number of in-licences required 
for individual research projects. Hence, the number of in-licences 
required to be entered into for a particular research project is likely to 
be even lower than the numbers reported in Table 14.  
 
Although these levels of licensing-in activity would seem at first 
glance to be quite low, we believe that the anticommons issue needs 
to be explored further. We have already seen evidence of widespread 
collaborations between the various sectors of the biotechnology 
industry in Australia, and seen that these collaborative arrangements 
generally include provisions relating to ownership and licensing of 
intellectual property.305 Indeed this would appear to be the preferred 
method for transferring technology from the research sector to the 
private sector and from upstream to downstream zones of the private 
sector. It is not difficult to envisage how this system works in 
practice, using the example of drug discovery research. Initial 
research is carried out in the research sector funded by a 
biotechnology development company. A potential target is found and 
patented. The terms of the collaboration require that ownership vests 
in the company. The company then adds value with the assistance of a 
large multinational pharmaceutical company. Ultimately the patent is 
either assigned or licensed to the pharmaceutical company in 
exchange for up front fees and royalties.  
 
On this basis we would not expect to see a great deal of licensing-in 
activity in the Australian industry sectors. However, this schema is 
                                                 
305 In Results Chapter 2. 
Results Chapter 5 
________________________________________________________ 
186  
overly simplistic because it fails to take into account the other 
relevant patents, particularly research tool patents, that may 
potentially be infringed at some stage during the research and 
development process. It also fails to account for the increasing 
number of steps in the drug development pipeline. It is to these 
arrangements and patents that we must look to determine whether or 
not there is an anticommons.  
 
 
NUMBER OF IN-LICENCES AND PROJECT 
ABANDONMENT 
 
The survey data on licensing-in activity presented above indicates 
that, aside from the direct in-licensing route from research to product, 
there is little evidence of other licensing-in obligations. However, 
these data only show the number of licences actually entered into. 
There may be circumstances where there is a requirement to enter into 
multiple licence agreements and because of this other options may 
also need to be considered, particularly project abandonment and 
inventing around. We explored this issue in our interviews. 
 
Interview data on number of in-licences per research project 
 
When asked about the specific number of licensing-in agreements that 
they were required to negotiate, some respondents said that they were 
unable to come up with a precise figure, because each project was 
different and depended on an array of factors. However, where 
respondents did put a figure on the number of their in-licences, this 
was generally relatively small. For example, one respondent said that 
for one project the company had to negotiate three to four licences. 
Another said that generally four to five licences will give you 
freedom to operate. Neither of these figures seems to be particularly 
high. In combination, this interview data and the survey data 
presented in Table 14 suggests that multiple in-licences are not the 
norm. Indeed, the norm would seem to comfortably sit at less than 
five. We question whether this was the order of magnitude that Heller 
and Eisenberg were contemplating when they posited their 
anticommons theory in relation to biomedicine.  
 
Having said this, most respondents expressed the view that the 
number of licences that have to be negotiated is clearly an important 
factor in deciding whether or not a particular project should go ahead, 
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and it would seem that decisions are made well before any attempts 
are made to enter into negotiations. In consequence, we believe that it 
is vitally important to acknowledge that it is possible that a number of 
potentially anticommons-affected projects do not come onto the radar, 
because such projects will have been abandoned well before any 
difficulty of negotiating with multiple parties is encountered. For 
example, one respondent reported that: 
 
We start looking at licensing-in as we come out of the 
discovery process into the development phase. We 
always keep an eye on what others are doing. We are 
always looking for blocks, e.g. if a project needs say 
20 licences to go ahead this may be a reason for not 
taking a product to development. There are various 
reasons for not pursuing a project, including IP, 
manufacturing capacity, cost. The requirement to get 
licences will not stop us if we have good intellectual 
property because we could build the cost of licences 
into any commercialisation deal, which would shift the 
costs from us. But if the costs are high or a great 
number of licences are needed we would have to 
factor this in carefully.   
 
Another respondent said: 
 
We generally look at the patent scene around research 
being undertaken by us. If it is going to be too difficult 
to obtain access, we don’t bother with that area of 
research.  One issue is stacking. We faced this issue in 
getting one of our products off the ground. Patent 
numbers can quickly add up, you can be dealing with a 
number of licensees. You may need to negotiate with a 
lot of people. We avoid dealing with technologies 
where we have to deal with more than one person or 
company to obtain licences. We look at around 100 
projects a year, on average two a week, and ultimately 
choose one. There are lots of areas of research, so if 
access looks like it might be difficult we walk away. 
 
Other empirical studies tend to arrive at similar figures for the number 
of acceptable in-licences. In the Straus study, for example, it was 
concluded that one to three licences per marketable product could be 
tolerated. However, it was pointed out that the number could reach 
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seven or more and that this could endanger the commercialisation of 
the final product.306 
 
Redirecting research efforts, inventing around and project 
abandonment 
 
Many respondents referred to the need to redirect their research 
efforts in order to avoid infringing patents held by others. We have 
already discussed issues associated with redirecting research to avoid 
single blocking patents in results Chapter 4. Here we focus on issues 
associated with redirecting research when a research area is 
encumbered with a number of patents rather than single blocking 
patents.  
 
At the outset a distinction needs to be drawn here between 
abandonment and redirection of research efforts. Abandonment 
clearly has much more important consequences both at the individual 
level, in terms of waste of resources, and at the society level, in that 
potentially valuable areas of research may be overlooked, or not 
researched as thoroughly as they could be. We do have some 
evidence of respondents reporting abandonment of research projects 
where they considered they would be unable to obtain the necessary 
licences on reasonable terms. Clearly, with the increasing complexity 
of the patent landscape it will become increasingly difficult simply to 
redirect research efforts, although at present it would still seem to be 
relatively easy, in some areas at least. 
 
There is no fixed rule as to the threshold number of problematic 
patents for project redirection or abandonment. Much depends on the 
nature and importance of the research. For example, one respondent 
described a project in which there were multiple blocking patents. 
Nevertheless, he explained that the company was still trying to 
negotiate a deal. “We don’t rule this out entirely, but it needs to be an 
important project.” 
 
Taken together, the above comments are very relevant to the question 
of whether or not an anticommons exists. If projects are abandoned 
where, for example, more than four to five licensing-in agreements 
are required and if this is a common occurrence, then this suggests 
that an anticommons may well exist. Furthermore, some caution is 
required in relying on data on numbers of licensing-in agreements 
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required for freedom to operate because this data ignores abandoned 
projects.  
 
Although our results suggest that many respondents will choose to 
redirect their research efforts to avoid heavily encumbered areas, at 
the same time we did perceive a general desire to find practical means 
to keep the stream of research and development going. In some areas 
the best way to achieve this may be by making patented technologies 
widely available by non-exclusive licensing for modest licence fees. 
Whilst this will not be appropriate for all technology, in some areas it 
will be advantageous for patent holders and licensees alike.307 Even if 
multiple licence fees are required to be paid, licensees will not 
necessarily balk at this provided that pricing is reasonable. Most see it 
as “just another cost of doing business.”  
 
Some of the other empirical licensing studies also briefly consider the 
role of MTAs and agreements relating to access to sequence 
databases in the establishment of an anticommons. Whilst we did not 
specifically raise these issues with respondents, some did comment on 
the number of MTAs that they were required to enter into. For 
example, one research institution survey respondent stated that the 
institution had over 30 MTAs. Some interview respondents referred 
to potentially restrictive terms in such agreements (discussed more 
fully in Results Chapter 4). In addition, it is widely known that some 
database access agreements have been entered into. The Australian 
National Health and Medical Research Council, for example, reached 
an agreement with Celera Genomics in 2000, allowing access to 
Celera’s human, mouse and Drosophila databases. The agreement 
required participating institutions to pay an annual licence fee of 
AU$6,000.308 
 
Project abandonment and research tool patents 
 
As Walsh, Arora and Cohen clearly point out, there is a difference 
between abandoning a project because another company has acquired 
a proprietary position in the area and abandoning it because of 
inability to access the inputs to the discovery process (the research 
tools).309 They suggested that it was relatively rare for research to be 
redirected to new areas because of concerns over research tool 
                                                 
307 Issues associated with exclusive and non-exclusive licensing are discussed more 
fully in Results Chapter 4. 
308  Reported in Today’s Life Science (July/August 2000) at 6. 
309 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28 at 298. 
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patents.310 Similarly we found that many of the instances in which our 
respondents reported project abandonment or redirection fall into the 
former category. In fact we found few instances in which research 
tool patents were raised as a matter of concern.311  
 
One comment made by a patent attorney suggests that the Australian 
industry should not be too complacent about this issue. She said that: 
 
Research tool patents are more and more becoming 
impediments. They are becoming more frequent in 
Australia. Not just claims to specific sequences. They 
are generally owned by multinationals. At present they 
are generally not being enforced. The patentee has to 
be aware of what other people are doing in their own 
lab. Hence they are difficult to enforce. The problem is 
that you don’t know that others are infringing. 
 
Our survey results do indicate that a number of the in-licences 
identified by respondents are non-exclusive with United States patent 
holders. This suggests that there may be some licensing-in of research 
tools from United States-based patent holders, although the fact that 
these licences are confidential means that it is difficult to collect 
further information on the precise nature of these licences. In 
addition, gene patents and patent applications also exist in Australia 
for a number of disease genes that are tested for in Australian 
diagnostic facilities. The implications of enforcement of these patents 
against diagnostic facilities are discussed more fully in Results 
Chapter 6. 
 
Other reasons for redirecting research and project abandonment 
 
It is actually quite difficult to obtain quantitative data on the numbers 
of projects that are abandoned and the reasons why project 
abandonment occurs. It may be that this will occur because of patent 
thickets and perceived future negotiating difficulties (i.e. 
anticommons issues). However, we do acknowledge that projects will 
be abandoned or redirected for a whole host of reasons, and these may 
often be more to do with the intrinsic value and likelihood of success 
of the technology than the level of encumbrance. Other reasons 
include lack of funding and perhaps most commonly in Australia, 
                                                 
310 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28 at 303. 
311 See comments of interview respondents on research tool patents in Results 
Chapter 1. 
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failure to find a commercial partner. The Walsh study suggests that 
the main reasons for not undertaking projects include technological 
opportunity, demand and internal resource constraints.312  
 
We have already discussed the problems encountered by the 
Australian industry in this area in Results Chapter 2. Many of the 
reasons are similar to those stated in the Walsh study. However, one 
overriding concern in the Australian industry is inability to find a 
financial sponsor. Most participants in the Australian industry are 
small to medium enterprises with fairly shallow pockets. Many will 
require venture capital to survive and unless they can make their 
research projects attractive to financial backers project abandonment 
will occur. However, in our view this issue is intimately linked with 
the anticommons issue: one of the reasons why a venture capitalist 
will not find a project attractive is that if it is in a heavily encumbered 
area, multiple licences will have to be negotiated, or, if licences have 
already been entered into, the technology could already be weighed 
down with royalty and reach-through right obligations. Venture 
capitalists in Australia in particular are risk averse and hence the freer 
that a particular research project is from encumbrances the more 
attractive it will be. 
 
 
ROYALTY STACKING 
 
Walsh, Arora and Cohen reported that royalty stacking was unlikely 
to be a “significant and pervasive threat” for most ongoing research 
and development projects.313 Our respondents were generally much 
more cautious on this issue. Most said that they were aware of the 
potential for royalty stacking to arise and that they guarded against it. 
Indeed, one upstream company respondent said that this is one of the 
first issues that is addressed. However, it is more difficulty to define 
what is actually meant by royalty stacking as such. One upstream 
company respondent said that his company defines royalty stacking as 
four to five licences with royalties of 15-20 percent. However, he 
acknowledged that this is not that common and that generally there 
will only be one or two licences. 
 
One respondent reported that the types of considerations that are 
taken into account in deciding whether to continue with an in-
                                                 
312 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28 at 304. 
313 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28 at 299. 
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licensing deal or not include: stacking royalties, competing interests 
and total percentage of royalties that the other party has already 
committed to. However, an intermediate company respondent said 
that his company had not encountered licence stacking. However, he 
went on to acknowledge that research was not undertaken if this 
problem arose, which would seem to be contradictory to his previous 
comment.  
 
One upstream company respondent predicted that in the future, when 
conducting licensing negotiations, companies may well be exposed to 
licence stacking and overlapping royalty structures. One respondent 
said that large pharmaceutical companies abhor royalty stacking. 
However, a pharmaceutical company respondent noted that although 
reach-through royalties and divided ownership don’t help in the drug 
development process, “they are not showstoppers”.  
 
A number of respondents commented that it is vital that intermediate 
companies have to keep an eye on their capacity to on-license when 
agreeing to royalty rates. This has to be factored into the 
commercialisation process and it can be a significant impost on 
revenue stream, because each one to two percent adds up. If an 
intermediate-level company has a number of obligations to pay 
royalties, this detracts both from their capacity to on-license and from 
the profits they are likely to get from further downstream licensing. 
 
We tentatively suggest that because the difficulties that Australian 
companies have in entering foreign markets, particularly the United 
States market, they have to make their technology as attractive as 
possible.314 One of the important ways to do this is to reduce 
encumbrances as much as possible. Consequently, royalty stacking 
may well be more of an issue for companies here than for companies 
in the United States that have an established position in that market.  
 
Added to this, Walsh, Arora and Cohen acknowledge that for start up 
companies and universities, stacking licence fees and royalty 
obligations can be prohibitive.315 Pharmaceutical companies and 
established biotechnology companies are much less likely to be 
affected. Given that much of the Australian biotechnology industry 
falls into the former category, again it is possible that the effect of 
                                                 
314 On entry into foreign markets as a barrier to entry, see Ernst & Young 2001, 
above n1 at 49. 
315 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28 at 301-302. 
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multiple licences will be more acutely felt here than in the United 
States. 
 
Having said this, however, Australian research institutions and 
companies may well be at an advantage over their United States 
counterparts if they can avoid having to license-in certain research 
tools. The fact that a number of the controversial United States 
research tool patents have not been granted here suggests that 
Australian players could have fewer royalty commitments than their 
United States counterparts.  
 
 
REACH-THROUGH RIGHTS TO FUTURE 
INVENTIONS 
 
Reach-through rights to future inventions can have the effect of 
deterring research and development. We have already pointed out that 
reach-through rights to future inventions are commonly contentious in 
licensing negotiations.316 A multitude of these provisions poses the 
risk of bargaining breakdown; as Heller and Eisenberg point out, an 
accumulation of reach-through licence agreements “…gives each 
upstream patent owner a continuing right to be present at the 
bargaining table as a research project moves downstream toward 
product development.”317 Terms giving rights to future inventions 
may also deter parties from being interested in the technology in 
subsequent negotiations. 
 
Despite this theoretical risk of accumulated reach-through rights, we 
did not hear complaints of them from any of our respondents. This 
does not mean they do not exist in practice; as there were many 
complaints about provisions giving reach-through rights in licences, it 
may well be the case that some downstream licensees are 
encountering stacking licences giving numerous parties rights to 
future inventions. It is also fair to assume given the comments from 
respondents, that licensees are baulking at the inclusion of such terms 
in licences. Most respondents who did specifically complain of 
stacking licences, did so however in the context of reach-through 
royalties.  
 
 
                                                 
316 See Results Chapter 4. 
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SUMMARY 
 
In summary, our survey and interview data show that patent searching 
is an onerous and expensive process and there is little doubt that 
increasing patent activity is adding to the complexity of searching, 
although improved database searching facilities are providing some 
assistance. Despite this increased patent activity, ultimately it appears 
that the number of patents that are likely to impact upon a particular 
research project is still quite small, at least for the majority of our 
respondents. Similarly, the number of in-licences entered into by our 
respondents is also quite small, often less than five. However, in part 
the reason for this is that if a higher number of problematic patents is 
encountered this is likely to lead to project abandonment, redirection 
or inventing around. 
 
Taken together, these results do not provide conclusive evidence as to 
the existence or absence of an anticommons in Australia. However, 
our results do show that industry participants constantly have to bear 
in mind a whole range of factors in deciding whether or not to pursue 
a particular project, including, at the very least: 
 
• whether or not they are infringing intellectual property held by 
others; 
• whether they should enter into licence negotiations; 
• how many licences they should enter into for any given 
project;  
• how much they should be prepared to pay in upfront fees, 
milestones and royalties, bearing in mind that it is likely that 
they will have to on-license their technology to bring it to 
market; and 
• whether, taking all of these factors into consideration, the 
project should be proceeded with, redirected or abandoned. 
 
These results have some resonance with other studies and with the 
outcomes of discussions at the OECD round table. It was noted in the 
OECD Report that: 
 
In the discussion, patent thickets, royalty stacking and 
reach-through rights were all recognised as real 
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concerns for the industry, but none were seriously 
judged as a threat to innovation in biotechnology.318  
 
Despite this perceived absence of threat to the industry as a whole, the 
Report nevertheless highlighted the necessity of finding “working 
solutions” to these issues.  
 
Our data indicates that the number of licences per project is not 
usually prohibitive. As previously mentioned, it is difficult to obtain 
definitive data on projects abandoned, but some respondents certainly 
reported abandoning projects if obtaining licences looked as though it 
would be too difficult. It seems inevitable that increasing complexity 
of the patent landscape will lead to the need to enter into multiple in-
licences, thereby increasing the difficulties in licensing, which in turn 
will increase the risk of project abandonment.  
 
Project abandonment may seem less of a problem when it occurs at 
the stage due diligence is done because it entails little cost to the 
company. But there will still be some social cost if marginal projects 
are not pursued – low-value transactions may still be socially 
worthwhile, particularly in the biomedical area where future value 
may be difficult to predict at the outset. Again, it is difficult to state 
conclusively whether this is an issue that is restricted to isolated 
circumstances, but there were enough respondents who reported it to 
conclude that it happens regularly if not frequently. 
                                                 
318 OECD , above n60 at 60. 
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RESULTS CHAPTER 6: SUPPLY TO 
END USERS 
 
The primary focus of our inquiries in this study was more to do with 
the impact of patents on research and development than on the effect 
of patents on end users of patented technology. Hence, in general, we 
did not ask the respondents to our research institutions and company 
surveys or our interviewees to provide us with a significant amount of 
information relating to the impact of patents on the provision of drugs 
and devices to end users. However, some respondents did make 
reference to supply-related issues.  
 
In the diagnostics area, on the other hand, we specifically sought 
details in the surveys relating to the impact of patents on the supply of 
diagnostic services. The reason for this is that the need to address this 
issue in the Australian context has become particularly pressing 
following the publication of the United States studies by Mildred Cho 
and Jon Merz and their colleagues indicating that a number of gene 
patents are having a negative effect on the availability of genetic 
tests.319 In addition, there is heightened concern in Australia about the 
possibility that the BRCA 1 patent will be enforced by Myriad 
Diagnostics, which would have a flow on effect on the availability of 
the test to consumers.  The results of our inquiries are presented 
below.  
 
 
PHARMACEUTICAL S 
 
The important role played by patents in the development and 
marketing of new drugs was widely recognised by our respondents. 
As one pharmaceutical company respondent noted, the importance of 
pharmaceutical patents for the industry is that they protect against 
generics, the “me too” drugs: “our aim is to get novel compounds 
onto the market before copycats come onto the market.” This 
respondent noted that pharmaceutical patents tend to be fairly 
narrowly confined to the particular product. As such, the objections 
raised to broad patents are probably not as relevant in this sector as in 
the more upstream sectors. Nevertheless, the award of a patent for a 
particular drug can be extremely valuable and it probably goes 
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without saying that pharmaceutical patents do allow for monopoly 
pricing and this will inevitably affect the availability of new products 
to consumers. The fact that pharmaceuticals, particularly bio-
pharmaceuticals, are likely to be at the end of a long and ever 
expanding stream of patent rights suggests that prices are set to 
increase even further to enable recovery of licence fees and royalties 
as well as the end producer’s own research and development costs.  
 
It is important that the disadvantage to consumers of monopoly 
pricing caused by the patent grant is extinguished as soon as the 
patent expires. This can be achieved by allowing generic 
manufacturers to enter the market immediately on patent expiry. 
There was some discussion by respondents of the provision in the 
Patents Act 1990 allowing an extension of time for pharmaceutical 
patents. Some interview respondents commented that this provision 
can be particularly detrimental to Australian-based generic 
manufacturers.  
 
Another issue that was raised by some respondents was related to 
formulation patents. There would seem to be a tendency for some 
formulation companies to ask for high royalties for licensing of 
formulation patents. One respondent referred to the following 
example:  
 
At one stage we approached companies that could help 
us develop a new technique for drug delivery. When 
negotiating with them they wanted five percent 
royalties. This seemed unrealistic to me because we 
had developed the product. Formulation companies are 
demanding very high royalties, and all have their own 
patents that don’t infringe each other’s. My view is 
that I would rather pay a fee for service than a royalty. 
Formulation companies want both. Formulation 
patents become an issue if a company has a delivery 
problem. If we can we try to avoid expensive 
formulations.  
 
Some of the examples of new types of formulations mentioned by 
respondents include: 
 
• sub cutaneous drug delivery;  
• oral formulations of insulin;  
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• a skin patch that protrudes into the skin causing drug 
absorption in about 10 minutes – needleless injection. 
 
Respondents noted that each of these can have big advantages over 
traditional delivery methods. However, the high royalties demanded 
by some patent holders may create barriers to uptake. 
 
 
DEVICES 
 
Few issues were raised by respondents relating to the impact of 
patents on the supply of devices. Devices would seem to fit within the 
framework for development, manufacturing and supply of traditional 
inventions. It is less likely that availability, price and quality of 
devices will be affected by the availability of patents than is the case 
for pharmaceuticals and diagnostic tests for the following reasons: 
 
• the regulatory requirements are less onerous than for 
pharmaceuticals;  
• the road from discovery to commercial application is less 
tortuous. There would seem to be far less evidence of licence 
stacking; 
• research and development companies may also manufacture 
the end product in house; 
• where there are patent licences, these are primarily for the 
purpose of manufacture rather than for downstream 
development. Hence reach-through royalties and other reach-
through rights are not an issue; 
• where licences are give to use devices as research tools, they 
tend to be non-exclusive. One respondent noted: “we need 
clinics etc on side so we given them as much access as 
possible.” 
 
 
DIAGNOSTICS 
 
As the studies by Mildred Cho and Jon Merz and their colleagues 
clearly demonstrate, there are serious issues relating to the extent to 
which patents, particularly gene patents, impact on the availability of 
diagnostic tests.320  
                                                 
320 See particularly Merz and others, above n43 and Cho and others above n159. 
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Survey data 
 
Because of growing concerns about the impact of patents on the 
delivery of genetic test services, specific questions were asked in the 
surveys sent to diagnostic facilities relating to the impact of patents 
on the delivery of diagnostic services and additional inquiries were 
made by telephone in order to get a good representative sample. In 
total, 31 of the 52 respondents (60 percent) answered questions 
relating to their laboratory, the tests it performs, payment of licence 
fees and/or royalties, receipt of notifications from patent or licence 
holders, responses to notifications, and views on patents. 
 
Respondents were first asked where their laboratory was located. The 
majority of respondent laboratories were in public hospitals (Table 
15). In contrast, in the Cho study the participants were more evenly 
spread between the private and public sector.321  
 
Table 15: Location of laboratory 
 
 Number (%) 
Public hospital 25 (81) 
University 1 (3) 
Both public hospital/university 1 (3) 
Private laboratory 3 (10) 
Both private lab/public hospital 1 (3) 
 
Respondents in the written survey were asked to list the tests they 
performed. Some responded in broad terms (eg. “neurogenetic 
disorders”, “cancer” etc), whereas others listed all of the tests offered. 
Respondents in the telephone surveys were asked to broadly list the 
tests they offered, but were asked specifically about BRCA 1 and 2, 
haemochromatosis and Fragile X. Data from the written surveys 
indicates that all of the genetic tests referred to in the Cho study322 
were performed by at least one respondent in this study, except for 
apolipoprotein E, which was not referred to by any respondent. 
Haemochromatosis was the most commonly available test, offered by 
at least 48 percent of respondents. Table 16 presents a summary of the 
compiled written and telephone survey results. 
                                                 
321 Cho and others, above n159 at Table 1. 
322See Cho and others, above n159 at Table 2, and Table 1 in Part 1 of this Report. 
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Table 16: Types of tests 
 
Category of test Numbers (%) 
Various blood-related disorders 11 (35) 
Various neurological disorders 11 (35) 
Various cancers 16 (52) 
Various single gene disorders 17 (55) 
Breast cancer 9 (29) 
Haemochromatosis 15 (48) 
Fragile X 8 (26) 
Not specified 1 (3) 
 
Survey respondents were also asked to specify the approximate prices 
charged for the genetic tests that they offered. Some provided very 
detailed information on the cost of each test. Others provided more 
general information. The results are broadly summarised in Table 17. 
A large number of these tests are freely available, either generally, or 
to patients within the state or territory, or through the MBS. Fees vary 
considerably between types of tests and laboratories, for example, the 
BRCA tests are free in some laboratories but can cost up to AU$1,950 
in others. 
 
Table 17: Cost of tests 
 
 Numbers (%) Fee range (where 
applicable) 
Free 4 (13)  
Free to in-state patients, fee for others 5 (16) AU$200-1,500 
Some covered by MBS,323 fee for others 6 (19) AU$35-1,800 
Fee based 6 (19) AU$50-1,950 
No answer 10 (32)  
 
Respondents were asked whether they were required to pay licence 
fees or make royalty patents to any patent holder in respect of any of 
the tests they performed. They were then asked to specify the nature 
and number of licences in the following categories: genetic test; 
reagents; PCR; other methods; and other. They were also asked to 
specify the method of payment (e.g. up front licence fee, royalty, 
both). The results are summarised in Table 18. Eleven respondent 
laboratories (35 percent) reported that payments of licence fees and/or 
royalties were made, but almost all of these (nine out of 11) were 
                                                 
323 As noted in Context Chapter 4, the Federal Government’s position is that the 
MBS only covers DNA testing for Fragile X, factor V Leiden, haemochromatosis, 
protein C and S deficiencies and antithrombin 3 deficiency. 
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royalties paid to Roche Inc for use of taq polymerase in the 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR).  
 
Table 18: Payment of licence fees or royalties.  
 
 Numbers (%) 
Total: 11 (36) 
PCR/taq:            9 (29) 
Other reagents:  1 (3) 
Test kit:             1 (3) 
Yes 
Unsure:              1 (3) 
No 18 (58) 
Don’t know/no answer 2 (6) 
 
Respondents were asked whether they had ever received notification 
from a patent holder that the testing they were performing was the 
subject of a patent. They were also asked to identify the patent and 
state their response. Only eight (26 percent) respondents stated that 
they had received notifications and all of these related to PCR (see 
Table 19). One of these respondents also commented that they had 
received a verbal notification concerning the haemochromatosis test, 
but this had not been pursued formally. 
 
Table 19: Notifications 
 
 Numbers (%) 
8 (26) 
PCR/taq:         8 (26) 
Yes 
HFE:               1 (3) 
No 23 (74) 
 
In summary, these results show that, compared with the results from 
the United States study, there is little indication that holders of patents 
related to disease genes were actively enforcing their patents against 
Australian genetic testing laboratories at the time that this survey was 
conducted. Despite this, many respondents expressed concern about 
the impact of gene patents on genetic testing services, as 
demonstrated in Table 20. Respondents were asked about the impact 
of patents on the development of new tests, access to tests, cost of 
tests and the quality of tests. This table presents a summary of 
responses to those questions. It should be noted that of those 
respondents who stated that the impact was variable, the majority 
highlighted gene patents as more likely to have a negative impact than 
other types of patents. 
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Table 20: Views on the impact of patents on diagnostic tests 
 
 Positive 
( %) 
Negative 
 ( %) 
Variable 
 ( %) 
No effect 
 ( %) 
No answer 
 ( %) 
Development of 
new tests 
6 (19) 12 (39) 9 (29) 1 (3) 3 (10) 
Access to tests 1 (3) 14 (45) 12 (39) 2 (6) 2 (6) 
Cost of tests 2 (6) 16 (52) 6 (19) 3 (10) 4 (13) 
Quality of tests 2 (6) 5 (16) 10 (32) 5 (16) 9 (29) 
 
The results in Table 20 clearly show that there was a level concern 
amongst our survey respondents that patents, and particularly gene 
patents, could impact negatively on the provision of genetic testing 
services. Very few respondents saw the impact as being positive, 
although a higher percentage said that patents impacted positively on 
the development of new tests (19 percent) than on access, quality and 
cost (three to six percent). 
 
In our view, these results probably reflect more widespread concern 
in Australia about the possibility that gene patent and licence holders 
might enforce their patents against testing laboratories (indeed, some 
respondents in this study answered “not yet” to the question of 
whether they had received notification letters). These survey results 
were collected prior to the widespread publicity surrounding the 
enforcement actions of GTG in relation to its junk DNA patents. 
Having said this, most of our data collection occurred after publicity 
surrounding the announcement on 28 October 2002 of a strategic 
alliance between Myriad and GTG involving the BRCA tests.324 This 
led to widespread speculation that the delivery of enforcement notices 
from GTG on behalf of Myriad was imminent, and doubtless affected 
the responses made in the surveys. However, it should be noted that 
GTG has never indicated that it has any plans to pursue this course of 
action, and in July 2003 it confirmed that it has no intention to 
enforce the BRCA patents on behalf of Myriad.325 Nevertheless, 
Myriad may still choose to enforce the BRCA patents in its own right 
in Australia in the future.  
 
                                                 
324 GTG and Myriad above n8. 
325 Letter from GTG to Medical and Scientific Colleagues, 21 July 2003. Available 
on the Genetic Technologies website at: 
http://www.gtg.com.au/Announcements.html#21jul  (accessed 30 July 2003). 
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Aside from the BRCA patents, the Cho study clearly showed that a 
number of other patents are being actively enforced in that country.326 
Could Australian testing laboratories face demands for licence fees 
from a number of different patent holders in the future? The small 
size of the Australian market suggests that it may not be worthwhile 
for foreign companies to pursue Australian laboratories. In addition, 
most laboratories are in public hospitals and many do not charge for 
their services, further suggesting that there may be little financial 
incentive in targeting them. Events in Canada surrounding attempts 
by Myriad to enforce its BRCA patents suggest that patent holders 
may be reluctant to be involved in litigation with public healthcare 
providers. Although the Ontario provincial health service chose to 
ignore an enforcement notice received from Myriad in 2001, Myriad 
does not appear to have taken any action in response.327 This lack of 
action by Myriad may have been the trigger that encouraged other 
provinces to resume testing.328 Other patent holders may also be 
reluctant to challenge state instrumentalities. However, it is hardly 
desirable for the cloud of patent infringement proceedings to hover 
over the delivery of healthcare services. 
 
Arguably, a number of the common genetic tests performed in public 
laboratories could infringe the junk DNA patents. Potentially, their 
impact could be far more significant than Myriad’s BRCA patents. 
However, it may be that an appropriate balance can be achieved 
between the right of GTG to enforce its patents and the need for 
health care providers and researchers to continue their important 
work. Dr. Mervyn Jacobson, the Executive Chairman of GTG has 
expressed his desire to work with other parties in the field – “with the 
ultimate objective being, to help improve the health and quality of life 
of the Australian community”.329 However, his statement in a recent 
television program that GTG is already enforcing its patents against 
testing laboratories in Australia has doubtless caused concerns in this 
sector of the industry.330 We suggest that, if anything, the views 
expressed by survey respondents on the impact of patents on genetic 
                                                 
326 Cho and others, above n159. 
327 See, for example, Macdonald, above n5. 
328 British Columbia Ministry of Health Services, ‘Federal Leadership Urged as 
Genetic Testing Resumes’. (14 February 2003) Press Release. 
329 M. Jacobson ‘Genetic Susceptibility Testing – A Third Progress Report’. 22 May 
2003. Available on the Genetic Technologies website at: 
http://www.gtg.com.au/Media.Coverage.html  (accessed 26 June 2003). 
330 ABC Four Corners, above n7. 
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tests are now even more likely to be skewed further towards the 
negative.  
 
Interview data 
 
A number of interviewees with links to genetic testing also made 
comments about the impact of patents in this area. One public sector 
researcher said that:  
 
Gene sequence and research tool patents are not 
problematic in the practical sense so far. I have no 
particular problem with paying a royalty to a 
legitimate inventor. It’s just another cost of doing 
research. Just by purchasing taq polymerase we pay 
royalties to a licensed supplier.  However, where 
patented tools/tests are not available for licence this is 
not in the community’s interest.  
 
Other respondents confirmed that in general people are not enforcing 
their patents in the genetic testing/research area but also recognised it 
could become a problem in future. Most respondents were well aware 
of the taq polymerase patent owned by Roche and had either 
themselves been approached by Roche or Cetus (its predecessor in 
title) for licence fees, or knew of others who had been approached. 
For example, one respondent said that: 
 
Roche didn’t approach me directly about their PCR 
patent but did approach some hospitals in the state. 
The lawyer representing Roche was asking for a seven 
percent royalty. We said that the tests cost nothing. 
They said that it should be seven percent of the market 
value. This was very confusing. The Health 
Department took over negotiations over royalties. 
Roche said that other states had signed up, but because 
of commercial in confidence they wouldn’t disclose 
anything about this. We didn’t know whether they had 
or had not signed up. This is the only time that we 
have been approached to licence in. 
 
Some of the respondents involved in research or clinical testing in this 
area admitted that they were only generally aware of intellectual 
property owned by others, largely because of lack of resources to dig 
through patent data to see if they are infringing someone else’s 
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intellectual property. Some expressed the view that it was not 
necessary to make detailed inquiries because of an understanding 
“(perhaps mistakenly) that for non-commercial research we don’t 
need a licence.”  
 
Respondents generally stated that they would be prepared to pay 
reasonable royalties for test kits, taq polymerase, and so on, and 
viewed this as just another cost to be built into doing tests. At the 
same time, concern was expressed about a requirement for licence 
fees to be paid when a diagnostic facility develops its own tests and 
uses its own taq polymerase. Even more concern was expressed about 
any requirement for work to be done at the patent holder’s laboratory 
at commercial rates. As one respondent put it: “this is bad 
commercially and in terms of quality of science…as well as 
interaction between the referring physician and the testing 
laboratory”. Another put it more succinctly: “there is a difference 
between paying a reasonable royalty and being held to ransom.”  
 
Concern was also expressed that control could be lost if testing is 
taken outside the hospital environment. One respondent noted that 
testing is only done if it is indicated, and a tight hold is kept on who 
can have it done and appropriate counselling is ensured. This could be 
lost if testing was undertaken outside the public hospital system. 
However, it was noted that this is not meant to suggest that a private 
facility will not offer a good service but only that it is more difficult 
to monitor.  
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
These results show that those respondents in Australian diagnostic 
facilities that we surveyed and interviewed have not yet been 
subjected to the same sort of patent enforcement actions that have 
been reported in the United States. However, there are serious 
concerns in this sector of the industry that it is only a matter of time 
before such actions are taken. In part, the responses of survey 
respondents were no doubt influenced by the announcement of an 
alliance between Myriad and GTG and the media hype surrounding it. 
However, this does not mean that these concerns are totally without 
foundation. Whilst it is likely that few respondents in the industry 
would object to the payment of reasonable royalties on test kits and 
other reagents, there is more concern abut the prospect of having to 
enter into licensing arrangements, particularly if the licence terms 
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limit the independence of facilities to carry out their own testing. A 
requirement that the patent holder or their licensee conducts all 
testing is likely to be vigorously (and, possibly, justifiably) opposed.  
 
In being granted gene patents, patent holders are entitled to enforce 
their patents against others, and have the right to chose whether or not 
to license others to use the patent, to determine the conditions of 
licence, and even, if they so chose, to ignore infringing actions.331 In 
this regard, patents relating to genetic tests are no different from drug-
related patents. However, there are justifiable reasons why people 
perceive the two to be distinct, not the least of which is the time, 
effort and money involved in bringing a drug to market. Each of these 
factors is likely to be orders of magnitude greater than for bringing a 
diagnostic test to market. Hence, it could be argued that the need for 
the patent incentive is less for diagnostic tests than for drugs. There 
are further important distinctions between drugs and diagnostic tests 
from the perspective of consumer access. Drug patents tend to be 
specific to individual drugs, and other alternative drug therapies may 
be available. Gene patents, on the other hand, have the potential to 
cover all diagnostic tests for a particular genetic disease.  Therefore 
restricted access could be much more of a problem in the diagnostics 
area than in the drugs area. Access and cost problems are exacerbated 
by the fact that the PBS covers a large number of drugs, whereas the 
MBS only covers five genetic tests.  
 
Another distinction between drugs and diagnostic tests relates to 
quality. There are extensive regulatory hurdles that new drugs have to 
pass through before they enter the market. This is not so much the 
case for new diagnostic tests. This may not be a problem provided 
that there is an open market, because consumers (or their service 
providers) will be able to select the highest quality test from the 
marketplace. However, if the market is closed as a result of restrictive 
licensing, quality could become an important issue. This issue is 
particularly likely to arise when, for example, there is geographic 
variation in a particular gene-related disease trait. Interestingly, 
despite this, our survey respondents tended to be less concerned about 
the impact of patents on the quality of genetic tests than on other 
aspects of testing, as shown in Table 20.332 This may be because 
people have not fully thought through the implications of patenting in 
this area. On the other hand, it may reflect a genuine viewpoint that 
                                                 
331 Subject, of course, to any limitations imposed by law. 
332 It should also be noted that Mildred Cho and her colleagues obtained similar 
results. See Cho and others, above n159 at 7. 
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the patent incentive is likely to improve the quality of tests or that 
patenting has no effect one way or the other on the quality of tests.333  
 
Whilst patent holders are entitled to enforce their patents, this should 
not be at the cost of reduced availability and quality of tests and 
ensuring that appropriate counselling is tied in with testing. 
Relevantly, the recently completed final Report of the ALRC and 
Australian Health Ethics Committee’s inquiry on the protection of 
human genetic information included a number of recommendations 
relating to genetic testing.334 For example, Recommendation 11-1 
proposed that access to genetic testing for health care purposes should 
be better regulated; laboratories should be accredited for any genetic 
test conducted for medical, diagnostic or treatment purposes and 
should be required to comply with relevant accreditation standards. 
The Report also emphasised the need for ongoing development of 
ethical standards, particularly in relation to consent and counselling 
(Recommendations 11-2, 11-3 and 11-4). If these recommendations 
are adopted and implemented then some of the concerns expressed 
above relating to testing in private facilities will be alleviated. 
However, the potential for increased test costs resulting from the 
payment of licence fees and royalties is likely to be a matter of 
ongoing concern and debate.335  
 
                                                 
333 For a practitioner’s perspective on these and related issues see D.G.B. Leonard, 
‘Medical Practice and Gene Patents: a Personal Perspective’ (2002) 77 Academic 
Medicine 1388. See also Cho and others, above n159. 
334 Australian Law Reform Commission Report No 96: Essentially Yours: the 
Protection of Human Genetic Information in Australia (2003). 
335 One concern that needs to be addressed is whether or not a condition of 
accreditation may be non-infringement of patent rights (John Walsh personal 
communication 28 November 2003).  
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RESULTS CHAPTER 7: MARKET 
SOLUTIONS 
 
The results presented in the previous six chapters paint a picture of an 
industry that is in the early stage of commercial development. There 
is a well-established tradition of high quality basic research in 
Australian research institutions. These institutions are discovering the 
importance of capturing the commercial value of their research and 
transferring their technology to the commercial sector. The 
commercial sector itself is spread across the whole gamut from 
upstream research to downstream product development. However, the 
product development sector is quite small. The final stages of drug 
development, in particular, are routinely carried out overseas rather 
than in Australia. One of the greatest challenges for the Australian 
industry is ensuring that research and development effort at one level 
is taken through to the next level in the continuum through to 
manufacture of end products.  
 
The importance of protecting inventions by patents in order to 
facilitate technology transfer is widely recognised across all sectors of 
the industry. The importance of ensuring freedom to operate and 
avoiding encumbrances on patent rights is similarly widely 
recognised. The industry is facing increasing costs in dealing with 
both of these requirements. However, in practical terms, there still 
appear to be somewhat of a laissez faire attitude taken both with 
respect to the enforcement of patent rights and with respect to dealing 
with patent rights held by others. In our view, this attitude may not be 
sustainable if the industry is to become the economic powerhouse that 
the governments of Australia hope for. It is likely that this will only 
be achieved if patents are properly managed and exploited and if due 
regard is taken of all of the relevant patents held by others. 
 
In this chapter of the Report we consider some of the practical means 
that the industry has found to deal with these issues. 
 
 
COLLABORATIONS AND LICENSING  
 
Perhaps the most obvious way to deal with patents that have the 
potential to restrict or prevent research and development is to enter 
into a licence agreement or some other collaborative arrangement. 
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Indeed, much of this Report has focused on the way that the industry 
utilises these options. 
 
Although there is significant licensing activity within the Australian 
industry, it may be that at the present time, licensing is less 
widespread than it is in other jurisdictions. Other studies have found 
that licensing activity within the industry is extremely liberal.336 
Walsh, Arora and Cohen, in particular, said that their respondents 
indicated that it is typically not that difficult to contract.337 Many 
broadly applicable foundational patents are licensed non-exclusively, 
and there is a trend toward realising value from patents by licensing 
widely.338 Our data indicates that approximately half of our 
respondents were involved in licensing activity; most respondents 
who own patents reported licensing them out, and many respondents 
reported being able to licence-in technology to which they required 
access.339 Although we do not have actual figures from other studies 
by way of comparison, these studies give the impression of prolific 
licensing activity. The youth of the Australian industry may account 
for licensing figures being slightly low relative to other jurisdictions. 
Our interview respondents assured us that the Australian market is 
very active in terms of licensing, and licensing is an important part of 
the business strategy of many intermediate Australian companies who 
seek to add value to technology they have licensed-in, before 
licensing it on. One respondent stated that in terms of the intellectual 
property of these companies,  
 
for most, the main value is a licence. Few [Australian 
companies] are big enough to extract value in their 
own right…Generation and licensing of intellectual 
property is the new paradigm in which we all have to 
live.  
 
Licence agreements with international companies and institutions are 
very important to the Australian industry, and indeed to the 
                                                 
336 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28 at 322-3; Straus, Holzapfel and Lindenmeir, 
above n36 at 6-7. 
337 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28 at 322. 
338 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28 at 323. 
339 See Results Chapter 2 dealing with licensing-out of technology, and Results 
Chapter 5 which discusses licensing-in figures obtained during the course of this 
study. Note also that in their 1999 report, Ernst & Young found that half of the 
companies they surveyed were involved in licensing activity; Ernst & Young 1999, 
above n1 at 35. 
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international industry as a whole.340 As one respondent commented, 
there are hundreds to thousands of intellectual property deals per 
month within the global industry. However, licence deals are not 
always straightforward, and some difficulties in contracting 
effectively have been encountered by our respondents. In conducting 
negotiations for licensing deals, we heard many comments about 
problems encountered when it comes to arguing over licence details. 
The views of a number of respondents are encapsulated in the 
following statement offered by a senior member of a technology 
transfer company:  
 
Getting a licence is not an easy process. You need to 
get an insight into who you are dealing with: their cash 
position, whether they are about to be sued etc. We get 
rumours about particular companies. Usually the 
outcome is a licence with an upfront and royalty 
component, skewed depending on who you are dealing 
with. Deal precedent is also important. Certain types 
of transactions have certain familiar aspects.  
 
This may be a product of inequality in bargaining power and levels of 
experience between our respondents, and parties in jurisdictions 
where the industry is more established.  
 
Widespread collaborative activity was also reported, and in many 
ways this represented an important method of gaining access to 
technologies or products, which were necessary to enable research to 
proceed.341 
 
Cross-licensing              
 
A cross-licensing arrangement is one where two or more parties enter 
into a reciprocal licensing arrangement to license each other’s patents. 
In a simple cross-licensing scenario, one patent generally represents 
an improvement over an earlier patent. A cross-licence is the typical 
response to a blocking patents situation342 and by licensing the earlier 
patent, the holder of the improvement patent is  able to practice the 
improvement. Similarly, the holder of the earlier patent can practice 
the improvement patent. 
                                                 
340 See also Nicol and Nielsen above n4 at 354-358. 
341 See Results Chapter 2 dealing with technology transfer.  
342 See further Results Chapter 4. 
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Ten respondents to the company survey had been involved in cross-
licensing arrangements (20 percent).343 All but one of these would 
appear to have entered into cross-licences with just one other party, 
although four respondents indicated that they had at least two cross-
licensing arrangements. Large-scale cross-licences and patent pools 
were not evident. Cross-licences for varying types of technology had 
been exchanged, and were entered into in four cases to avoid liability 
for infringement. From the information provided by respondents, it 
was difficult to ascertain the industry sectors over which cross-
licensing arrangements extended. 
 
Several of our interview respondents from both companies and 
research institutions, reported being involved in cross-licensing 
arrangements, and this figure is low relative even to the survey 
results. However, it was the view of a number of other respondents 
that cross-licensing arrangements would become increasingly 
important. For example, one respondent said that: 
 
In future in conducting licensing negotiations 
companies will be faced with a huge web of licensing 
and cross-licensing arrangements. 
 
In many cases, cross-licences are entered into as part of a 
collaborative relationship. They enable parties to continue research 
and to practice improvements that a particular party may have 
developed. On the other hand, one respondent thought that cross-
licensing arrangements usually arise due to conflict. It seemed to be 
generally accepted among those respondents who had cross-licensed 
that cross-licensing represents an effective way of overcoming 
blocking patents, and similarly that cross-licensing is likely to 
become more prevalent as the patent landscape becomes more 
complex.344 
 
 
INVENTING AROUND  
 
In ensuring freedom to operate, many respondents confirmed the need 
to make an evaluation of patents they need to access, and patents they 
need to work around. One of the respondents we interviewed who 
                                                 
343 Note that one of these respondents was involved in plant and animal research. 
344 Cf Straus, Holzapfel and Lindenmeir, above n35 at 7. 
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was involved in downstream development activities, stated that 
reasonably skilled people can negotiate a way in where there are 
impediments, or find ways around them. Inventing around 
problematic patents was reported to be an important strategy 
employed by researchers in all sectors of the industry. It has also been 
suggested that the ability of researchers to invent around may prompt 
licensing on reasonable terms.345 Several respondents disagreed that 
inventing around is a commonly employed tactic for avoiding 
infringement. One respondent whose company is involved in 
upstream research concerning specific mutations on particular genes 
thought that you would need to know a lot about a patent before you 
could successfully invent around it. Another whose company is 
involved in downstream research considered that inventing around is 
‘treading on thin ice’, although this respondent acknowledged that 
they look at relevant patents in the area every day so that they are 
aware of what others in the area are doing.  
 
However, about two thirds of all respondents we interviewed who 
were engaged in research stated that they frequently invented around 
patents. One respondent estimated that researchers probably spend 50 
percent of their time inventing around, while another considered that 
researchers in his company spend around 90 percent of their time 
working out how to get around patents held by competitors. It is clear 
that the ability of researchers to invent around will depend on the 
field of research involved, specifically: 
 
• how encumbered the area of research is; 
• the breadth of the relevant patent(s); and 
• the nature of the patented product or technology. 
 
Level of encumbrance 
 
Some areas are more heavily patented than others are. One respondent 
commented that it may be getting harder to invent around within the 
biotechnology industry because of the increasing number of patents. 
It would appear that one of the most heavily encumbered areas is 
stem cell research, and yet respondents still reported working around 
those areas covered by competitor patents. This is probably a factor 
that will become more relevant as the patent landscape within the 
industry becomes more cluttered. 
 
                                                 
345 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28. 
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Patent breadth 
 
Inventing around is easier in some areas than others because the 
patents are narrower and thus more susceptible to inventing around. 
Patent requirements have tightened up in the United States so patents 
are narrower and therefore easier to invent around.346 Some of the 
earlier patents were considered to be a real problem. One respondent 
pointed out that patent attorneys are trying to draft claims more 
broadly to prevent inventing around. 347 Also, one respondent 
acknowledged that they tried to patent very broadly, filing as many 
patents as they could on a compound to prevent inventing around. 
This assisted them in avoiding a blocking patents situation in that it 
secured an area of research.  
 
The technology or product 
 
Some types of technology or product are easy to invent around, while 
others are more difficult. One respondent from an upstream company 
made the following comment: 
 
Gene sequences are a special case. Most of the method 
patents have competing methods for almost anything: 
microarrays etc. There are half a dozen guys trying to 
push the processes and if anyone tries to corner the 
market it will go somewhere else. It was thought that 
patenting genes, SNPs would corner the market. But 
now look at gene expression, messenger RNA 
expression, which are not captured by the patents, 
interference RNA, etc. these are all competing 
technologies. It is such a creative process, I have no 
concerns that anything could block for very long. In 
the end others will find ways around the things that 
people are trying to block. Next year is not even 
relevant. People do sometimes try to block but in 
every case they have failed. 
 
At the furthest downstream end of the drug development pipeline, a 
respondent from a small pharmaceutical company noted that they 
considered that there were few patents in the pharmaceutical industry 
                                                 
346 With the exception of device patents where it was considered by one respondent 
that the United States standard of examination was quite poor, and resultant patents 
were difficult to get around. 
347 See the discussion on blocking patents in Results Chapter 4. 
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that could not be invented around. As one respondent from an 
intermediate company noted, it is often possible to get around patents 
held by others by “…moving down the synthetic pathway, changing 
processes, or inventing around.” Again, patent claims in some areas 
are necessarily narrower than in other areas. For example, narrow 
process patents may be easy to get around, while promoters are one 
kind of technology that some respondents considered to be impossible 
to invent around. Respondents in some areas commented that they 
could “get around anything”, while others made more qualified 
statements.  
 
Although inventing around may be possible, will it result in all lost 
opportunities being recovered? Other studies have suggested that a 
single patent (or even group of patents) is unlikely to entirely inhibit 
research in a particular area. This is because, for example, a patent 
over a single protein is unlikely to prevent research into a particular 
disease given that many diseases are complex and there are often 
“…multiple approaches to the metabolic pathways.”348 This is borne 
out by our interview data that makes it clear that few researchers or 
companies are having to cease research entirely, although there may 
be some social cost associated with research being redirected to avoid 
infringement. This will depend again on the technology in question. 
There is likely to be little social cost in the simple case of a researcher 
inventing around to avoid infringing a competitor’s patents. Indeed, 
society is more likely to benefit in such a scenario. There may 
however, be some social cost where, for example, a patent over 
technology that is useful for research into the development of 
different but competing products is enforced. In many instances our 
data did not allow us to make this distinction, although it appeared 
that some cases at least fell into the latter category.  
 
 
PATENT ENFORCEMENT 
 
Another strategy for dealing with problematic patents is simply to 
ignore them. However, this strategy carries with it the risk that 
enforcement action will ensue. Most respondents reported that they 
have procedures in place to monitor infringing activities. However, 
the general view expressed by a number of respondents was that there 
is a great deal of infringement going on that is very difficult to track, 
and even when it is tracked, enforcement can be difficult because of 
                                                 
348 Walsh, Arora and Cohen, above n28 at 42. 
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the cost of litigation and the risk that a counter claim will be made for 
revocation. Some infringement may be unintentional, and may arise 
for a whole host of reasons, including: 
 
• lack of adequate provision for patent searching; 
• difficulty in determining the scope of a particular patent and 
what amounts to infringement; 
• the fact that when the patent alleged to be infringed is in a 
different field it would not necessarily come to light with 
usual search terms; and 
• lack of certainty about exemption for research work (see the 
discussion on the research exemption below); 
 
A number of respondents reported that they believed that some people 
would continue to pursue particular projects even when they knew 
that this work may be infringing a patent. In some instances, the 
reason given was a belief that the patent was invalid and that the 
breadth of claims was not warranted by the contribution made to the 
field by the invention. In other cases, it seems that some companies 
may simply not bother to search the prior art, and only tackle the 
issue of patent infringement when it becomes a problem. One 
respondent referred to this as a “cavalier approach of some 
commercial parties”. On the other side of the coin, a number of 
research institution respondents reported that, because governments 
tend to take risk averse strategies, projects would be dropped 
completely if there was any risk of infringement. Furthermore, it 
seems that it is unlikely that research institution patent holders would 
actively pursue infringers. A number of respondents said that they 
would leave it to commercial partners to take such actions.  
 
Detecting infringement 
 
A number of respondents commented on the difficulties that they 
encounter in detecting infringement. Most company respondents have 
procedures in place for tracking infringement, including searches of 
scientific publications, patents, etc. For example, one respondent said: 
 
I spend hours every day on detecting infringement. 
The process is not black and white. I scan all sorts of 
stuff: web, magazines etc. Looking for activities in a 
couple of categories that use our technology. If there is 
the merest hint I collect the name. If it comes up again 
I start to dig. Then I do detailed digging and try to get 
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as strong evidence as I can that they are infringing. 
Seldom do they use the exact words of the patent. It 
requires a degree of interpretation. I don’t start writing 
letters until I am pretty confident that what they are 
doing falls within the scope of the patent.  
 
Another said that his company has set up a sophisticated system for 
detecting infringement including a database of actual and potential 
competitors ranked in order of likelihood of infringing.  Despite 
having these procedures in place it was recognised that detecting 
infringement is still difficult, particularly with regard to universities 
and private companies. However, one respondent did express some 
confidence in being able to track infringement.  
 
Pursuing infringers 
 
Even if infringement is detected or suspected, the alleged infringer 
will not necessarily be pursued. For example, one upstream company 
respondent noted that: 
 
Until you get a fair way in, a lot of companies are not 
fussed that you are infringing and would not pursue 
you. There are a lot of infringers nibbling around the 
edges of markets that patent holders are not aware of. 
They may chase, they may not. Quite openly, a lot of 
patents are being infringed, particularly in the drug 
industry. In Australia there is a fear in infringing 
because of the limited amount of capital most biotech 
companies have – a large US company would attack 
them and they would be unable to defend such an 
action. 
 
Another said that the question is how much money you have in the 
bank. It seems unlikely that start up companies would have the 
resources to chase infringers. One respondent stated that the best 
tactic in such circumstances is to lodge a claim in court then get the 
public relations machine going to move negotiations along. The 
situation is particularly difficult for research institution patent holders. 
One respondent in this area said: 
 
We do nothing about infringement, leaving it up to our 
commercial partners. We have few resources. Even if 
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our intellectual property was infringed, we might write 
a letter but we couldn’t take legal action. 
 
One respondent was strongly critical of participants in the Australian 
industry who do not protect their intellectual property. He put it quite 
simply “if you haven’t got the finances to protect your intellectual 
property you shouldn’t be in the business”. He estimated that to be 
serious about intellectual property an annual budget of AU$1 million 
is required, without getting to the cost of infringements and 
oppositions. A public company respondent supported this type of 
viewpoint, stating that she considered that pursuit of infringers was 
part of the company’s responsibility to its shareholders. She said: 
 
If we suffer damage we would vigorously pursue 
infringers. We would also pursue if we had granted 
rights to a partner. So, we vigorously pursue 
infringement where there is the prospect of damage to 
the company and collaborators and with respect other 
people’s IP. We don’t run around infringing other’s IP. 
 
If a patent holder is able to persuade others that they are engaging in 
infringing activities the outcome can be quite lucrative. One 
respondent gave the example of a company that had a piece of 
intellectual property that they were not exploiting at the time. They 
discovered that a company in Europe was infringing the patent and 
were able to persuade them to pay royalties. A few weeks later a 
United States company contacted them asking to negotiate a licence.  
 
Given that patent searching and tracking infringement both impose 
onerous obligations on industry participants, we will explore some of 
the ways that these obligations could be reduced in the last part of this 
report. In particular we consider whether international discussions 
relating to the use of patent clearing houses are relevant in Australia. 
 
Being pursued 
 
We obtained very little evidence of industry participants actually 
being pursued for patent infringement. As discussed above, in part 
this is because there would seem to be a practice-based research 
exemption operating in the research sector. The majority of research 
institution respondents confirmed that they had never been pursued 
for patent infringement. Some company respondents also said that 
they were not aware of any infringement notices being issued against 
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them. A patent attorney confirmed that her clients are not getting 
cease and desist letters at present. 
 
The diagnostics industry sector would seem to be most concerned 
with the prospect of receiving cease and desist letters. This sector has 
received demands in the past relating to the taq polymerase patent. In 
addition, respondents in this sector were well aware of the 
enforcement actions by Myriad in other countries concerning the 
BRCA 1 patents. Nevertheless, aside from the tap polymerase 
demands there was little or no evidence that respondents were being 
pursued for infringement. However, one respondent noted that he was 
aware of enforcement action by GTG in New Zealand concerning its 
junk DNA patents. This action will clearly be a matter of growing 
concern across the industry. Indeed, one research institution 
participant commented that “everything we do every day infringes 
them.” 
  
 
RESEARCH EXEMPTION 
 
There is a significant risk that companies may face enforcement 
action if they infringe patents, either intentionally or innocently. In 
this section we consider whether research institutions face the same 
risk, or whether they are more unlikely to face such enforcement 
actions. 
 
The data presented in Results Chapter 3 indicates that research 
institutions are putting in place good strategies for managing their 
own patents. Furthermore, they are actively involved in transferring 
their technology to industry, both through collaborations and, to a 
lesser extent, through licensing. At the same time, however, licensing-
in activity within the research sector is relatively low. To a large 
extent, this was justified by research institution respondents on the 
basis that their research is exempt from patent infringement. Indeed, 
some respondents put forward the argument that all research as such 
is exempt, whether it is conducted in research institutions or private 
sector. However, if this were the case it would be difficult to see how 
research tool patents could ever be enforced, and yet there is clear 
evidence that this does happen and that if managed properly these 
patents can bring in substantial licence fees. Hence, arguments that 
research per se is exempt appear fallacious. 
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As we discussed in Context Chapter 3, the legal status of any form of 
research exemption in Australia is by no means clear. Use of the word 
“exploitation” to describe the rights of patent holders in section 13 of 
the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) certainly has a commercial air to it and 
hence there may be a good argument that basic research is exempt. 
The recognition in United States case law of an experimental use 
exemption supports this conclusion. However, the growing 
commercialisation of public sector research suggests that it may be 
difficult to rely on a blanket exemption for all research conducted in 
the public sector. The recent case of Madey v Duke University349 in 
the United States illustrates the risks involved in relying on this 
exemption. The question of how to distinguish between basic 
research, which may be exempt, and commercial research, which is 
not, is by no means easy to answer. We look here at the practical 
aspects of the question: how in practice is the distinction made? In the 
last part of this Report we look at the question from the legal 
perspective: does the law recognise any distinction between 
commercial and non-commercial research and if  not, should it? 
 
A practice-based research exemption? 
 
From the practical perspective, a number of interview respondents 
commented on the difficulties involved in determining when and 
where an exemption from patent infringement might apply. For 
example, one patent attorney acknowledged that the research 
exemption is very cloudy and that it is very hard to tell whether there 
is a commercial taint to research. A technology transfer officer 
confirmed the difficulties encountered in determining whether or not 
a particular research project can safely be pursued. She noted that if 
the project is pure research it is seen as being safe, but there are 
problems when, for example, a commercial partner has an option to 
commercialise the research results, because this has never been tested. 
It would seem that in a number of situations decisions about risks of 
infringement are not dealt with by the research partner to a 
collaboration, but are left to the commercial partner to deal with.   
 
Views of company respondents on a practice-based exemption 
 
A significant number of company respondents said that they would 
not seek licences from participants in the research institution sector 
because it was not a wise decision from a business perspective. For 
                                                 
349 Madey, above n87. 
Results Chapter 7 
________________________________________________________ 
220  
example, one pharmaceutical company respondent explained that 
even though intellectual property is the company’s life blood there is 
recognition of the benefits to be derived from encouraging research in 
the areas that the company has an interest in. This respondent stated 
that his company would provide research materials to researchers in 
research institutions and that the starting premise is supply rather than 
denial. However, he added that if the research becomes commercially 
valuable the researcher has to come back to the company to 
renegotiate.  
 
Another respondent said that it would be ridiculous to contemplate 
chasing universities for infringement. He explained that in part this 
was because it would affect the company’s reputation in the academic 
community and in part because damages would not be recovered in 
any event. Another respondent said “it would be crazy to sue a public 
sector researcher: a man of straw and PR wise it’s a loser”. Other 
company respondents supported this view, stating that it was far 
better to come to some sort of collaborative arrangement. However, 
one respondent did sound a note of caution, commenting that in some 
situations they may be obliged by a collaborator to pursue a university 
infringer. In such circumstances it seems likely that attempts would 
be made to negotiate a licence first and that slapping a writ on the 
researcher would not be a first option. One respondent said that the 
only time that his company would think about pursuing a university is 
if there is use of a key research tool.  
 
Some respondents said that it would be unlikely that they would 
pursue infringement at the research level irrespective of whether this 
is carried out in the public or private sector. The reason given was 
that it may be necessary to infringe a patent in order to determine 
whether a particular line of research is worth pursuing. One 
respondent said that because of this his company would not pursue 
infringement at the research level, and that, on the other side of the 
coin, his company probably infringes to some extent in the 
development of its inventions.  In his view, it is only when the 
research gets to the commercial stage that patents should be enforced.  
 
Views of research institution respondents on a practice-based 
exemption 
 
Research institution respondents generally confirmed that at present it 
seems that it is a rare thing for a patent to be enforced against them. 
One said: 
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Patents held by others are never a problem. I have 
never had an infringement letter, except one years ago 
relating to taq polymerase. We were making it. Roche 
wrote a letter to us. We wrote back saying that we 
were not infringing and would not pay anyway. That 
was the end of it. 
 
As such, at the present time there seems to be a general practice based 
research exemption operating in Australia, even though the law is not 
clear. Quite how long this situation will continue remains to be seen.  
 
Changing views 
 
There can be little doubt that patent holders have the right to enforce 
their patent rights against research institutions in some situations. 
Although there is little evidence of this occurring in practice, it 
appears that some patent holders are now prepared to take this step. In 
part this is justified by the increasing commercial focus and patent 
activity within research institutions. For example one upstream 
company respondent stated that his company was prepared to enforce 
its patents at the meeting of research world and commercial world. He 
noted that in doing so, the company could rely on the Madey v Duke 
definition of non-infringing research, but the company takes a more 
generous view than this. He said that a commercial licence would be 
required where there is a commercial arm transaction underlying the 
research. A number of examples were given of types of research that 
the company would consider fall into this category: 
 
• if there is a fee for service;  
• if an invoice is raised and there is a revenue stream; 
• if the purpose of the research is for generating intellectual 
property; 
• if the research is done on a matter that clearly intends to lead 
to commercial outcome. 
 
This respondent also said that his company does not grant carte 
blanche immunity to hospitals and universities but splits licences 
between commercial and non-commercial. 
 
Another respondent confirmed that the Madey case shows that there 
are no such things as not-for-profit institutes because they are 
businesses which have as one of their purposes generation of funds. 
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This respondent concluded that for a university to say that it can use 
intellectual property without recognising it as a commercial asset is 
problematic. He added that universities are driven to commercialise 
and they have a clear commercial goal. In his view, therefore, 
universities need to be more up front about this and acknowledge that 
they are chasing commercial goals.  
 
A licensing consultant confirmed that companies are prepared to 
pursue institutions. He cited one example where a licence was 
demanded and: 
 
[t]he university did a cost benefit analysis and decided 
that it could continue research to produce papers etc. 
But the cost is AU$100,000 in defending an 
infringement action. Companies can be ruthless.  
 
Because of these difficulties and uncertainties involved in drawing the 
line between basic and commercial research, a number of technology 
transfer personnel stated that ideally freedom to operate should be 
confirmed from the outset. There does seem to be a great deal of 
sense in this proposition. However, it has to be balanced against the 
high costs involved in undertaking patent searches and, where 
necessary, negotiating licences (discussed in Results Chapters 4 and 
5).  
 
 
CHALLENGES TO VALIDITY 
 
Another option that is available when faced with problematic patents 
is to attempt to have them invalidated, either through opposition or 
revocation procedures available under the Patents Act 1990 (Cth).  
 
Although a number of respondents said that they encounter patents 
that they believe are invalid, very few would actually take the step of 
challenging them in court. One respondent said that they would drop 
the compound instead. However, one research institution respondent 
said that the organisation would challenge a patent if necessary. He 
gave the example of a case where the owner wanted reach-through 
rights, ferocious royalties and up fronts. Having said this, it seems 
that such challenges in the biotechnology area are extremely unlikely 
to be pursued in court. The lack of case law on biotechnology patent 
validity is testimony to this. Nevertheless, the threat of instituting 
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revocation proceedings is likely to be a powerful bargaining tool in 
licence negotiations.  
 
Patent opposition 
 
There is more case law on opposition to biotechnology patents, with a 
number of reported decisions of the Commissioner of Patents or his 
delegate. However, appeals to the Federal Court are still rare. 
 
There seems to be some quite marked divergence of views relating to 
the value of opposing patents. A patent attorney stated that his clients 
do tend to file oppositions to competitors patents. An upstream 
company respondent also said that his company would file 
oppositions if the claims go beyond the invention and threaten the 
company’s core intellectual property. He said that the company 
simply could not afford to allow any claims to go through that 
threaten its business. However, an intellectual property manager in an 
intermediate level company stated: 
 
My position is that in some ways it is better to hold 
fire. Opposing claims doesn’t get you very far. In fact 
it helps the patentee to refine their claims. As a tactic it 
is not good to spend money on it. It is better to build 
up your position in case an injunction is taken out 
against you [for post grant infringement]. We would 
be willing to enter into licensing negotiations in these 
circumstances.  
 
Similarly an intellectual property advisor noted:  
 
I have seen very little, if any, examples of 
oppositions. It is a cost issue: it is very expensive and 
difficult to identify where the benefit is.  
 
On the other hand, a technology transfer respondent intimated that 
oppositions could be powerful tactical tools. She said that they can 
kill a project quickly because public institutions lack the AU$100,000 
or so needed to defend them. In her view this is also an issue for small 
companies, particularly start-ups. Bigger companies could use 
oppositions tactically to close down areas of research.   
 
One respondent estimated that the cost of oppositions in Australia 
could be from AU$20,000 to several hundred thousand. In Europe if 
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there is an appeal the costs are likely to be in the hundreds of 
thousands. The United States has no opposition system. However it 
does have interferences and the cost of a standard United States 
interference is US$300-400,000. Pursuing an infringer in the United 
States is easily up to $1 million.350 This respondent noted that 
opposition is plan B and that his organisation looks at the possibility 
of licensing beforehand and may take a licence even though it is 
believed that the claims are invalid. However, if there is some 
certainty that the patent is not valid it is less likely that negotiations 
will be entered into. One of the problems with entering negotiations is 
that it gives some acknowledgement to the fact that a licence is 
needed. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
These results suggest that the market has the capacity to overcome 
many issues raised by intellectual property impediments. Participants 
in the industry recognise that intellectual property is an important 
asset, and value their own intellectual property and intellectual 
property owned by others. They have a healthy respect for this latter 
category, and take measures to ensure they have freedom to operate. 
 
In many cases, licence negotiations between patent holders and users 
allow research to proceed and new products to be developed. This is 
exactly how a well functioning patent system should operate. 
However, as previously noted, negotiating difficulties, restrictive 
licence terms, refusals to license, stacking royalties and so on all can 
act as impediments to a well functioning market. There are doubtless 
cases where unhindered research and development is impossible. 
 
In any well functioning patent regime a fine balance exists between 
protecting the rights of owners and the rights of users. Whilst the 
Australian patent system would appear to be assisting the medical 
                                                 
350 It should be noted that the primary recommendation in an inquiry by the United 
States Federal Trade Commission into competition and patent law and policy was 
that a new administrative procedure should be enacted to provide for an 
administrative procedure for post-grant review and opposition to patents. Federal 
Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition 
and Patent Law and Policy (Washington: US Government Printing Service; 2003) 
available at: 
http://xml.coverpages.org/ni2003-11-11-1.html (accessed 9 December 2003) 
(hereafter Federal Trade Commission). 
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biotechnology industry in achieving a reasonable level of success, an 
investigation of possible institutional measures aimed at promoting 
the development of the industry is nonetheless warranted. This is the 
subject of the next part of this Report.    
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OUTCOMES CHAPTER 1: THE 
LEGAL LANDSCAPE AND 
OPTIONS FOR REFORM  
 
Our results have shown that in some instances the Australian 
biotechnology industry takes a fairly relaxed attitude to both 
enforcing its own patents and ensuring that it does not infringe 
the patent rights of others. Some Australian industry participants 
take a fairly aggressive attitude towards protecting their patent 
rights, but this is not common. The lack of aggression was 
heavily criticised by some respondents. For example, one 
upstream company respondent said that: 
 
Our major capital asset is intellectual property, 
but we take a loose approach to it, operating on a 
mate’s basis. This is a good way to kill the 
industry. We need to use intellectual property 
strategically. It is not just a collection of 
inventions. The key is stopping others, not 
enabling them. Australia does not seem to have a 
good understanding of this in companies or 
research groups. Yet this is the starting point for 
the development of the biotech industry. 
 
It is likely that patents will be more aggressively enforced in 
Australia in the future and this may well change the relaxed 
attitude of some participants in the industry to such matters as: 
 
• keeping their patent rights clean and free from 
encumbrances; 
• monitoring the use by others of their own intellectual 
property; 
• maximising exploitation of their own patent rights both 
through self-exploitation and through transferring 
technology; 
• avoiding enforcement actions by other patent holders; 
and  
• obtaining clear authorisation to use technology under 
patent that is necessary for industry participants to 
continue their own research and development activities.  
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These matters are relevant to all three of the industry sectors that 
we have focused on in this research project, namely: the 
research sector, the company sector and the diagnostics sector. It 
may be that these issues will be resolved over the next decade or 
so and a vibrant Australian medical biotechnology industry will 
be a sustainable goal. Alternatively, these challenges of 
managing intellectual property in an aggressive environment 
may impair its development. Bearing this in mind, the final issue 
that we wish to explore in this Report is the extent to which the 
law is adequate to ensure that the industry maintains its forward 
momentum.  
 
We must point out that in this part of the Report we are not 
attempting to provide a definitive treatise on law reform in this 
area. What we seek to do is to broadly canvass some of the 
options for law reform that are relevant to the findings presented 
in Part 3 of this report. In considering any option for law reform, 
it should be emphasised that a delicate balance exists in the 
Australian industry between: 
 
• institution-based researchers who want to continue their 
important research but at the same time are aware of the 
need for commercial development and financial support 
from the private sector; 
• upstream companies, which often struggle to obtain 
financial backing for their research. These companies 
will often need to access technology from research 
institutions but will also need to be able to transfer it to 
downstream partners on favourable terms. Often these 
downstream partners will be located in other 
jurisdictions, particularly the United States; 
• intermediate companies, which are likewise likely to be 
heavily involved in accessing technology and in 
transferring it to downstream partners,; 
• downstream companies, which, at this stage, form a 
small part of the Australian industry. The issue from 
their perspective is being able to compete effectively 
with foreign competitors; and  
• end users and the providers of products to them. The 
issue from this perspective is equitable access to high 
quality new products at a reasonable cost.  
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The issue of being able to effectively compete with overseas 
competitors and in overseas markets is not limited to 
downstream companies, but is one that is faced by all of the 
industry sectors. We emphasise that it is vital that law reform in 
this area does not swing the balance too far against any of these 
sectors. We briefly canvass a number of options for reform 
below. 
 
 
EXCLUDING GENE SEQUENCES 
 
Discussions about the appropriateness of patenting genes and 
gene sequences have been going on for over a decade, but to 
date they have had negligible effect on patent law practice. At 
the international level, the UNESCO Declaration on the Human 
Genome and Human Rights states in Article 1 that: 
 
The human genome underlies the fundamental unity 
of all members of the human family, as well as the 
recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity. In 
a symbolic sense, it is the heritage of humanity. 
 
And in Article 4 that: 
 
The human genome in its natural state shall not give 
rise to financial gains. 
 
The European Biotechnology Directive351 states in Article 5.1 
that: 
 
The human body, at the various stages of its 
formation and development, and the simple 
discovery of one of its elements, including the 
sequence or partial sequence of a gene, cannot 
constitute patentable inventions. 
 
Recently the European Parliament passed a resolution 
specifically relating to the BRCA patents.352 Although the 
Parliament does not have the jurisdiction to legislate to prohibit 
                                                 
351 Directive 98/44/EC On The Legal Protection of Biotechnological 
Inventions. 
352 Patenting of human genes B5-0633, 0641, 0651 and 0663/2001.  
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patenting of human genes it clearly stated its very strong 
opposition to them in the Resolution. The Resolution expresses 
the European Parliament’s dismay at the possible consequences 
of granting patents on human genes and called for the European 
Patent Office to reconsider patenting of genes.  
 
It is important to recognise that gene sequences in their natural 
state are not patentable. It is only when they have been isolated 
and synthetically produced and when a function has been 
ascribed to them that they become patentable. Although Article 
27 of TRIPS does not specifically allow for the exclusion of 
gene sequences, arguably they could be excluded on the basis 
that they are discoveries rather than inventions. However, this 
would mark a significant shift from established judicial 
interpretation of the discovery-invention distinction.  
 
In our view, the difficulties in this area arise more from loose 
examination of the patent criteria and allowance of broad claims 
than from allowing gene patenting per se. We do not support the 
step of prohibiting the patenting of all gene sequences, for the 
following reasons: 
 
• there is apparent consensus amongst the nations with 
active research and commercialisation programs in this 
area that patents should generally be allowed for 
inventions relating to DNA sequences;353 
• a significant number of patents have already been 
granted for a number of inventions that include DNA 
sequences in their claims, both in Australia and 
elsewhere; and 
• this sort of prohibition will not provide a complete 
solution to the problem. All it will do is to invite patent 
attorneys to use their skills in creative drafting to avoid 
the prohibition. This is precisely what has happened with 
the ordre public/morality exclusion, the methods of 
medical treatment exclusion and the plant and animal 
variety exclusions in Europe, none of which impose any 
                                                 
353 See, for example, the Joint Statement by United States President Clinton 
and United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair (March 14, 2000) available 
at: 
http://www.geneticalliance.org/geneticissues/clintonblair.html (accessed 5 
July 2002). 
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significant limitations on the types of patents being 
granted in Europe.   
 
 
EXCLUDING DIAGNOSTIC TESTS 
 
Article 27 of TRIPS does allow for the exclusion of methods of 
medical treatment. As previously discussed, there is no express 
exclusion in the Australian Patents Act 1990 (Cth) and the 
Federal Court has ruled against a case law exclusion.354 
Problems encountered (or feared) by diagnostic facilities may 
well justify amendment to the Patents Act 1990 to specifically 
exclude diagnostic methods. Whilst there may be some merit in 
creating this exclusion, further analysis must be undertaken to 
ascertain whether this would swing the access/innovation 
public interest balance too far in favour of access, with the 
consequence that the industry would be discouraged from 
developing new tests. In addition, it must be emphasised that 
the permissible ambit of the exclusion can only extend to 
methods of diagnosis, and not to the diagnostic tests 
themselves. 
 
 
PUBLIC INTEREST PROVISION 
 
Article 27 of TRIPS allows an exclusion where the exploitation 
of an invention would be contrary to public order or morality. 
Arguably, an exclusion of this nature could be incorporated into 
Australian legislation to allow the exclusion of patents where 
there are sound ethical reasons why patenting is not in the public 
interest, for example to ensure access to new developments in 
health care. In the alternative, the courts might read this 
provision into the general inconvenience exclusion incorporated 
into Australian patent law through the definition of invention in 
Schedule 1 of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth). 355 However, there are 
a number of problems with both of these options. Most 
importantly, the TRIPS provision is quite explicit in only 
allowing the exclusion where the exploitation of the invention 
                                                 
354 See Context Chapter 3. 
355 The relevant law in relation to each of these options is discussed in 
Context Chapter 3. 
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would be contrary to public order or morality. There is nothing 
to suggest that the development of diagnostic tests, drugs and 
devices is contrary to public order or morality. Taking all these 
considerations into account, it is doubtful that the inclusion of an 
explicit order public/morality exclusion in Australian patent law 
would provide a genuine solution to the problem of balancing 
access rights with patent rights.356 
 
 
INCREASING THE STRINGENCY OF 
PATENT INVENTION AND DISCLOSURE 
REQUIREMENTS 
 
It was noted in Context Chapter 3 that Australian patent law has 
recently undergone extensive reform, one of the results of which 
is that the novelty and inventive step criteria have been 
significantly tightened up.357 It is difficult to determine whether 
these reforms will alleviate concerns about lack of stringency in 
their application to biotechnology patent applications until a 
sufficient number of applications has been examined using the 
new criteria.  
 
We support the introduction of an industrial applicability or 
utility criterion in Australian law, requiring the Patent Office to 
adopt the examination practice of requiring specific, substantial 
and credible industrial applicability/utility.358 The IPCRC 
recommended that this could be achieved through examination 
of the usefulness requirement in section 18(1)(c) of the Patents 
Act 1990 (Cth). However, in our view an easier solution may be 
to amend section 18(1)(a), including after “manner of 
manufacture” the words “as prescribed”. Industrial 
applicability/utility requirements could then be prescribed in the 
Patent Regulations.  This is in line with United States practice, 
where utility requirements are prescribed in the form of 
guidelines. In the alternative, the Patent Office could be directed 
                                                 
356 Note that Australia already has a provision allowing for exclusions based 
on “general inconvenience”, which may allow exclusions based on public 
policy considerations. See discussion in Part 1 Chapter 3. Also see M. 
Forsyth ‘Biotechnology, Patents and Public Policy: A Proposal for Reform in 
Australia’ (2000) 11 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 202. 
357 Through the Patents Amendment Act 2001 (Cth). 
358 IPCRC, above n47 at 154.  
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to amend its Patent Manual to include this requirement in its 
instructions to patent examiners.359 However, we believe that a 
significant change of this nature should have some form of 
legislative backing. 
 
The views of interview respondents in this study strongly 
support the need for more stringent examination of 
biotechnology patent claims. There appeared to be a general 
view among respondents that excessively broad claims are being 
allowed by the Australian Patent Office. This could be improved 
by changes to the Patent Manual. However, again the most 
appropriate avenue may be to prescribe matters for 
consideration of section 40 criteria along the lines of the United 
States written description requirements. 
 
It may also be worthwhile to consider the option of making the 
opposition and revocation procedures more accessible. In its 
Report on competition, patent law and policy released in 
November 2003, the United States Federal Trade Commission 
highlighted the negative impact of poor quality (or 
“questionable”) patents on competition. The Commission 
concluded that better procedures need to be put in place to 
challenge the validity of these questionable patents, 
recommending that administrative processes should be set up for 
post grant review and opposition.360  The rationale for this 
conclusion is that: 
 
It is much cheaper for society to make detailed 
[patent] validity determinations in those few cases 
[in which patents are challenged] that to invest 
additional resources examining patents that will 
never be heard from again.361 
 
 
                                                 
359 http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/patents/manual/P_vol2.htm  
360 Federal Trade Commission, above n350. 
361 Ibid, Executive Summary Part II.C, quoting from M.A. Lemley, ‘Rational 
Ignorance at the Patent Office’ (2001) 95 Northwestern University Law 
Review 1495 at 1497. 
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EXEMPTIONS FROM INFRINGEMENT 
 
At present there are few recognised defences, or exemptions 
from infringement, in Australian patent law.  
 
We have already noted in Context Chapter 3 that a number of 
European countries have provisions in their patent law providing 
for exemption for private, non-commercial use of a patented 
invention and for work done “on” the invention (as opposed to 
work done “with” the invention).  
 
There may be some desirability in introducing these provisions 
in Australian patent law to provide greater clarity on the extent 
to which non-commercial research is protected from 
infringement actions. However, with regard to the first 
provision, it may be difficult to define precisely which activities 
are protected, since much of the biomedical research conducted 
in research institutions is likely to have commercial implications 
at some stage. Depending on the way that the provision is 
drafted, it could have as limited applicability as the United 
States case law exclusion post-Madey. This would seem to 
provide protection that is too narrow. On the other hand, it is 
difficult to see why research with a clear commercial focus 
should be exempt just because it is conducted in research 
institutions. The second provision could also be expressly 
included in Australian law, or could be read into existing law. 
Whilst this will provide greater certainty in respect of work done 
on patented inventions, it is unlikely to provide much assistance 
in relation to problems associated with use of those inventions. 
 
 
COMPULSORY LICENSING / 
GOVERNMENT USE PROVISIONS 
 
A compulsory licence is a court or administrative order 
requiring the patent holder to grant a licence to work the 
invention, in effect limiting the patent holder’s exclusive right to 
exploit the invention. Government use is self explanatory: use of 
the invention by the government for the purposes of the state. 
The justification for these provisions is that encouraging 
innovation is good for the economy. If a patent is granted and 
not exploited there is no innovation, and therefore no benefit 
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from the patent grant. Innovation is suppressed. In such 
circumstances, it is recognised that others should be allowed to 
exploit the invention. 
 
Article 31 of TRIPS allows for use without authorisation subject 
to certain limitations. The main restriction is that prior to such 
use, the proposed user must have made efforts to obtain 
authorisation from the right holder on reasonable commercial 
terms and conditions and such efforts have not been successful 
within a reasonable period of time.  This requirement may be 
waived in the following cases: 
 
• national emergency; or  
• other circumstances of extreme urgency; or  
• public non-commercial use.   
 
Article 31 provides a number of stringent imitations on 
compulsory licensing and government use. The circumstances in 
which compulsory licences are allowed vary from country to 
country. In the United States, the primary ground on which 
compulsory licences are issued is to remedy anti-competitive 
conduct. Developing countries are relying on Article 31 to 
enable domestic manufacture of cheap generic drugs in response 
to health crisis like HIV/AIDS. The Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health does make it clear that it is 
legitimate to use compulsory licensing-in response to public 
health crises.362 
 
Australia has provisions in the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) that allow 
a person to apply to court for a compulsory licence where “the 
reasonable requirements of the public have not been met” 
(sections 133 and 135).363 This provision has rarely, if ever, 
been used. There are a number of difficulties: attempts must first 
have been made to obtain a licence; an application has to be 
made to the Federal Court; there is no judicial guidance on what 
                                                 
362 WTO Doc WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2 (adopted 14 November 2001). Note 
also the subsequent agreement providing for suply of drugs to countries with 
little or no manufacturing capacity: TRIPS Council (2003) Implementation of 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health available at: 
http://www.wto.org/engish/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm (accessed 
26 September 2003). 
363 See also Results Chapter 4. 
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constitutes the reasonable requirements of the public; and 
reasonable remuneration has to be paid. Again, there is no 
judicial guidance on what amounts to reasonable remuneration.  
 
There are also provisions in the Patents Act allowing for 
exploitation of patents by the Crown or by a person authorised 
by the Crown, section 163, and also compulsory acquisition, 
section 171, and assignment, section 172. Exploitation by the 
Crown under section 163 is limited to exploitation “for the 
services of the Commonwealth or State” where exploitation is 
“necessary for the provision of those services”. Cases suggest 
that this provision covers such things as the use by a state rail 
authority of an invention for the construction of rail carriages364 
and the use by a local government authority of a meter relating 
to measurement of water supply.365 
 
The fact that the compulsory licensing provisions in the 
Australian legislation are not made use of suggests on the one 
hand that they are too difficult and/or costly. On the other hand, 
it could suggest that they are achieving a desired outcome, in 
that the availability of the compulsory licensing option actually 
encourages parties to negotiate a voluntary licence.  
 
Nevertheless, there is justification for reforming these 
provisions to make them more user-friendly. For example, 
applications could be made to an administrative body rather than 
to the Federal Court.366 The circumstances in which an 
application can be made could also be clarified, rather than 
having to rely on the argument that the reasonable requirements 
of the public have not been met. Although Article 31 of TRIPS 
                                                 
364 General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner of Railways (NSW) (1964) 
112 CLR 125. 
365 Stack v Brisbane City Council (1995) 32 IPR 69. 
366 Note that the IPCRC recommended that applications for compulsory 
licences should be made to the Australian Competition Tribunal, with rights 
of appeal to the Federal Court. Additional changes to the compulsory 
licensing provisions were also recommended, specifically repeal of section 
135 and the introduction of a competition test. See IPCRC, above n47 at 163. 
The Government accepted this recommendation in part, preferring to add a 
competition ground to the existing grounds, rather than to replace them. See 
IP Australia, Government Response to Intellectual Property and Competition 
Review Committee Recommendations (Canberra: Commonwealth of 
Australia; 2003). Available at: 
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/general/response1.pdf (accessed 13 
December 2003) (hereafter Government Response). 
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does lay down fairly stringent requirements for compulsory 
licensing provisions in domestic legislation, these are not 
insurmountable.  
 
One final issue that needs to be considered is that of 
dependency. Existing compulsory licensing provisions in the 
Australian legislation deal with situations of dependency, by 
allowing for the issue of a second compulsory licence when the 
invention for which the compulsory licence is to be issued 
cannot be worked without infringing another patent. A second 
compulsory licence may be granted when the invention for 
which the compulsory licence is sought “involves an important 
technical advance of considerable economic importance”.367  
However, as the provisions currently stand there is no express 
reference to applications for compulsory licensing on the part of 
the owner of a dependent patent. Presumably a dependent patent 
holder could only obtain a compulsory licence if the “reasonable 
requirements of the public” test is satisfied. Given that 
circumstances of dependency are likely to arise frequently in the 
area of biotechnology, there may be justification for amending 
the existing provisions, making special provision for issuance of 
compulsory licences to dependant patent holders where the 
invention covered by the dependant patent “involves an 
important technical advance of considerable economic 
significance”368 over the invention for which the compulsory 
licence is sought. 
  
 
FAIR USE AND AUTOMATIC/ 
STATUTORY LICENSING 
 
We are also of the view that the approach taken to use of 
materials in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) should be examined, 
with a view to considering the implementation of equivalent use 
strategies in patent law. In copyright law, the balance between 
owners and users of copyrighted material is acknowledged to a 
far greater degree than for patents and is far more prescribed. 
                                                 
367 Section 133(3B) Patents Act 1990. See also the discussion of the 
compulsory licensing provisions in Results Chapter 4. 
368 Adopting the current wording of section 133(3B) as it applies to 
applicants who seek compulsory licences to work dependent patents and 
primary patents. 
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Copyright users can rely on a number of fair dealing defences, 
particularly for research and study, criticism and review and 
reporting of news. In addition libraries, being the main users of 
copyright material have a number of specific defences that they 
can rely on. The United States has even broader fair use 
defences. There is some justification in crafting a patent 
research exemption in the same way as the copyright fair use 
defences. There could also be other fair dealings, for example in 
relation to the use of diagnostic tests.369 However, the difficulty 
with this proposition is that the patent holder would not be 
entitled to any fee for the use of their patented invention, which 
may not be fair. It may be more appropriate to think of this area 
in the same way as the educational and other automatic licensing 
provisions under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). Educational 
institutions have to pay remuneration for the use of copyright 
material, but they do not have to negotiate individual licences. 
Nor do they have to apply for compulsory licences. They merely 
fill out the appropriate remuneration form and pay the 
appropriate remuneration to approved collection agencies. There 
are generally standard rates for fees, and if there are disputes 
these are resolved by the Copyright Tribunal. 
 
In our view, there may be some attraction in creating a statutory 
licensing scheme for some types of biotechnology patents. The 
regime might require: 
 
• registration of patents by the owners, putting the onus on 
them to notify users that they have a patent and will 
pursue infringers; 
• payment of standard licence fees; 
• collection of fees by approved collecting agencies; 
• the creation of a Patent Tribunal (or extension of the 
Copyright Tribunal’s jurisdiction) to resolve disputes 
and determine fee structures. 
 
The validity of patents would, of course, remain open to 
challenge in the courts. The justification for this sort of 
regulation on the use of patents is that its primary purpose would 
                                                 
369 For a discussion on the applicability of fair use in United States patent law 
see M.A. O’Rourke ‘Towards a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law’ (2000) 
100 Columbia Law Review 1177. 
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be to reduce the time and cost expended in patent searches, 
tracking and pursuing infringers and negotiating licences. At the 
same time it may also lessen the risk of anti-competitive 
conduct, increase certainty and decrease individual licence fees 
but at the same time it would maintain an income stream from 
licence fees for the patent holder. We are not suggesting that 
such a scheme would be appropriate for licensing of all types of 
biotechnology patents. In most instances freedom of contract 
should be maintained. However, where broad access to patented 
products or processes is clearly in the public interest, this sort of 
regime may provide a suitable means of balancing access and 
incentive to innovate. Examples might include certain patented 
research tools and diagnostic tests.  
 
Clearly, detailed examinations would be required prior to the 
implementation of a new regime of this nature. There would 
have to be some certainty that such a regime would in fact 
improve access without adversely affecting the rights of patent 
holders.  
 
Similar provisions already exist in French patent legislation, in 
the form of ex officio licences or “licence d’office”. These are 
referred to as public authority deeds, which enable the central 
government to grant a patent licence when public health issues 
justify it. They contrast with compulsory licences, or “licence 
obigatoire”, which allow application to the Tribunal de Grande 
Instance when the patent holder has failed to use the patent.  
 
The remaining question is whether this is allowed by TRIPs. 
The compulsory licensing provisions in Article 31 may be too 
restrictive. However, Article 30 allows for limited exceptions to 
the patent holder’s exclusive patent rights provided that they do 
not unreasonably conflict with normal exploitation of the patent 
and do not unreasonably prejudice the interests of the patent 
holder. Arguably a statutory licensing scheme could fall within 
the concept of a limited exception, provided that it was indeed 
limited to particular matters. One obvious category would be the 
provision of medical services, particularly diagnostic services. 
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COLLECTIVE RIGHTS 
ORGANISATIONS 
 
Perhaps the most significant stumbling blocks in the smooth 
transfer of technology protected by patents that were 
consistently identified by participants in our research project 
were the difficulties, time and cost involved in searching for 
relevant patents on the one hand, and  searching for patent 
infringers on the other. Negotiating suitable access agreements 
was the other most consistently perceived hurdle.  
 
These issues are common to the medical and agricultural 
biotechnology industries. One of the solutions put forward to 
overcome anticommons and blocking patents issues is the 
establishment of collective rights organisations, which 
traditionally comprise cross-licensing arrangements of varying 
complexity, and patent pools. Collective rights organisations 
enable the consolidation of intellectual property rights by 
intellectual property holders so that negotiating contracts with 
numerous rights holders is streamlined and transaction costs are 
consequently reduced. A number of commentators have been 
strong advocates of allowing an industry to evolve to the point 
where these private arrangements are entered into, because they 
may be more tailored to particular industries and workable in 
practice than statutory schemes designed to deal with high 
transaction costs.370 At the same time, other commentators have 
been pessimistic about the likelihood of emergence of collective 
rights organisations within the biotechnology industry.371 
 
In the area of agricultural biotechnology, one of the solutions 
that has been proposed is the development of an intellectual 
                                                 
370 See particularly R. Merges, ‘Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual 
Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations’, (1996) 84 California 
Law Review 1293. See also United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
Patent Pools: A Solution to the Problem of Access in Biotechnology Patents? 
(2000) at 8. 
371 See, for example, Heller and Eisenberg, above n131; A. Rai, ‘Regulating 
Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science’ 
(1999) 94 Northwestern University Law Review.77 at 132-5; F.M. Scherer 
‘The Economics of Human Gene Patents’ (2002) 77 Academic Medicine, 
1348 at 1363. 
The Legal Landscape 
__________________________________________________ 
243 
property clearing house mechanism.372 According to Graff and 
Zilberman, the goal of a clearinghouse for agricultural 
biotechnologies would be to:  
 
…reduce transaction costs and other market 
failures that hinder the exchange of IP, creating 
pathways through the patent thicket and giving 
freedom-to-operate with proprietary 
biotechnologies.373 
 
These are precisely the issues that need to be dealt with in the 
Australian medical biotechnology industry. The question is 
whether or not a clearinghouse mechanism would be appropriate 
in this industry.  
 
Again the copyright industry provides a useful model for the 
establishment of a clearinghouse mechanism. Copyright 
collecting agencies like the Australian Performing Rights 
Association (for music), Copyright Agency Limited (for literary 
works) and Screenrights (for dramatic works) all work on the 
basis of collecting copyright fees on behalf of their members 
and distributing them based on statistical sampling techniques. 
The advantage of this system is that reasonable fees and ease of 
payment result in high compliance.  
 
This system would not be suitable for all types of biotechnology 
patents. In particular, drugs and other products that tend to be 
exclusively licensed would not fit within this model. However, it 
may be more readily transposed into other areas, particularly 
bioinformatics, gene sequences and other research tools that 
tend to be broadly licensed (or ideally should be). 
 
Graff and Zilberman highlight three basic services that a 
clearinghouse mechanism would have to provide: 
 
                                                 
372 See G. Graff and D. Zilberman ‘Towards an Intellectual Property 
Clearinghouse for Agricultural Biotechnology (2001) 3 Intellectual Property 
Strategy Today 1 (hereafter Graff and Zilberman); G. Graff, A. Bennett, B. 
Wright, and D. Zilberman ‘Intellectual Property Clearinghouse Mechanisms 
for Agriculture: Summary of an Industry, Academia, and International 
Development Round Table’ (2001) 3 Intellectual Property Strategy Today 15 
both available at: 
http://www.biodevelopments.org/ip/ (accessed 20 September 2003). 
373 Graff and Zilberman, ibid at 1. 
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• the capacity to identify all relevant intellectual property; 
• the establishment of a pricing scheme, terms of contract 
and royalty disbursement accounting system; and 
• an arbitration mechanism. 374 
 
Other important features include technology specificity, 
independence, neutrality and the capacity to monitor patent 
validity. In sum, these are the same sort of features that one 
would expect of a statutory licensing scheme. The advantage of 
this scheme is that it is likely to be more economically efficient 
and compliance by industry is likely to be higher.375 The 
advantage over patent pooling and cross-licensing is that the 
higher degree of independence makes it less susceptible to anti-
competitive practices.  
 
If a clearinghouse scheme and a statutory licensing scheme 
could be combined in some way to provide a co-regulatory 
regime, this would be in keeping with the current Federal 
Government’s approach to regulating other areas of new 
technology.376 We suggest that this option deserves closer 
scrutiny. In particular, a cost-benefit analysis will have to be 
undertaken, comparing existing costs to the industry, 
particularly the costs involved in patent searching and 
negotiating licences with the expense involved in setting up a 
clearing house system. 
 
 
THE ROLE OF COMPETITION LAW 
 
One final matter that needs to be considered is the extent to 
which patent exploitation may amount to anti-competitive 
conduct contrary to the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) 
(hereinafter ‘the TPA’). Part IV of the TPA contains a number 
of provisions dealing with restrictive trade practices, or anti-
                                                 
374 Ibid at 9. 
375 Ibid at 3-4. 
376 See, for example, the regimes for regulating Internet censorship through 
the Australian Broadcasting Authority and industry codes in Schedule 5 of 
the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth); private sector privacy through the 
National Privacy Principles and industry codes in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) 
and Internet gambling through the Australian Broadcasting Authority and 
industry codes in the Interactive Gambling Act 2001 (Cth). 
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competitive conduct. Probably the most relevant provisions for 
our purposes are: 
 
• section 45 which regulates collusive conduct between 
competitors (contracts, arrangements or understandings) 
which substantially lessens competition; 
• section 46 which prohibits a company with a substantial 
degree of market power from misusing that market 
power by eliminating or substantially damaging 
competitors or preventing the entry of potential 
competitors or deterring or preventing a party from 
engaging in competitive conduct; 
• section 47 which regulates exclusive dealing; 
• section 48 which prohibits resale price maintenance (the 
practice of stipulating the price at which a buyer must 
resell a product); 
• section 50 which regulates anti-competitive mergers. 
 
The grant of a patent in effect gives a patent holder a monopoly 
over the right to exploit an invention. The patent holder may 
exploit the invention themselves (or choose not to exploit the 
invention), or permit other parties to do so. Issues in respect of 
exploitation arise at the intersection of patent law and 
competition law. For example, where a patent holder, sole 
licensee or assignee chooses not to exploit a patent and not to 
allow any other party to exploit a patent, section 46 of the TPA 
has the potential to apply if it can be established that the patent 
holder, licensee or assignee is misusing its market power in a 
particular market. It is probably only in very rare circumstances 
that a refusal to license a patent will constitute a contravention 
of section 46,377 and the same applies to a complete failure to 
exploit a patent.  
 
Where a patent holder chooses to allow another party to exploit 
an invention through a licence arrangement, they are essentially 
                                                 
377 See J. Nielsen ‘Biotechnology Patent Licensing Agreements and Anti-
competitive Conduct’ Centre for Law and Genetics Symposium Regulating 
the New Frontiers: Legal Issues in Biotechnology, University of Tasmania 10 
December 2001. In: Centre for Law and Genetics Occasional Paper No 4 
(2002) 35 at 44-5; P. Tucker, ‘Refusal to Licence Intellectual Property Rights 
and Misuse of Market Power – Where is the Line in the Sand?’ (1999) 78 
Australian Intellectual Property Journal at 86; Radio Telefis Eirann and 
Independent Television Publications Ltd v Commission [1995] 4 CMLR 718. 
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giving rights to practice the monopoly granted by the patent. A 
licence is a contractual arrangement and as already pointed out 
is governed by principles of freedom of contract. Two related 
concerns may arise: firstly that the patent monopoly may 
effectively be extended through these post-grant contractual 
arrangements, and secondly that the patent holder may restrict 
the ability of the licensee to practice the invention as fully as the 
patent holder was entitled to practice it. For example, where 
patent holders require that licensees give them rights to future 
inventions developed using the licensed technology by including 
reach-through provisions in a licence agreement, this may have 
the effect of discouraging potential licensees from entering into 
an agreement. This may clearly have a detrimental effect on 
competition, and thus, competition law may be used to act as a 
control mechanism over the terms upon which patent licence 
agreements are entered into.  
 
There are probably limited instances where the use of particular 
terms in licence agreements flagrantly contravenes the 
provisions of Part IV. Section 51(3) of the TPA provides some 
protection to patent holders by exempting terms in patent licence 
agreements from a number of the Part IV provisions. However, 
a term will only be exempted to the extent that it ‘relates to’ the 
patented invention. A question may arise, for example, as to 
whether it provides protection where a term claims rights to a 
future invention, because the term may relate to a new invention 
rather than the original patented invention.378 Section 51(3) has 
been criticised because it fails to provide intellectual property 
holders with any certainty, and was the subject of detailed 
consideration in the IPCRC review.379 The Federal Government 
has indicated that it intends accepting the recommendations of 
the review committee in relation to section 51(3).380  
 
These changes are unlikely to clarify the circumstances in which 
section 51(3) operates to protect intellectual property holders 
from contravening Part IV, although a discussion of the specific 
                                                 
378 The Trade Practices Commission, the precursor to the ACCC indicated 
that it would adopt this position in a Background Paper dealing with 
intellectual property and competition law; Trade Practices Commission, The 
Application of the Trade Practices Act to Intellectual Property, Background 
Paper, (Canberra: AGPS, 1991).  
379 IPCRC, above n47. 
380 Government Response, above n366. 
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recommendations are outside the scope of this discussion. At 
present it is far from clear which terms are likely to be caught by 
section 51(3), and it is likely that the widespread use of 
potentially anti-competitive terms is commonplace. Policing the 
use of these terms would involve considerable resources, and 
there are a number of other reasons why monitoring the use of 
particular terms in licence agreements is difficult, not least of 
which is that many agreements are entered into on a confidential 
basis.381 Section 51(3), even in its amended form, will not be 
without its problems. It is questionable whether it will provide 
some more certainty to intellectual property holders to enable 
them to contract freely. An important concern is to avoid 
dampening both the incentive to innovate and the ability to enter 
into pro-competitive licence arrangements. 
 
Finally, collaborative arrangements, including patent pooling 
and cross-licensing arrangements,382 may give rise to anti-
competitive concerns. If a collaborative arrangement involves 
collusion and has the effect of substantially lessening 
competition, it may have the potential to be anti-competitive.383 
Similarly, companies entering into mergers should be wary of 
the effect of bundling their intellectual property rights. Although 
it is difficult to conceive of a situation where a merger between 
an upstream company or intermediate biotechnology company 
and a downstream or pharmaceutical company had the effect of 
dominating a particular market, each case should be individually 
assessed. The Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz (now Novartis) merger 
provides a case in point. When investigated by the United States 
antitrust authorities, the companies entered into a consent decree 
requiring them to broadly license their patents in the area of 
human gene therapy to ensure competition in the area.384  
 
The balance between patent law and competition law is a fine 
one, and difficult issues arise. This led the United States 
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission to hold an 
                                                 
381 See, for example, Nielsen, above n377 at 48-50. 
382 On this point see the United States Department of Justice and Federal 
Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual 
Property (1995). These Guidelines generally recognise the pro-competitive 
effects of cross-licensing arrangements in particular. 
383 See, for example, J. Barton ‘Antitrust Treatment of Oligopolies with 
Mutually Blocking Patent Portfolios’ (2002) 69 Antitrust Law Journal 851 at 
870. 
384 Ciba-Geigy Limited, 123 F.T.C. 842 (1997) 
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extended set of hearings on the interaction between intellectual 
property law and competition law.385 An examination of 
comments by many notable speakers at the hearings 
demonstrates the difficulties that arise from an application of 
competition law to intellectual property law. The issues are 
difficult in basic supply markets, but even more difficult in 
markets for intellectual property rights. Add a market in fairly 
early stages into the mix, and we must be even more wary of 
advocating wholesale legal change without carefully examining 
the effect this is likely to have on the operation of the market.  
 
The discussion on competition law issues contained in this 
Report is far from exhaustive, and it was not intended that the 
legal issues associated with applying competition law to 
intellectual property law be canvassed comprehensively. Our 
intention was to point to issues that may arise, and to point out 
that competition law ultimately aims to benefit consumers by 
increasing the availability of new products. Although 
competition law may have some role to play, we need to be 
wary of meddling too much with the fine balance that exists in 
the marketplace as enthusiasm to innovate may be dampened. 
An application of competition law should be considered on an 
individual basis rather than imposed wholesale, and considered 
as facilitating the continuing development of the industry. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Many of the options discussed above focus on regulation to 
assist users of technology. Others focus on changes to 
patentability or exclusions from patentability. Some of these 
require little legal change while others would require 
considerable work to implement. In these cases, a careful 
evaluation of each of these options would be crucial. In the next 
Chapter, we briefly reiterate our key findings before providing a 
                                                 
385For details see: 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/index.htm (accessed 10 December 2003). 
See also Federal Trade Commission, above n350. 
The Legal Landscape 
__________________________________________________ 
249 
brief overview of how consideration of these options should 
proceed.
 250 
 
OUTCOMES CHAPTER 2: 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this study we aimed to put the debate about the relationship 
between patenting and medical biotechnology into a practical context. 
We did this by asking participants in the research institutions, 
company and diagnostics sectors of the industry to respond to a series 
of questions about their own research, patents and technology transfer 
procedures as well as their dealings with other participants’ patents 
and technology transfer operations. We collected quantitative data in 
the form of written surveys and qualitative data in the form of semi-
structured interviews. 
 
We framed our analysis against the backdrop of the following 
matters: 
 
• heightened concerns in Australia about the impact of 
biotechnology patents, particularly in the research and 
diagnostics sectors; 
• empirical evidence of massive increases in patent activity; 
• inquiries into the need for law reform in this area, both in 
Australia and elsewhere; 
• theoretical discussions about the impact of biotechnology 
patents on innovation, particularly relating to restricted access 
and anticommons; and 
• other empirical studies on the impact of biotechnology patents 
on the various industry sectors in other jurisdictions. 
 
We envisage that this Report may be a useful policy tool for various 
government agencies, including, most notably, the ALRC in its 
current inquiry, Gene Patents and Human Health. Accordingly, 
material has already been provided to the ALRC during the course of 
writing this Report. The conclusions reached in this Report are 
presented in the form of findings rather than recommendations given 
that we did not have a specific reference to consider these issues. 
Nevertheless, in our view some of these findings could form the basis 
of more formal recommendations. Having concluded this study, we 
are in the process of undertaking further in-depth analysis of a 
number of the findings presented in this Report. 
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STUDY FINDINGS 
 
We presented our results in seven chapters and followed this with a 
brief discussion of options for law reform. A key finding is that a very 
delicate balance exists between the role played by patents in 
encouraging innovation and the potential for patents to impact 
negatively on research into, and the development of, new drugs, 
therapies and diagnostics. Whilst the existing system is not perfect, 
great care will need to be taken in modifying this system to ensure 
that the balance is not too greatly disturbed. To adopt the words of 
Fritz Machlup:  
 
If we did not have a patent system, it would be 
irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of 
its economic consequences, to recommend instituting 
one. But since we have had a patent system for a long 
time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our 
present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.386 
 
Our primary conclusion is that while there is some scope for legal 
intervention, given our findings that a fairly vibrant market is 
developing and operating in Australia, any reform would be at the 
margins. 
 
To justify this finding we briefly outline the key outcomes of each of 
our results chapters below. We attempt in this discussion to clarify the 
main issues for the industry, and identify the legal avenues that might 
be used to address these issues. 
 
1. Research and patent issues 
 
Australian research institutions continue to be rich sources of high 
quality research results many of which have great potential for 
commercialisation. Participants in the research sector accept that 
patenting is an essential component of the commercialisation process. 
Like company participants, they see that obtaining patents is 
necessary to ensure the flow of investment for research and 
development.  
 
                                                 
386 F. Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System (Washington: US 
Government Printing Service; 1958). 
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There are some concerns in all sectors of the industry about the 
breadth of some of the patents that were granted in the 1990s. 
However, issues surrounding broad patents are being resolved in 
some jurisdictions. In particular, the USPTO has narrowed the scope 
of acceptable claims and United States courts are striking down 
overly broad claims. There was some criticism of the Australian 
Patent Office by our respondents. In particular, it was felt that the 
Patent Office was allowing overly broad claims to be granted. The 
lack of biotechnology case law exacerbates this problem because the 
Patent Office is not being given any guidance by the courts as to 
biotechnology claims interpretation. Thus, while problems were 
identified by our respondents, the issues raised seemed to be related 
more to resources and application of existing patent law standards 
rather than the constitution of those standards.  
 
There are ongoing concerns about the impact of gene patents on 
downstream research. There are also some concerns about research 
tool patents, although in general they would seem to be of less in 
issue in Australia than in the United States. We suggest that this is 
because a number of the more controversial research tool patents have 
not been granted in Australia and there is little evidence of aggressive 
enforcement practices in relation to granted patents.  
 
The views expressed by our respondents on the value of particular 
types of patents depend very much on the position in the industry of 
the respondent. Respondents in downstream sectors object to 
upstream patents, whilst at the same time vigorously defending 
downstream patents. For respondents in the upstream sectors, 
however, upstream patents are essential to their economic viability.  
 
Whist we strongly agree that it is important to maintain the free flow 
of raw scientific data as much as possible, this should not be at the 
cost of unfair discrimination against certain industry sectors. The 
cascade of patents that flow from the upstream to the downstream 
sectors of the industry inevitably increase the price of end products, 
but this has to be balanced against the value of innovation at the 
upstream end of the industry and the importance of maintaining its 
economic viability. 
 
2. Transfer of technology 
  
Our results show that there is an extensive network of collaborations 
within the Australian industry, particularly between research 
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institutions and upstream or intermediate level companies. Overseas 
collaborations are particularly important. The mechanisms used to 
transfer technology within these collaborative arrangements are many 
and varied. Whilst assignment of patents from research institutions to 
companies was common in the past, there is now more reluctance to 
relinquish control over the future development of technology created 
in the research institution setting. 
 
Some participants in the Australian medical biotechnology industry 
are capable of bringing their own products to market, particularly in 
the device sector. However, for the most part, particularly in the drug 
discovery sector, participants need to be able to transfer their 
technology downstream. Indeed, in most cases there are a number of 
intermediate steps from the research sector to the market. Most 
Australian biotechnology companies fall into the upstream and 
intermediate sectors. As such, the challenge for the Australian 
industry is to make their technology attractive to downstream 
partners. In many cases this will require transfer of technology 
overseas. Adequate patent protection is just one of the challenges for 
the industry. At present there appears to be a “buyers’ market” in the 
Australian biotechnology industry. It is very difficult to find suitable 
downstream partners and negotiate a good deal, but not impossible.  
 
The issues facing the Australian industry to some extent mirror the 
industry elsewhere. Whilst the rates of technology transfer in 
Australia are encouraging, the process is not without its impediments. 
Ways need to be found for making the process as streamlined as 
possible.  
 
Statutory licensing and/or collective rights arrangements may assist 
some industry participants, particularly those seeking to license-out 
widely and non-exclusively. 
 
3. Issues for research institutions 
 
Scientists in research institutions in Australia are becoming more 
knowledgeable about intellectual property issues and research 
institutions are putting better strategies in place than was the case in 
the last decade. Some of the important features of good intellectual 
property strategies include: 
 
• open dialogue between scientists, technology transfer officers 
and patent attorneys; 
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• clean ownership through assignment to the institution 
(although Melbourne University has the strategy of vesting 
ownership in the inventor); 
• rapid review of publications to ensure that they do not 
compromise future intellectual property; and 
• clear profit sharing arrangements. 
 
Two issues raised by respondents that are of some concern are the 
quality of patent applications and valuing of technology. Some 
respondents reported that there is a tendency both to over-file and to 
over-value. However, as research institutions become more familiar 
with intellectual property management strategies it is likely that they 
will find ways to work around these problems. 
 
Many of these issues could be (and are being) addressed through the 
implementation of better management procedures. In the area of law 
reform, there is one particular matter that needs to be addressed. The 
scope of the current research exemption (if it exists at all) is far from 
clear. Although we would endorse clarification of this exemption, it 
may be that this would have little practical effect because much 
biomedical research has commercial implications at some stage. 
 
4. Restrictions on access 
 
It would be premature to conclude that exclusionary practices in 
relation to patented technology within the Australian biotechnology 
industry are having minimal effect on innovation. There was 
substantial evidence of exclusionary practices, but this to some extent 
is to be expected in any patent system. The question we sought to ask 
is whether exclusionary practices are having a negative impact on 
innovation and the development of the industry. 
 
Liberal licensing practices of some essential or foundational 
inventions are evident within the industry. Respondents reported 
having little difficulty gaining access to broadly applicable research 
tools and technologies. It was not quite so clear that this was the case 
with technology useful to produce two competing products. There 
were a number of scenarios where access to technology of this type 
appeared to have been restricted in some way, and if so it is possible 
that innovation may be impeded. Although we cannot conclude with 
any certainty how frequently this had occurred, we can state that there 
were certainly instances of it. Many respondents did, however, report 
being able to either access technology they needed, or redirect their 
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research efforts. But access was often gained at a cost. The imposition 
of terms claiming reach-through rights is commonplace, and 
numerous other terms that slow the pace of negotiations are 
frequently sought. Even when a negotiated outcome is reached, the 
pace of innovation may be slowed. The cost to the industry is 
significant, but the social cost may be greater. 
 
Some legal options do already exist to deal with these issues, 
particularly competition law and compulsory licensing. Further 
examination of statutory licensing and clearing house mechanisms, 
and of a research exemption may be warranted. 
 
5. Anticommons issues 
 
There is no doubt that the increasing complexity of the patent 
landscape is creating difficulties for the Australian medical 
biotechnology industry. In particular, searching obligations are 
onerous and expensive. However, as with other studies, our results 
suggest that for any particular research project the number of 
problematic patents is quite small, generally less than five. 
Nevertheless, we conclude that in part the reason for this is that if 
there is a higher level of encumbrance research will be redirected. We 
are unable to state with any level of precision the number of research 
projects that are abandoned because there are too many problematic 
patents in the area. However, we know that this problem does exist. 
 
Because of the difficulties encountered by the participants in the 
Australian industry in licensing-out their patents, they are very 
conscious about the need to keep their technology as attractive as 
possible to downstream partners. One of the critical factors is the 
need to avoid over-encumbrance. Participants in the Australian 
industry are conscious of royalty stacking and endeavour to keep this 
to a minimum in their licensing-in activities.  
 
Our respondents do not report significant problems associated with 
the enforcement of multiple research tool patents. In part this is 
because a number of the most aggressively enforced research tool 
patents do not exist in Australia, or, if they do exist, they do not 
appear to be enforced. However, we expect that these or other patents 
may well be enforced in the future. Hence it would be premature to 
say that the Australian industry is free from the rigors of research tool 
patent enforcement.  
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Legal options that may provide assistance in avoiding the undesirable 
effects of an anticommons include statutory licensing and collective 
rights arrangements, improved standards for granting patents and 
possibly a more clearly delineated research exemption. 
 
6. Impact on end users: the provision of diagnostic services 
 
Although biotechnology patents will clearly impact on all health care 
products, our analysis primarily focused on the issue of supply of 
diagnostic services. In contrast to a recent study in the United States, 
we found little evidence of enforcement of patents in this area, aside 
from Roche’s PCR patent. We understand that GTG’s junk DNA 
patent is now either being enforced against Australian diagnostic 
service providers, or is almost certain to be enforced in the near 
future. It may be possible to negotiate appropriate access rights in 
relation to this patent.  
 
Respondents in this area had far greater concerns abut the effect of 
patents on research than respondents from either of the other two 
sectors. Moreover, many had concerns about the impact of patents on 
the provision of diagnostic tests to end users. Because the owners of 
gene patents do have the capacity to exert significant influence on the 
provision of these services, we suggest that options for law reform 
should be scrutinised more closely in this area than in others. Many of 
the legal options already mentioned are relevant here. The option of 
exempting methods of diagnostic testing could also be further 
examined. 
 
7. Market solutions 
 
When faced with the knowledge that they might be infringing a 
patent, most of our respondents said that their first option would be to 
attempt to negotiate a licence. Whilst there is significant collaborative 
and licensing activity in the Australian biotechnology industry, there 
are also significant challenges, as noted above. One of the ways that 
this and other industries have dealt with these challenges is to 
establish cross-licensing arrangements. There is some evidence of 
cross-licensing in Australia. However, levels are fairly low and there 
is no evidence of any sort of systematic approach within particular 
industry sectors. One of the main ways to avoid patent infringement is 
to invent around patented technology. This is easier to do in some 
areas than in others. However, it is generally made more difficult 
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when broad patents are granted. Moreover, significant costs are 
involved in finding appropriate ways to invent around. 
 
One other option when a particular area of research is discovered to 
be infringing a patent is to ignore it. Many respondents in research 
institutions rely on the argument that their research is exempt. There 
is also some evidence of patents being ignored in the company sector. 
Similarly, in the diagnostics area, it appears that most patents are 
ignored. The risk from the individual perspective is that if caught the 
individual could face a large damages award and/or an injunction 
preventing them from continuing their research. From the broader 
social perspective, such actions could be seen to be undermining the 
social value of the patent system.  
 
Patent holders encounter serious difficulties in tracking infringers. In 
particular, infringement of research tool patents is notoriously 
difficult to detect. Even when infringement has been detected, 
enforcement is a high cost procedure and there is a risk that once 
infringement proceedings are initiated a counter claim could be made 
for revocation.  
 
We found some evidence to suggest that a practice-based research 
exemption exists in Australia. Companies are loathe to enforce their 
patents against researchers in research institutions both because it 
would creative a negative image against the company and also 
because research institutions lack the financial resources to make 
legal challenge worthwhile. However, this attitude may not continue 
into the future. 
 
Some industry participants will look at the option of challenging the 
validity of patents, either in pre-grant opposition proceedings or post-
grant revocation. However, the costs are significant and such 
challenges cannot be embarked upon lightly. One of the difficulties 
this presents in Australia is that because of the costs there are few 
challenges and because of this there is little in the way of precedent. 
This increases the risks associated with litigation in this area. One of 
the problems that this creates is that many patents that may be invalid 
are never challenged, emphasising the importance of granting good 
patents or of enabling challenges to questionable patents. Research 
institution patent holders in particular are unlikely to be able to take 
the step of challenging competitors’ patents because of the lack of 
resources and risk-averse strategies.  
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REFORM OPTIONS 
  
Although working solutions are being found by industry participants 
to many of the problems associated with biotechnology patents and 
technology transfer, some consideration of options for law reform is 
warranted. The legal solutions canvassed in this Report can be 
broadly categorised into solutions that regulate the grant of patents 
and solutions that regulate in some way the manner in which patents 
are used. We recommend the consideration of a number of options 
that fall into both categories, and we conclude by identifying these 
options below.  
 
Regulating the grant of patents 
 
We do not believe that wholesale reform of the patent granting 
requirements is desirable. At the same time, this does not preclude a 
consideration of refinement of patent standards and ways in which the 
grant of patents might be constrained. Indeed, many commentators 
have called for such a consideration. For example, two members of 
the NIH Working Group were of the view that the issues unearthed by 
that group arose primarily because of the ways in which patent 
standards were applied in biotechnology.387 Fine-tuning the patent 
system in biotechnology was considered by them to be a necessary 
exercise.  
 
Our results indicate that there is a need to improve examination 
practices in Australia to ensure that good quality patents are issued. 
This is particularly important because pre and post-grant challenges to 
validity do not occur routinely enough to strike out invalid patents or 
to provide guidance as to examination of other patents. We are of the 
view that a gene sequence exclusion or a ordre public/morality 
exclusion would not add a great deal and may in fact create 
uncertainty. However, the following legal options warrant further 
consideration: 
 
• the addition of an industrial applicability/utility requirement at 
the examination stage and crafting of more biotechnology-
specific guidelines for assessing the description criteria;  
• the possible exclusion of methods of diagnostic testing, which 
would require further analysis; and 
                                                 
387 See NIH above n37 at fn5 of that Report.  
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• the creation of an express research exemption. Basic and 
applied research would, however, have to be clearly 
distinguished.  
 
Regulating the use of patents 
 
In our view, some of the options outlined in this Report for regulating 
the use of patents deserve closer scrutiny. However we stress that any 
proposals for reform should be carefully evaluated before 
implementation to ensure that they benefit the industry as a whole and 
not a subset of the industry. 
 
As such, we make the following findings: 
 
• whilst there may be some desirability in relaxing the 
compulsory licensing procedures, this should not be at the cost 
of devaluing the patent grant;  
• mechanisms to assist with reducing the onerous demands of 
patent searching and tracking infringement need to be 
explored. We believe that it may be fruitful to look at co-
regulatory mechanisms for regulating the use of patents. In 
this regard, some of the mechanisms employed under the 
Australian copyright system may provide guidance. However, 
we recommend that such measures should not be adopted in 
any wholesale way across the industry. In most instances 
freedom of contract should prevail. We suggest that it may be 
appropriate to consider some of these measures in the areas of 
non-profit research, diagnostics and broadly applicable 
research tools; and 
• finally, any extension of the role of competition law should be 
evaluated very carefully. Competition law provides an 
existing vehicle for addressing some access issues, and exists 
as a remedy in the event of anti-competitive practices. It is, 
however, rarely utilised in relation to restricted access to 
intellectual property, and this suggests that there could be 
some difficulty promoting its use to address exclusionary 
licensing practices. Given the confidential nature of many 
transactions involving intellectual property, carving out a role 
for competition law and the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission may be difficult. 
 
Detailed consideration of these legal options represents the next step 
in analysis of the way forward for the Australian industry. Our 
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intention is to explore these issues using our findings as a basis for 
this detailed analysis. Each issue raises complex questions and 
implications for the industry. As such, we would urge caution in 
implementation of law reform so that the momentum of the industry 
can be sustained. 
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